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THE
L I F E
O F
SCIPIO AFRICANUS,
AND OF
EPAMINONDAS;
INTENDED AS A
SUPPLEMENT to PLUTARCH'S LIVES.

WITH
NOTES and OBSERVATIONS
ON THE
B A T T L E of Z A M A,
AND REMARKS, CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL,
ON THE PRINCIPAL BATTLES OF
E P A M I N O N D A S,
By M. DE FOLARD.

To which is prefixed,

A DISSERTATION ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
A GREAT MAN, AND AN ILLUSTRIOUS
OR EMINENT MAN;

By the Abbé De St. Pierre, of the French Academy.

Now first translated into English from the Original French of
the Abbé Seran de la Tour,

By the Rev. R. PARRY,
RECTOR of KEMERTON, GLOUCESTERSHIRE,

VOL. I.

L O N D O N.

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ADVERTISEMENT

To the READER.

IT is a question which may probably be asked, why I choose at this time to trouble the public with the translation of a book which made its first appearance in the world so long since as the year 1739, and not having been rendered into our language sooner, may fairly be presumed to be at this time utterly forgotten? In answer to which I will candidly own, Sir, that this was the chief inducement which led me to offer it to your perusal.

The book was put into my hands some years ago, and recommended to me by a friend whose judgment I respected, as a well written, entertaining, and instructing performance. I gave it an attentive reading, which afforded me much pleasure and satisfaction; and induced me to amuse myself and beguile many heavy hours in translating it.

The æra of history it takes in, is perhaps the most interesting of any in the annals of Greece and Rome; from which we derive almost our whole knowledge of antiquity: the persons who are the leading subjects of it, perhaps the two most extraordinary great men of the vast number those countries, so fertile in heroes, have produced.

The one by the force of immense talents and the inexhaustible resources of his own mind, without practice, without ex-

perience, became, even when advanced in years, the most able statesman, the most expert general. He did not barely redeem his country from the most abject state of dependance; but by the most glorious victories raised her to be not only the admiration, but the arbitress of Greece. And this he effected with men who were become a proverb for dulness and stupidity.

The other, when he had hardly arrived at the state of manhood, roused the spirits of his fellow-citizens, chased despair away, and saved Rome from being abandoned after the dreadful defeat at Cannæ; and by the most patriotic exertion of the most extensive abilities, and the most brilliant talents, in the space of fourteen years, attended with an uninterrupted series of successes, by conquering Hannibal at Zama, and by obliging the Carthaginians to surrender to the flames 500 ships of war, and acknowledge the superiority of the Romans, by becoming their tributaries, laid the foundation of that universal empire they soon after so gloriously attained to.

I will detain you no longer than only just to observe of what use this publication may possibly be to us.

If ever this country was in a situation which required the assistance of all the abilities in the nation, she is acknowledged by every party and description of men to be so at this present, permit me then to flatter myself that it is possible the example of Epaminondas may excite modest philosophic men to look into themselves, and exert talents to preserve her, which may have been hitherto unprofitable, only from having been unemployed; and charge me not with vanity and presumption, if I dare to hope that the young gentleman whom our patriot King has placed at the head of affairs may be even still farther encouraged by perusing the Life of Scipio, to bring forward all the power of those amazingly extensive abilities, acknowledged and admired by his most inveterate rivals, which heaven has endowed him with, successfully to restore his drooping country to that high rank among the nations to which the happy genius of his immortal father once raised her.

These,

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
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These, Sir, are the motives that induce me to put into your hands the following sheets. I have neither fame nor profit in view; but if the perusal of them should excite modest merit to step forth to the assistance of our country, or prevail with those whom providence has blessed with an extraordinary share of genius and abilities, to exert them with redoubled ardour and perseverance in her cause, I shall esteem myself amply repaid for any trouble I have had as the

TRANSLATOR:



THE



T H E
AUTHOR'S DEDICATION.

To the K I N G.

S I R E,

A KING who can adorn the Throne with the most amiable virtues in his person, the most useful to his people, as well as the most formidable to his proud, busy, and jealous neighbours, has only to take for his model the far greatest man in the whole Roman History, Scipio Africanus, the rival and conqueror of Hannibal. Heaven itself seems to have formed this particular hero to mark out to the rulers of this world the art of governing

governing with justice. Happy the people who are born under such Sovereigns ; happy the subjects to whom a studious attention to the accomplishments, the talents of illustrious persons, is one means of assuring their sovereign of their zeal and attachment. This is indeed the most flattering reward which the history I now venture to offer a second time to your Majesty, can possibly deserve.

I am,

With the most profound respect,

S I R E,

Your Majesty's

Most humble

And most faithful,

Servant and subject,

The Abbé Seran de la Tour.

THE
P R E F A C E.

ALL mankind are born with a strong desire to be happy; it is common to all conditions and to all nations: but though born with this invincible longing, which makes them naturally aim at happiness, yet all men are not born with that nice discernment, which will enable them to choose the true means that lead to it; the shade of ignorance, the powerful enchantment of the passions, and the force of prejudices, often blind and mislead them. They flatter themselves for a time, imagining they have found this invaluable treasure, which fills all the faculties of the soul; this is often but a pleasing reverie. A melancholy recovery out of this slumber convinces them of its vanity and insufficiency.

The only source of lasting happiness arises from the love, the study, and the practice of virtue; these alone spread through the heart that calm content, which vice always promises, but virtue alone is able to bestow; she only can form the good citizen, who enriches his country in times of peace; bold soldiers to defend it in war; great generals to command the one, and incorrupt magistrates who will render justice to the other; there is no man truly great, but he, who to superior talents joins eminent virtue; and, when great goodness happens to be joined with superior abilities, a permanent felicity will be the certain result of the charming union.

Man is sent into the world with all those dispositions, which are requisite to lead him happily to that point, which is the ultimate end of all his actions ; but to attain to it there is a necessity of culture, of discipline, and application. Nature gives us, (if I may be allowed the expression) the canvass of our good fortune ; it is intirely plain when we come out of her hands ; happy if we labour to embellish it with the acquisition of talents and virtue ; miserable if we suffer it to be disfigured by vices and the empire of our passions.

This truth being made sufficiently clear, is it not rendering mankind one of the greatest services to furnish them with the means of acquiring those talents and those virtues, which in distinguishing them will make them equally happy in themselves and useful to society ? And can there be a method more agreeable and more effectual, than the portraits of great men represented in the history of their lives, as it were in a picture ; the beauty of which every one is capable of admiring ?

If we can instruct men by the example of men like themselves, is not this a much shorter road than that of precepts, which lay down the rules of our duty indeed, but shew us not the application ? In painting in lively colours and well contrived shades, either patriotism, courage, disinterestedness, firmness, moderation, decorum, a passion for glory and a contempt of life, is not this communicating to mankind some of the best lessons of virtue ? Of the same species with the great men whom they admire, and made as capable of carrying the exertion of these same virtues to the utmost perfection, is it not natural to expect they should be induced by a noble emulation to attempt to rival them ? In seeing the affection, the esteem, the gratitude, which nations have testified for those celebrated men in return for the services they have received, may
not

not they attempt to attain to the same glorious rewards, by treading in those paths they have marked out to them? May they not hope to equal these worthies? I will venture to advance a step farther, and say, that they ought to aim at being even happier in rendering still greater services to society than their illustrious predecessors; the necessary increase of knowledge and science gives them many helps and means which the others knew nothing of. By the reflections which must naturally arise from reading their lives, by a steady, constant application to draw from thence principles of conduct, they will, in a manner, make *their* experience their own; they will reap benefit even from *their* defects, and gain instruction from the very errors *they* have sometimes fallen into. The lives of such great men, which may serve as a pattern, is a most excellent school of morals and politics to mankind; the relation between the motive and the action, is there always found reconciled to each other, and this works its effect with much more certainty than an indefinite precept, of which we have no application or example; more especially when the greatness of the recompence, which generally follows extraordinary actions, is well considered. If I dwell a little on the utility of the lives of great men, it is because many people seem not to lay that stress upon them which they truly deserve. As I have not undertaken to write that of Scipio Africanus, but with the advice of several respectable persons, I judged it incumbent on me, to give the public some account of their extensive views and designs in a project of a general collection of the lives of eminent men.

The late Abbe de St. Pierre, member of the French academy, in his political works, delivers himself thus on the subject.

“ There is no moral treatise which is read with such
 “ pleasure, and consequently with so much advantage, as
 “ the life of a great man well written ; we are led to the
 “ acquisition of his talents and virtues so much the more
 “ forcibly, as we see them more highly rewarded by pub-
 “ lic applause, the esteem of princes, and the admiration
 “ of all worthy men.” He wished much that an author
 could be found, industrious enough to undertake a work,
 which he was persuaded would be of the utmost utility,
 to which he himself has given the title of an Universal
 History, contained in the lives of great and illustrious
 men. The project is undoubtedly forbidding by its great
 extent ; but at the same time it might engage our atten-
 tion by its excellence, and by the advantages which would
 accrue from it to the public. A design worthy the heart
 of the Abbe de St. Pierre, a name as well known through-
 out the rest of Europe, as in France, his native country ;
 an author so eminent, that in all his works there are al-
 most as many sentiments as sentences.

Scarcely any man before him, laid out his whole study,
 life and fortune, in forming, in collecting, and perfecting
 schemes for the general good of mankind. It was not
 necessary to procure them a place in his works that they
 were evidently good ; it was sufficient with him, if they
 might possibly be so some time or other. He did not ex-
 amine their beauties either on the score of genius or no-
 velty ; the more simple and plain they were, the more he
 valued them. His zeal for the happiness of mankind was
 not confined to certain ranks and conditions, nor to
 any one particular country ; from one hemisphere to the
 other whatever was human engaged his attention, and
 found in him a brother full of tenderness. This justice
 is due to that illustrious society, of which he was so long
 a member, the French academy : as many tears were shed
 there

there at his death, as in his own family; and if *their* unanimous concern composes the panegyric of the individual who is the object of it, few members of the academy have received more praise and applause than he did. I hope I shall be excused for taking occasion here to bear this testimony to the memory of a man, to whom I was attached much more by the affections of the heart, than by ties of blood.

I shall insert at the close of this preface the discourse of this academician on the Distinction between a great Man, and a Man of an illustrious or shining Character. This discourse has already made its appearance before the life of Epaminondas; it was the Abbe de St. Peirre himself who first advised me to set off my work with this ornament; and that, which was most pleasing to me, was not either the name of the author or his quality as academician, but the plan, the object, and the solidity of this discourse, almost singular in its kind. The rules there laid down, mark out by real and clear distinctions the exact place in our esteem, and the proper degree of admiration, which we should allow to an illustrious man, and a great man. This is a species of introduction the most useful in reading the lives of heroes, such as was Scipio Africanus, whose history I have here attempted.

When I undertook this work, it was not without the advice of the Abbe de St. Pierre, and of many other persons, perhaps even more eminent for their taste than their writings.

I might say of the Life of this famous Roman, what Xenophon said of Cyrus, "As this great man ever appeared
"to me worthy of the highest admiration, I took a pleasure in endeavouring to find out his genius, what his
"education had been, what his exercises and occupations

“ were ; in short, by what methods this great prince had
“ made himself so worthy of praise.”

It was this natural curiosity which led me to examine in the most faithful records of antiquity, how or by what means Scipio could possibly attain, at so early an age, to the first employments in the Roman republic, gain so many victories over the most able generals, and put an end to the Punic war by the defeat of Hannibal, himself excepted, the greatest general of the age.

The fountains, from whence I have taken almost the whole of what I relate, are principally Polybius and Livy, whom I cite minutely. The life of Scipio was written by Plutarch, but the contempt of letters in the barbarous ages, or the negligence of those who cultivated them, have deprived us of that, as well as of many others. To repair in some sort this loss, I have been persuaded to attempt a history of Scipio. I cannot but express my surprise, that of so many eminent writers, who daily enrich the republic of letters with their works, not one has been tempted to give this history to the world. Scipio signalized his very youth by actions so shining, as would be sure to please in a simple recital only ; in a more advanced age he formed the greatest projects for the safety and glory of his country, and encountered in the execution of them with the greatest obstacles, only to overcome them by his courage and sagacity. The oration of Fabius in opposition to his proposal of carrying the war over into Africa ; the answer which Scipio made to engage the senate to enter into his design, whilst Hannibal was yet in Italy ; his interview with the same Hannibal on the eve of the battle of Zama, which was to determine the fate of Carthage ; the beauty, the dignity and sublimity of the thoughts and designs of this great man, which appear in every part of this discourse, have ever been regarded as master-strokes of
human

human genius. When these two famous rivals saw each other again some years after at the court of Antiochus, their meeting was not less extraordinary, and there are few works, in which the actions in general are more noble and more affecting; but undoubtedly there never was a commander so noble or so fortunate as Scipio: he spent almost all his life in opposing the most expert general, and the most formidable people; and the lustre of his laurels was never tarnished, I will not say by a defeat, but not even by the slightest check.

The History of Epaminondas, a celebrated captain of the Grecians, and at the same time an eminent philosopher, which I have added to that of Scipio, is of a similar kind. We do not here see Rome against Carthage, but Greece against Greece, as happy in the production of great men as that famous mistress of the world; who perhaps would never have been able to reduce the Grecians to her empire, had they then had such chiefs as Epaminondas at their head. On all occasions he overcame those renowned Spartans so boasted in history; he gave an irrecoverable blow to their power, leaving the glory of Thebes his native country at the highest pitch, which he had found sunk to the very lowest ebb of obscurity. Beauty, variety of events, grandeur of persons and actions; in a word, every thing that can please, compose the rich materials of this work. Is not this what ought to influence us chiefly in the choice of subjects? If History were rendered interesting, all the world would be eager to read. The instructions gained from reading them cost hardly any thing to the Readers; whilst their minds are agreeably engaged, their hearts are formed to virtue almost without their perceiving they were studying it.

The chief battles which Epaminondas fought, appeared to be conducted so skillfully to M. Folard, that he has

published a chart of them, with an explanation, which shews all the depth of genius of this celebrated Captain.

In this history, as well as in that of Scipio, I have borrowed light from that learned soldier in a science, with which I am utterly unacquainted. His remarks on the battle of Zama seemed so new and excellent to several persons of acknowledged taste, that they have advised me to subjoin them to the Life of Scipio. When I hinted it to M. Folard, his ready politeness prevented my request.

If I have not followed his opinion with regard to Hannibal, it is because I judged he was rather singular in what he advanced; and not being an adept in the science of war I should have been unable to maintain it against such, as might choose to attack it: the sole reason, which induced me not to depart from the judgment of the original authors. It may be remarked, in reading M. Rollin's Roman History, that in the whole of what he says of Scipio, the choice of facts, their order, their disposal, the matter in the quotations, the design in his portraits of Scipio and Hannibal, and in his reflections on the constitutions of the republics of Rome and Carthage, all are exactly the same as in this history: but it is clear that this likeness, or sameness, was not stolen from the writings of this eminent historian; since the history of Scipio made its first appearance in 1739, and M. Rollin's book did not come out till 1741.

M. Rollin, charmed with the elegant style of Polybius and Livy, has loaded the great events in the life of Scipio with long-winded quotations, and which he even still lengthens by giving the text of two historians on the same actions. Very competent judges have convinced me, that this prolixity, however pompous it may be, weakens the force of history. Those harangues, in which elegance vies with eloquence, appeared to them rather to belong to the historian,

historian, than to those great men in whose mouths they are put. A consul addressing himself to the senate, or a general to his council, would undoubtedly express himself with dignity; but conciseness is rather the characteristic of their eloquence, than pompous and flowing diction, which is the portion of the orator. These arguments determined me, in spite of the example of M. Rollin, not to insert in this edition any new quotations, at least such only as were full as short as they were necessary. It appeared to me much more useful to add an introduction, to inform the reader of the situation of affairs both at Rome and Carthage, at the time when Scipio came into the government.

I have but one reflection more to make. If we are to take our ideas of great men from the greatness of events, which have happened in their administration, and from the importance of the changes, which their example has produced in the morals or politics of their country, there are few histories, which will raise more curiosity than that of Scipio. To him is generally attributed the rise of urbanity or politeness among the Romans, the origin of their taste for propriety, and their love of letters; three essential points, which the first institutions of Rome despised, banished, and condemned before his time with the most obstinate rigour. I have been particularly attentive in this edition to unravel the causes and effects of this change. This object is perhaps the most interesting to a reader, who thinks and reflects.

A
DISCOURSE
ON THE
DISTINCTION
BETWEEN
A GREAT MAN and an ILLUSTRIOUS MAN,
BY THE

Abbe de St. Pierre, of the French Academy.

WE must not, like the vulgar, confound the idea of a powerful man with that of a great man; power often comes either by inheritance, or by different circumstances of fortune; or, to speak more properly, by the various outward arrangements of providence: but no one can become great but by the internal faculties of the soul and qualities of the heart, and by the extraordinary advantages they procure to society.

These are the Great Men who deserve our esteem, our praises, and our inward regard; for as to outward and apparent respect, it is the portion of men in power and high stations. Esteem belongs only to the person or man, outward respect is due to the place or rank.

Neither are we to confound the Great Man distinguished by his great talents, by his eminent virtues, and his extensive good deeds, with the Illustrious Man, who is indeed

deed distinguished by his great talents and utility to the public, but not by his great virtue. We will proceed in setting down more precisely this distinction, after observing what a great genius once said to me, That one of the properest places for this work would be to print it at the beginning of Plutarch's Lives of Illustrious Men.

SOLON, EPAMINONDAS, ALEXANDER.

Each nation has its great men ; we are naturally led to compare them together, and we hardly know how to determine which is the greatest, but by weighing them one against the other. It is then necessary to compare :

1st. The greatness of their talents for overcoming extraordinary difficulties.

2d. The greatness of the ambition of some, and of the zeal of others in procuring public good.

3d. The greatness of the advantages or benefits which they have procured to mankind in general, or to their fellow-subjects in particular.

Epaminondas appears to have been the greatest man among the Greek commanders. It is true indeed that the conquests of Alexander have made more noise, but the difficulties which he surmounted were, all circumstances considered, by no means so great as those which Epaminondas had to struggle with ; but it is by the greatness of the difficulties overcome that we are to estimate that of abilities, of courage, of perseverance.

Besides, that, which is decisive in comparing these two men, is, that Alexander's enterprises had no laudable motive ; he acted from ambition, to satisfy self-interest, to aggrandize himself, and merely to please himself ; a principle which can have nothing great in it. On the contrary, Epaminondas was chiefly excited to his enterprises by
the

the pleasure he felt in procuring safety, and other great advantages to his fellow citizens; most virtuous and consequently praise-worthy motives. Epaminondas also procured to his country many more advantages than Alexander did to his. Thus Epaminondas is a great man; and Alexander is no more than a warrior, a famed captain, a king of great repute amongst kings; in a word, he is no more than an illustrious man, and more so for his success than for the good he did his country.

A man may be allowed to have no other motive in his designs than self-interest, when there is nothing of injustice in them. He may also be actuated by his pleasures, provided there is nothing but what is honourable in them: to act purely for their own interest, to enlarge their fortunes, or increase their pleasures, is the common practice of the generality of men; but that, which is barely lawful, has nothing eminent, nothing virtuous in it; and of course has no claim to applause.

Exploits which are neither praise-worthy nor virtuous, because they have not the interest of others, or the public good for their motive, may yet sometimes have a seeming greatness from extraordinary successes, like those of Alexander. The numerous difficulties, which he surmounted, excite our admiration, and are proofs of either great courage or great abilities: thus the success of difficult undertakings may possibly render a man most illustrious, most famous; but without a virtuous principle it is impossible they should ever make him a great man.

Such is the rule of judging, which reason dictates to us. For what increase of happiness resulted from the conquests of Alexander either to the Macedonians, the Greek republics, or to mankind in general? Whosoever gets the better of great difficulties deserves to be admired, but is not always intitled to our esteem and applause. We admire

admire an excellent rope dancer, we look with astonishment on those superstitious Indians who keep fasts, and undergo bodily mortifications, which seem to be beyond the power of nature to bear ; they perform things extremely difficult, we admire the difficulty : but to this admiration we do not add a great regard for their persons, whereas we bestow our admiration, esteem and gratitude upon those, who like Epaminondas accomplish exploits, which are not only very difficult, but at the same time profitable to their country.

There is no one Grecian, who appears to me to be at all comparable to Epaminondas except Solon, who overcame vast difficulties by his great talents and constancy ; and who with motives perfectly virtuous did his country infinite services in gaining their assent to wise and salutary laws.

SCIPIO, CÆSAR, SYLLA.

Amongst the Romans Scipio, the conqueror of Hannibal, seems to me to surpass all the great men of his country. Cæsar surmounted none of those difficulties that Scipio did ; he never had an Hannibal to beat.

Cæsar enlarged the power of Rome ; but Scipio in doing the same thing saved the Romans from being slaves to the Carthaginians. He established the internal liberty of the Roman republic, and increased her power by the addition of all that of the republic of Carthage, the counterpoise to that of Rome.

With respect to Cæsar's motives, he laboured for his own particular advancement, and to augment his own power ; Scipio on the other hand in his undertakings aimed more at the glory and pleasure of doing great services to his country, in preserving to it all its liberty within,
and

and adding vastly to its power without, than he did at improving his own personal grandeur.

Cæsar in working for himself in the conquest of the Gauls rendered great services to the Romans; but when he availed himself of those forces and that authority, with which the Romans had intrusted him, to destroy the constitution of their government, and to make himself contrary to the most sacred oaths and the religious ties of good faith the tyrant of the republic, I no longer fix my eyes on the services he did his country; from thence forward I see nothing but his treason. He no longer appears to me any thing but a man of common ambition, a thief, renowned for his great abilities; who had the address to conceal his villainous intentions and wicked ambition under the appearance of honest and effectual services. It is so true, all things considered, that he was rather blameable than praise-worthy, that if he had fallen at Pharsalia, where he destroyed so many Romans, and if Pompey on being the conqueror had restored the senate to its ancient authority, and the people to their right of suffrage, as Sylla did, there is no doubt but Cicero, Hortensius, Cato, and other good citizens, would have put Cæsar vanquished and punished on the same footing as Cataline; with this difference indeed, if they perceived it, that if the republic had received greater services from Cæsar than from Cataline, it had likewise suffered infinitely greater mischiefs from him; so that his name would have come down to us as much execrated as the infamous name of Cataline, who on his part was by no means deficient in great talents, but who failed of success in his detestable plot. Cæsar's point was to make himself master of the government, and consequently to destroy the republic; he succeeded in this abominable undertaking: Cataline formed the like scheme, and failed in it. Will any one be so bold as to conclude,
that

that Cæsar from his success is a great man, while the other merely for want of it is an execrable villain? Who now does not see that they are in effect both of them compleat villains, who sacrificed unjustly, and without scruple, the greatest interest of the state to their own private advantages; and consequently that in fact they are both objects of public hate and abhorrence.

There is no reason to think that Cæsar made himself master of the republic solely for fear Pompey should be before hand with him; for if his chief motive had been the safety of the state, and advancement of the public good, ought not he on entering Rome victorious over the usurpation of Pompey, ought he not, I say, to have restored to his fellow-citizens the liberty of suffrage in the choice of magistrates and ministers of state? Ought he not to have re-established the sovereign authority in the republic? Ought he not, in concert with Cato and other honest men, to have regulated the method of scrutiny in elections, especially for the chief employs? Ought he not to have laboured with them also to secure for ever against future traitors the means of corruption of votes, which he himself had practised to attain to public employments? This was the only way to acquire the most fair and noble character, that a good man could desire. It was to him the only way to gain the title of a great man, to which he aspired; but he had not a soul discerning and just enough to know wherein the true greatness of man consisted; he had not a mind capable of perceiving with Cato what an essential quality to a great man it is to aim at the honour and pleasure of promoting, as much as possible, at his own expence the happiness and well-being of his country.

He set out wrong, and followed the example of the ordinary ambitious; who instead of sacrificing to real grandeur, which is unchangeable and immortal, sacrifice only

to great power which is but an outward grandeur, brilliant indeed but false and transitory.

I will suppose that in Cæsar's time there had been a wealthy merchant at Rome, who for the sake of enriching his family might have exposed himself to great perils, and surmounted vast obstacles, as well by his extraordinary understanding, as his courage, and who attained to an immense fortune, without doing the least injustice to any one. We should not rank him amongst the great men, no, nor even the illustrious men of the republic, because he had not procured any great advantages to his fellow-citizens, but to his own family only. Now this at least may be said of him, that he has never done any thing blameable in the conduct of his life; he has nothing to reproach himself with; he has done on a larger scale what the generality of tradesmen do on a smaller. He has made a large fortune, but without wronging either the state or individuals; whereas Cæsar in acquiring more property, more power than the merchant; overturned the government of his country, and by civil wars brought on it an infinity of heavy evils.

To judge of the real value of this grand conqueror and this great trader, we have only to consider, that no honest citizen would have wished the death of the merchant, whilst every good man would have been most heartily glad that Cæsar had never been born. Now can we possibly esteem him a great man, whom neither mankind in general, nor his country, nor above all, any good man would have regretted the loss of?

This will undoubtedly appear to be a most amazing paradox to all my readers who are prepossessed from their infancy in favor of Cæsar, and perhaps struck with his talents more than his virtues; but I am bold of speech when I argue in defence of justice, and the public good. If I

attack their rooted prejudices, they are at liberty to examine my principles or the consequences I deduce from them.

Sylla, the first usurper of the republic, possessed himself of the sovereign authority lest Marius, his enemy, another most dangerous man, should seize upon it; but after having lived during his dictatorship with the sentiments of a tyrant; after having like an ordinary man exercised his usurped power for several years, he conceived at last that he could never deserve the title of great, no, nor even illustrious, to which he had aspired from his infancy, unless he submitted himself to the fundamental laws of the state; he perceived that he should be looked upon only as an illustrious villain, so long as he remained, alone, in spite of the laws, possessed of the whole power of the republic; so he wisely determined to give up his sovereignty, and to restore to his countrymen the right of suffrage in filling the great employments. In short, to be a great man, he gave up great power, because it was acquired unjustly; he became a plain citizen, subject to the magistrates, protected by the laws, and died a great man.

C A T O.

I do not find amongst the Romans, except the later Cato, a man who can be put in competition with Scipio: a Roman historian has in very few words given us the highest idea of him: "Never, says he, did he vie with
 " the most ambitious, to attain by base and unjust ways to
 " the first post in the republic; but he constantly and
 " warmly contended, with the best citizens, who should
 " render, by innocent and virtuous means, most important
 " services to his country." Salust by this one passage clearly proves Cato's superior judgment, who in oppo-
 sition

tion to the prejudices of almost all the Romans, who then esteemed it the height of grandeur, to be the most powerful in the state, clearly saw that power is only a false grandeur, and that the reality of it exists only in the good use of power for the greatest public utility.

He shews us Cato, capable of thinking that the honour which great posts confer is incomparably less, than that of being esteemed the best, or even one of the best citizens.

He describes the ardour and courage of Cato in constantly studying virtue, that is to say the greatest public good; and from the same sketch of Salust we may observe the meanness, and, if I may use the expression, the vulgarity of the opinions, the sentiments and the motives of Cæsar and Pompey, who judging of the true greatness of man with as little discernment as the common herd preferred great power, that is the kind of grandeur which is annexed to great employments, to real grandeur and the high esteem of the judicious, which is not the consequence of great abilities, but of the application of them for the greatest benefit to the state. It is certain that virtue appears something more manly more fixed and respectable in Cato. Zeal for the public good seems in him yet a little warmer and steadier than even in Scipio; but to balance it, the great essential services which Scipio did his countrymen, are much more important than the whole of Cato's put together. Virtue in Scipio appears more lovely and amiable, so that, if I were to judge, the gentleness of my temper would, I think, lead me to decree in favour of Scipio.

DESCARTES.

We justly regard Descartes that famous philosopher of the last century, not only as the greatest natural philosopher and geometrician that had appeared in the world till his time; but we look upon him moreover as a *great man*; because by a prodigious extent of understanding, by a justness of reasoning, amazing in his time, by an indefatigable eagerness for labour, and by an invincible intenseness of thinking, he surmounted the greatest obstacles, to perfect, in mankind, their manner of reasoning, not only in physics, but also in all other parts of human science; it is not in his own discoveries in the sciences that we are most taken with him, it is for having put his followers in the way of making, incessantly, discoveries incomparably more useful; and to judge of the extent of his genius we need only give a little attention to the multitude of most exact and probable demonstrations, which *he has brought to light*, from the point where he found geometry and physics, to that where he left them. He has in 20 years given us more *probable propositions* about natural philosophy, than the disciples of Plato, of Aristotle, and Epicurus, have done in 2000.

The chief point is the great advantage he has procured to human reason; we reasoned hardly at all with any justice, that is to say by deductions or consequences, before Descartes; our *reasonings* had hardly any coherence between themselves, we saw in them hardly any thing of system, scarcely any thing compact, and of which the parts were connected one with another to form something solid.

There are diverse sorts of probabilities, there are also different degrees of the same kind. Now, before him,
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we confounded both the different species, as well as the different degrees of probability; and this confusion was an inexhaustible source of errors, of disputes, and false reasonings. We had a number of wits, who talked agreeably, but we had not one, who demonstrated solidly. The geometricians alone, knew what a demonstration was.

Before him the meaning of a demonstration, the meaning of *a just consequence*, that sense, which so much distinguishes one genius from another, this *scarce sense* was hardly made use of at all, except in geometry. We laid down, as principles, the most obscure propositions, the most equivocal, the most false; we also made false deductions from true principles, and we confounded moreover the convictions which we attain, as well from a habit of judging often and for a long time together, in the same manner, as from the number of those who supported our opinions, with the conviction which arises from evidence: thus the prepossessions of infancy, became principles so certain, that they seemed to us self-evident. We walked like blind men, and did not get one step forward on the right line in the road to truth; properly speaking we only went round in a circle, and our circle was likewise of very small diameter; add to all this that for want of a certain *ingenious sense*, necessary to enable us, of ourselves to discern the truth, we were reduced to quote one another and to cite even the ancients of 2000 years. We who assisted by their lights, and the improvement of 16 centuries, ought to have had, without comparison, more knowledge and science than those ancients who lived in the infancy of human reason; we were even become so weak, that to know how we ought to think on any subject, we no longer disputed about the point in question, but of what sentiment or opinion was Aristotle, or some other such person, liable, as well as ourselves, to ignorance, and error. We had

eyes and we saw not; he taught us to open our eyes and make use of them, and this we owe to him.

If he has left us few or no certain demonstrations, in physics; it is because in his time the subject was scarce capable of it; but he has pointed out to us the means of approaching daily to a higher degree of probability, and even of certainty; thus guided from henceforth by his method, we examine our ideas, and keep them distinct, to arrange them, and join them by argument; we define our terms more exactly, to avoid the equivocal; we are beginning to practise the method of forming arithmetical demonstrations in political questions, an object the most important of all the human sciences. He had a virtuous motive for his undertaking, he aimed neither at fortune nor rank; he coveted only the high glory of doing the greatest service to society in general by perfecting human reason. His motive then is most praise-worthy, we see clearly that his design was most noble, and that he must have surmounted, by his great courage and genius, the greatest difficulties, to be able to succeed in it—and he has succeeded. He has rendered to mankind in general a most essential service. Thus behold him without dispute a *great man*, and moreover, one of the *greatest men that ever lived*.

The common motives of those who are only
Illustrious or Eminent Men.

We see men every day, who exert the whole force of their genius, all their ardour, all their perseverance, to outstrip their equals in trifles, very difficult 'tis true, but in the main very little useful towards increasing the good of their country. It seems as if they aimed at disputing either the strength of their genius, or memory, in proving
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that they are able to surmount greater difficulties than their fellows, and may by that means come to be more distinguished ; but they never think of vieing in the usefulness of their exploits, which is a real defect of discernment, and a plain indication of a narrow mind ; for before we undertake to wrangle about quickness, or extent of genius, would it not be much better to contend first about discernment in the choice of the subject on which we mean to employ that penetration ? Would it not be best to begin by chusing a subject the most material towards augmenting the good of our countrymen, instead of fixing upon those which are incomparably less useful ?

Others with great talents have laboured without intermission with constant and invincible industry, and have really overcome surprising difficulties, but purely to make a *shining* fortune, and to be great, at least in the eyes of the vulgar, who estimate mens *greatness* only by the extent of their power, that is to say by the greatness of riches or places. But as these confined and vain men meanly keep within the bounds of their own particular interest, or that of their family, without any regard to the public good ; as their motive is neither great, praise-worthy, nor virtuous, it is not to be wondered at, that the intelligent part of mankind, should not look upon them as *great men*, whatever talents they may have been possessed of, how great success soever they may have had in attaining to the greatest fortunes, or the first posts in the state.

Good men will on the contrary look upon them as the most trifling geniuses, the most groveling and ordinary souls, who had no other motive than the grandeur of place, and not the acquisition of great qualities which might command a great place, and since those ordinary ambitious have foolishly forsaken that real glory, which springs from great talents, when they are usefully applied

to the public good, to run after vanity ; since they have failed of discernment in the most essential point in life, that is in the choice of the end which they ought to propose to themselves, it is by no means surprising that they are little esteemed. History presents to our view a crowd of these weak spirits and *common* men, who purchase foolishly honourable places and dignities, by a conduct the most dishonourable, that is by the most shameful flatteries, by the basest actions, by perfidies and the blackest calumnies. But who, for example, would give the least praise to Sejanus, or to Tigellius, the most absolute ministers of the greatest empire in the world ? They surmounted with much judgment and incredible *zeal*, immense difficulties, both in attaining to the post of chief and sole minister, and in maintaining themselves in it. I grant it, but was it from virtuous motives that they struggled ? And besides what extraordinary services did they render the empire when they were possessed of these great stations ?

We are naturally led to form comparisons between men of the same calling and profession, we then find those who by surmounting great difficulties, are become very excellent among their *fellows* ; they are *great* in their profession ; and we say a great poet, a great actor, a great orator, a great lawyer, a great physician, a great geometrician, a great astronomer, a great statuary, or a great architect, because in surmounting great difficulties by their labour and quickness of understanding, they are very much distinguished amongst those of the same profession.

But the appellation of *a great man* can properly belong only to great geniuses of two kinds of eminent and important professions.

The former of these professions regards the great increase of the happiness of mankind in general : such is the profession of speculative geniuses, attentive to perfecting,
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In any considerable degree, those parts of human knowledge, which are most conducive to the well being of the species, and the demonstration of any number of important truths, tending to promote the general good of society; happily for the public good, in the employment of these speculative men, who enquire after the most interesting truths, a great genius, with a deep and constant meditation, may far surpass his competitors, in the great benefits he is able to confer upon the world, and become a *great man*, without the assistance of high birth, great power, exalted reputation, vast revenues or public employments. The extent of his genius supplies the place of all these advantages.

The other illustrious and important profession, is that of practical, rather than speculative geniuses, employed more in action than thinking; this aims at increasing, not the happiness of mankind in general, but that of one particular nation. Such is the business and employment of kings, when they have like Henry the Great such a passion for glory, and such an aversion to idleness, as leads them to prefer from their earliest youth, the trouble and honour of ruling well, to the charms of indolence and an effeminate voluptuous life; and when they are blessed like him with that strength of mind, necessary to guide themselves with firmness and the helm of state with steadiness.

Such also is the business of ministers, of generals of armies, and chief magistrates of provinces; because, in these employments, they may by their great talents, and application, do an infinite number of daily services to their country.

Now as speculative geniuses such as Descartes may distinguish themselves from their equals, by the vast utility of their discoveries; so active geniuses employed in reducing to practice the truths demonstrated either by men

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of study or experience, may also greatly distinguish themselves, in their line, by the great advantages they procure to their country; kings among kings, ministers among ministers, generals among generals, and chief magistrates among chief magistrates; but if they are guided only by ordinary motives, how great so ever their talents and success may be, they can claim no higher title than that of eminent, whereas if their motives had been great and virtuous, they would have surpassed eminent men, and been justly intitled to be ranked among the *great*.

It is clear then that the chief men in these two kinds of professions, one speculative which has respect to the enlarging the happiness of mankind in general, the other practical which aims at improving the happiness of only one particular nation, can alone be intitled *great men*; the three following then, are the only conditions on which they can be stiled *great men*.

1st. A generous motive, or a great desire to promote the public good.

2d. Great difficulties surmounted, as well by the great constancy of a patient and resolute soul, as the great talents of a mind, discreet, enlarged and fruitful in expedients.

3d. Great advantages procured to mankind or to his country in particular.

In a word a *great man* must be a great benefactor, either to the world at large, by maxims or truths, most important in themselves, well demonstrated; or a great benefactor to some particular country either by a wise and virtuous conduct, through a long course of years, or by rules and establishments of vast moment, or by great advantages gained over its enemies.

These are what really constitute a *great man*.

The greater the advantage is, the more durable, the more extensive in its influence over a great number of families,

families, and the more difficult it is to be effected, so much the more is he, who confers it, to be distinguished among great men.

HENRY THE GREAT.

From hence we may see that if Henry the 4th King of France could have brought his famous, and sensible project, of establishing an universal and everlasting peace, between the Christian powers to bear, he would have procured the greatest possible good, not only to his own subjects, but moreover to all the nations of christendom, and even by a necessary consequence to all the rest of the world; a good which all families living and in future would have partaken of through all succeeding ages; a good which includes an exemption from the immense and innumerable evils, consequent on wars both foreign and domestic, a good that would have produced all the advantages which necessarily result from an universal and unalterable peace. If he had, I say, effected this wonderful scheme, he would without comparison, have been the *greatest man* that ever was or ever will be.

It is evident that such a benefit surpasses infinitely all the obligations the republick of Rome was under to Scipio, for Scipio procured great advantages for his own country only, and that at the expence of the neighbouring nations, and because he left not the means proper for preventing either foreign or civil wars. On the contrary, Henry the Great by his admirable project would have secured France his own country, for all succeeding ages, from all wars both foreign and domestic, but he would have preserved it without any expence to its neighbours, and would at the same time have saved all the families of all the other states,

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not only from the perils, but moreover from the inconceivable and actual evils of all possible wars. He would even have executed this glorious project in the first or second year of his forming it, had he known the truth of a proposition which I have since demonstrated in three volumes on the scheme of a perpetual peace, which is as follows; to make the establishment of the arbitration of Europe firm and lasting, it is by no means necessary that the Sovereignities of which the European Republic is to consist should be equal or nearly so, either in extent or power, as this Prince imagined; but it is enough that they should all remain in the state they are in at present, taking for a fixed immovable point the present possession, the execution of the last treaties, and the annihilation of all claims which tend to diminish this present possession, or to elude the last treaties.

The sovereigns would have received equivalents infinitely advantageous in lieu of all their reciprocal pretensions; and these equivalents, so considerable, would have been the immense advantages that would have resulted, from the impossibility of disturbing the general peace with success, from retrenching the greatest part of the expenses of war, and from the perpetual continuance of that peace.

This prince, however, will always be intitled to the honour of the most important invention, the most useful discovery which has appeared in the world for the good of mankind; and the effecting this work may possibly be reserved by Providence for the greatest of his successors.

CHARLES

CHARLES THE FIFTH.

Charles the Fifth by the numerous wars he waged, and the success he had in these undertakings, reigned with eclat. He surmounted also during his reign great difficulties, as well by his conduct as his courage; this has distinguished him greatly among Kings and Emperors, whether those that were before or those that came after him.

But as he had not always for the main end of his enterprizes, the desire of being a just and benevolent neighbour, as he was not always a strict observer of his engagements, as he did not constantly, after the example of Louis the XIIth aim at increasing the riches of his subjects, as a father is anxious to improve the fortunes of his children; but on the contrary frequently lessened their estates, by immense subsidies on purpose to increase his own by his conquests; this conqueror by confining his good offices to his greedy courtiers, at the expence of his people, as Kings too commonly do, has attained indeed by the great difficulties he surmounted, to the title of an illustrious King, to that of a great King among Kings his equals, of an illustrious Emperor or even a great Emperor with Emperors: he may justly be stiled Charles the Great; but between that and a great man, that is to say a great benefactor, either to mankind in general or to his own subjects in particular, there is an immense difference.

To the misfortune of his subjects and of his neighbours, he neither learned from his education nor the experience of his whole life, of what importance it was to him, towards attaining the title of a great man, constantly to act towards all the world with equity, and towards his subjects and neighbours with benevolence: we perceive
likewise

likewise in perusing his history, that he was but little zealous in promoting the good of his subjects, and that he would never have attempted to surmount so many and such great difficulties, had he had for his object and motive, only the honour of procuring many blessings for them, and establishing, during his reign, a perfect tranquillity throughout Europe.

GREAT RANK, GREAT QUALITIES.

Neither high rank nor great qualities make a great man; Emperors, Kings, ministers of state, may be very middling men, even rascals, and most despicable beings, with all their great power, witness Nero and Sejanus.

The sole rule by which we ought to estimate men, is ever,

First, A great desire for the public good and virtuous motives for their grand enterprizes.

Secondly, Great advantages accruing to the public from these grand enterprizes.

Thirdly, Great obstacles removed, in their undertakings, the proof of their superior talents, their great courage, and their extraordinary perseverance in the cause of virtue.

Without these three essential conditions, there may be much of pomp, and brilliancy in their successes; but there is nothing virtuous at the bottom, and consequently nothing praise-worthy. The multitude often mistake false stones for diamonds: but set Epaminondas near Alexander, Scipio near Cæsar, place Trajan near Charles the Fifth, bring the true and the false near each other, the people even the most dull and ignorant will soon discern the

the difference; they are soon undeceived, and will no more be drawn into the like error.

History has handed down to us the memory of generals and ministers of state, who have greatly distinguished themselves in their employments; they have done great services to their country, in overcoming great difficulties; but they sold their services as high as they could to their Prince, to their Country; they coveted high dignities, they aimed less at *honour* than *honours*. These are illustrious men I allow; but can they be ever esteemed great men, who have nothing but what is little, mean and vulgar in their principles?

True it is that great men in promoting the greatest public utility, cannot but have for their chief motive the pleasure arising from the glory of excelling their equals, whether for the general good of mankind or the happiness of their own particular country; for a man, however great, does not therefore cease to be a *man*; that is to say a being desirous of happiness, even as there is a necessity that man being a reasonable creature should covet pleasure; it is ever the hope of some kind of pleasure, or the fear of some pain, which is the main spring of all his actions.

These great men then seek the pleasure of being distinguished by increasing the happiness of others; they seek the pleasure of glory, but it is that of the most valuable kind, namely the glory, the most profitable to their country; they eagerly pursue that glory which produces the greatest advantages to society, and alone is worthy of our respect and admiration. Thus the more they covet the pleasure of true glory, and the most valuable distinction, the more worthy are they of our praise and esteem.

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It will be proper for our purpose to observe here, that a man may be eminent in any art or any profession without being an illustrious man upon the whole. Lully, for example was eminent in music; but we should never say, if we would speak with justice and precision, that he was an illustrious man; because he laboured only for his own fortune, and because his profession was not illustrious; that is to say it was not of the number of those wherein a man may render very important services to his country.

Plutarch with his most excellent good sense would never have been guilty of such a gross mistake as one of our writers has fallen into; who has most ridiculously placed among illustrious men, (*absolutely speaking*) and at the side of the late Mareschal Turenne, illustrious poets, astronomers, gardeners, and illustrious engravers, which were neither *great men*, nor yet illustrious men; they were only men whose professions were not the most useful to the public good, and who for the most part had no other motive for their undertaking, than the enlargement of their own fortunes.

The man who has no one great talent, but is just and charitable, does nevertheless distinguish himself amongst his equals, by his virtue; the instances of gratitude and esteem which he receives from those who know him, are to him a sort of resource of pleasures, which proceed from the valuable distinction of virtue. Now these pleasures are most sensibly felt by virtuous minds, but yet if there are no distinguished talents, it is impossible he should ever pass for an illustrious man.

There is then a great difference between a man eminent in a profession not illustrious, and an illustrious man upon the whole, that is to say in a profession illustrious and important to society.

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There is likewise a great difference between an illustrious man (upon the whole) and a *great man*, the great man will ever be illustrious, but the illustrious man is by no means always a *great man*; and if we duly attend we shall find that the judges of all times and nations have never formed any other idea of the difference or distinction between a great man and an illustrious man; it has been handed down to us from age to age, even to this very day.



A N
I N T R O D U C T I O N
T O T H E
L I F E O F S C I P I O.

THAT famous and terrible war which Publius Cornelius Scipio terminated to the advantage and glory of his country, was the second which the Romans waged against the Carthaginians. After twenty years of uninterrupted combats, the courage of Rome in a state of poverty, at last conquered the effeminate opulence of Carthage. Sicily, the original seat and subject of dispute between the two republics, was ceded to the conqueror; by the treaty which put an end to the war,* the greater part of the isles in the Mediterranean passed from the dominion of Carthage under that of the Romans. Another article of this treaty of peace settled the partition of Spain between the two nations. All which lay on this side of the Ebrus was declared to appertain to the Romans, and what was on the other side was suffered to remain to the Carthaginians. In short, to prevent as much as possible a second rupture, all the allies of the two republics, were comprehended in the general pacification. It was agreed be-

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* An. R. 512. Ante C. 240.

tween them, that they could not be attacked without a breach of this treaty. A general knowledge of these chief articles may suffice for the understanding of this history.

Although the remarkable events which happened prior to Scipio's coming to the command, are not absolutely essential to his history, the reader ought however to be informed of the situation of the affairs of the republics, both of Rome and Carthage, which was the natural consequence of these events. It is with this view that I am now about to relate briefly what passed, that was considerable or worthy notice, in Italy, Sicily, and Spain, where the Romans and Carthaginians were engaged in so obstinate a war, that the absolute subjection of one of them must necessarily follow.

The resentment and ill-will of Carthage, plundered of almost all her possessions in Italy, and the Mediterranean, was kept within bounds only by the necessity of smothering it. The sequel shews that there were only two things wanting to make it break out; an able general to determine them to it, and a treasury which would put them in a condition to carry on a war with vigour. A three and twenty years peace procured the latter resource; the other, which the superiority of the Romans in the art of war, gave them less reason to hope for, presented itself in Hannibal --- just in the prime of life, educated in the camp of Amilcar Barcas, his father, inheriting his military talents, and his hatred for Rome, bold, indefatigable, enterprising, the idol of the soldiers, and all the youth of Carthage. That republic never had so great a subject of hope, or so fair a prospect of success. Had he had the integrity of Rome, Rome herself might have grudged him to her

her enemies. But whether it was the misfortune of his education, or the effect of his constitution, this man *singular* for his talents, and *his virtues*, shewed he was not less so for his vices and defects. It appears from the portrait historians have given of him, that he knew no laws but those he had no interest in violating, no faith but that which he could not break without fear, no gods or religion which did not second his views, for ever governed by his ambition and his aversion to Rome; from these two principles all his enterprizes resulted, to this end tended all his successes.

Rome and Carthage took advantage of the peace, to attack each their several enemies. The Carthaginians were desirous of subjecting the whole of that part of Spain which was given up to them. We may judge how difficult an enterprize it was, since the people they attacked marched an army of near an hundred thousand men against Hannibal. The conduct of this war was given to his father Amilcar: he carried it on with various success. This general, who hated the very name of Roman, saw with indignation the shameful treaty which ill fortune had dictated to his republic: it was the effect of the Roman victories, and he flattered himself that he should, one day or other, gain such over them, as would wipe out the dishonour. He took his son into his camp in his most tender infancy; he was but nine years old, when he gave those remarkable proofs of hatred to the Romans so well known to all the world. This was the first dawn of the reputation of this young Carthaginian; he learnt war under his father, whom he lost after he had been nine years in the army. Whether by an order of government, or on account of his domestic affairs,

he returned to Carthage as soon as he had paid him the last offices of duty and affection.

Asdrubal, supported by the credit of Amilcar's party, whose daughter he had married, obtained the command in Spain,* in spite of that of Hanno. These two factions formed, within the state, and even in the very senate of Carthage, two parties in perpetual opposition to each other. That of Hanno was entirely for peace; the other of Amilcar called out for war, cost what it would: a misunderstanding dangerous to the people they governed, and still more favourable to those they wished to attack. Asdrubal having applied to the senate of Carthage, to give some employment in his army to his brother in law, Hanno openly opposed it. He said, that all the haughtiness and ambition of Amilcar would be revived in his son; that they could not suffer him to join an army intirely possessed of the same spirit, without exposing the republic to the dangerous consequences of the rashness of his youth. His steady opposition served only to heighten the triumph of the party, called the Barcinian, from the surname of Amilcar; Hannibal carried it without a division, and instantly set off for Spain.

All that the Carthaginian army expected from the son of Amilcar, it met with in Hannibal. In a short time he surpassed the hopes he had given them: a soldier, officer, and general, he knew how to accommodate himself to whatever circumstances required. Always the first in the army, whether by courage in engagements, by his attention to discipline in camps, or lastly, by his knowledge and the extent of his views: all the army esteemed him as the first man of the republic

* An. R. 528. Ante C. 222.

pulic in whatever station he filled. Three years were enough to diffuse this impression of his abilities through the minds of all; he had passed only this short space of time with his brother Asdrubal when he lost him.

That which might perhaps have consoled Hannibal, had he not been so young, the hopes of succeeding Asdrubal in the command in Spain, was to him a new subject of grief. Hardly at the age of twenty-three, could he dare even to propose himself for his successor? The army of its own accord gave him the dispensation which was necessary for this purpose, he was unanimously named general, and he demanded it of the Senate of Carthage by threats rather than intreaties.

We may imagine what efforts Hanno made to counteract the efforts of a cabal, the consequences of which must certainly be very dangerous; but the suffrages were not by any means *given* at Carthage, they were openly sold. The Barcinian faction bribed all that they could not seduce, and the choice of the army was approved and confirmed.

The new general began by subjecting in Spain all that he had any suspicions of,* and who made the least resistance. Though inferior, he was every where conqueror, and gained the affections of his soldiers and allies, by gentleness, by confidence, by plunder, and above all by his talents for war, which they were as yet acquainted with only by their successes. Precautions necessary for the secret designs he had, of carrying the war into Italy, so soon as he should think himself in a condition to do it. Difficult as this enterprize might be, it was no more than what that Roman

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general,

* An. R. 531. Ante C. 221.

general, as famous by his death as his victories, the *great* Regulus, had effected some time before in Africa, and almost upon Carthage herself. We may presume that if this great man had not set him the example of this diversion, he would have given it to the Romans.

The firm peace which seemed to reign* between the two republics was the greatest obstacle which Hannibal met with in the execution of his project; the repeated complaints he caused to be spread at Carthage, against the allies of Rome, prepared mens minds for an open rupture. He alone knew his own secret. It was not with the Roman allies, but with Rome herself, that he was eager to engage. These complaints had so great an effect that he had leave given him to make reprisals, if he thought proper. No sooner had he received this permission than he marched against the Saguntines and laid siege to their capital; it was pushed on and supported with the greatest ardour. The Romans informed of this act of hostility, sent a deputation to Hannibal, to demand of him the cause. He took care under several pretences to avoid seeing them; they went to Carthage, obtained an audience, made their complaints, and were unable to recover minds already prepossessed. In the very senate-house of this republic, the two nations made a new declaration of war. The Saguntines suffered greatly from the delay occasioned to the succours they had demanded of the Romans. But whatever some historians may say, would it have been consistent with the principles of equity, for Rome to revenge herself on a whole nation for an offence which she attributed only to the restlessness
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* An. R. 534. Ante C. 218.

of their general? Carthage was accustomed to falsehood and injustice. A strictness of good faith the most pure, formed as yet the character of the Romans. In a word, is it of a subject that a state demands a reason for outrages or affronts which it has received? Is it not to the state that it applies? And if it takes upon itself to punish by its own authority the subject it has cause of complaint against, is it not wanting in due respect to the state which alone has the right of giving satisfaction? It is true that the time this negotiation took up occasioned the capture and ruin of Saguntum, but should not this evil be rather imputed to the injustice of Carthage than the prudence of Rome, who is charged, perhaps hastily on this occasion, with sluggishness and cowardice in her resolves?

Be this as it will, the cruelty which Hannibal exercised towards the Saguntines and their city, impressed the greatest dread of his name on all his enemies. It was his intention; he was willing to make himself feared by them, as well as he knew how to make himself beloved by his allies. This cruelty contributed, perhaps more, to the almost general defection of the Roman allies in Spain, than all the artifices he employed to draw them over to his party.

Hannibal secure of Spain by his negotiations as well as success, discovered to his army the design he had formed of passing over into Italy.* A genius so enlarged as his, sees objects in every light possible; before his departure he provided for the security of Spain and of Africa, by leaving troops in the country and fleets in the ports, able to resist the Romans. Having taken these measures,

* An. R. 535. Ante C. 218.

measures, he marched with haste over Spain,* the Pyrenees, the Gauls, and the Alps, ever meeting with but never stopped by difficulties, all of which he surmounted because he had foreseen them. He never indulged himself in conquering the several people who attempted to stop him; but when he found it impossible to gain them over, apparently more affected with their defeat than themselves, he let them see, in him, only a conqueror more desirous of contracting a firm alliance with them, than they could be themselves. If he lost any men these losses were repaired by recruits. His army in proportion as it advanced became more numerous, more rich and better disciplined. Dangers, fatigue, hardships of the seasons, he encouraged all to bear by his own example. This march, one of the most difficult as well as the most fortunate, was four hundred leagues. It took up Hannibal five months to effect it; he finished it in the most rigorous climate of Gaul, that of the Alps, in the very depth of winter: the want of subsistence, of all sort of supplies, even of roads through which he might pass over the innumerable precipices he found among those dreadful rocks, did not prevent his getting beyond them. At last he arrived in the neighbourhood of Turin.

Rome had taken her measures for opposing the Carthaginians. Sempronius, one of the consuls, had departed for Sicily at the head of the legions and allies. Publius Cornelius Scipio, the father of our hero, was sent to the borders of Italy to oppose Hannibal's entrance; pretors or proconsuls were also sent into Spain. It is to give the reader in a few words the state of the affairs
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of the Romans in these three particulars, that we are about to relate what passed before Scipio the younger was charged with the conduct of this war. The first steps which Hannibal took beyond the Alps were marked with the blood of the people who attempted to oppose the inundation of this torrent. The inhabitants of the city of Turin refused him a passage; he opened himself one sword in hand, demolished their town, and put all he met to the sword.

Scipio was meditating to march against Hannibal, when he was informed that he was coming towards him, with incredible haste. The two armies met each other on the banks of the *Ticinus* a little river of Lombardy. The cavalry began the engagement with some skirmishings in this first attack which Hannibal made upon the Romans, presently they charged all in a body, and the consul not considering the advantage Hannibal had over him with those sort of troops, was wholly taken up in sustaining and resisting the shock: all his efforts were in vain, the cohorts in disorder gave ground on all sides. The consul, to encourage them, threw himself into the midst of the enemy, accompanied only with an handful of horse; he was immediately surrounded, and received a dangerous wound. We shall see in the history of Scipio that noble action by which he began to establish his reputation on the day of this battle, of which he repaired the loss.

The Senate being informed of Scipio's defeat, sent orders to Sempronius his colleague to join him with a part of the troops which he commanded in Sicily. He arrived a short time afterwards in his camp, when he found him advantageously intrenched on the banks of the Trebia. Sempronius, a man vain, self-sufficient, prepos-
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fest of his own superiority over Hannibal, as well as that of his troops over those of the Carthaginians, resolved to give battle as soon as possible. Amongst many reasons which Scipio made use of to combat this resolution, that of the recovery of his health, which owing to the consequences of his wound was still so very bad that he kept his tent, was what he chiefly insisted on. His colleague would not give way; he wanted to conquer, he said: to that end they had only to engage.--- Engage he did, and gave proof of his want of capacity in the whole art of war; he entirely lost the battle and 26,000 men, as well Romans as allies of the republic.

Caius Flaminius and Publius Servillius Geminus, who succeeded the two consuls, were but very moderate soldiers and bad generals. Flaminius raised to the consulship, thought himself the only senator whom the republic should have placed there, in circumstances which began to be difficult. He had all the haughtiness of great men without one of their virtues to balance it. Hannibal knew him, flattered his defects, feigned to be afraid of him, and drew as great an advantage from his inability for war and command, as from his own great talents for both. He braved Flaminius, he teized him, insulted his posts, and piqued him at last so sensibly that he drew him out to follow him into a most dangerous defile. Flaminius was the only person who could not perceive the risk he run in entering it, he persisted in following Hannibal, who pretended to retreat. Any other general would at least have reconnoitred the eminences which commanded this defile, as well to know the disposition of the enemy as to possess himself of such important posts. Flaminius hurried on by his impetuosity, thought of
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nothing but going forward; hardly was he caught in the snare, when the Carthaginian ambushes on each side, and the body of Hannibal's army, which was formed at the opening of the defile, charged him on all quarters, he was totally defeated, lost 15,000 men on the field of battle, and 6000 who were made prisoners--- he perished there also himself, a punishment too light, if a heavier one could be had, for those haughty and ignorant generals, who sacrifice the best blood of a nation to their inconsiderate rashness.

If we reflect a little on these two engagements we shall easily perceive, that the Romans were not beat so much by Hannibal as by their own generals; it is clear that their victories were effects of the ignorance of the consuls much more than the fruits of his capacity. I by no means except from the faults of the consuls, that which Publius Scipio committed, in engaging intirely with the Roman cavalry against the Carthaginian, the most perfect of its time.

So many disgraces opened the eyes of the Senate, to the necessity of giving the republic a chief capable of repairing them. They found him in the famous Fabius, who was at first elected pro-dictator, because the consuls, who alone could name one were absent, and afterwards dictator. This new general pursued a conduct diametrically opposite to that of his predecessors. Resolved constantly to follow Hannibal, to cut off his supplies and provisions, and prevent his extending himself, he at the same time determined to avoid as much as he possibly could coming to any general action: he justly thought that to retard an enemy, who wishes and who ought to go forward, is to conquer him.

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The conduct of the dictator presently convinced Hannibal, that Rome was not without generals. Without any communication with his friends, almost destitute of subsistence, in the heart of the country which his army occupied, he at last suddenly decamped. The treachery of a guide, who did not well understand his orders, drew him into almost as bad a scrape as that in which Flaminius perished. Fabius, who constantly followed him, was already persuaded that he could not extricate himself more happily. Skill was of no use in this circumstance; Hannibal had recourse to that Carthaginian finesse which he was possessed of in an eminent degree; a stratagem too well known to require repetition snatched him out of the hands of the Roman general, at the very instant when in all appearance it was impossible for him to escape. The fault of a guard who suffered themselves to be improperly alarmed, and who deserted their posts, was imputed to Fabius.

They murmured at his inactivity, they accused him of want of spirit, they even went so far as to suspect him of an understanding with Hannibal, whose great interest it was to encourage these suspicions, that they might take the command from him. Fabius informed of the talk at Rome, and the conversation of his army, made not the least alteration in his conduct, his desire was to save his fellow citizens, he was little anxious to please them.

The people had given Fabius for lieutenant of cavalry, Minutius, contrary to the custom which left the dictator at liberty to name his own; the complaints of the soldiers, those of all Rome, some successes in light rencounters, and above all the desire of being distinguished, made him wish to come to action, contrary to the sentiments of his

his general. He solicited at Rome a share in the command, and obtained it chiefly at the instance of Terentius Varro, a vile Plebian, whose eloquence, which was never employed but in support of his equals, against those who were most respectable in the senate, had raised him even to the rank of senator.

Minutius no sooner found himself possesst of the chief command, than he fell into a snare laid for him by Hannibal; as desirous of engaging the lieutenant as he was unwilling to face the general. His army would have been lost but for the generosity of the dictator, who marching to his assistance rescued him from the danger into which his imprudence had hurried him. Minutius was rash and presumptuous, but he wanted only the school of adversity to convert his defects into virtues. He effectually knew himself, did justice to the superior abilities of Fabius, openly called him his father and deliverer, obliged his army to give him the same title, and voluntarily surrendered to him the command which he might have kept.

Hannibal, without fortresses, without succours from his republic, in perpetual distrust of his new allies in Italy, was not master of his own conduct; it was necessary for him to fight and to conquer, without this he must soon be in want of every thing; he was likewise not without some uneasiness concerning the fidelity of his army, whose daring murmurs were often pointed even at himself.

The Roman Senate was determined to crush him by force; with this view they raised one half more than their usual number of troops. If these preparations were alarming to Hannibal, the choice
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which the people * made of Terentius Varro to be one of the consuls of this year put him again in spirits. The Senate who tried every thing to prevent his election, succeeded not in any of their oppositions. A most terrible inconvenience, resulting from the authority of a restless people; never were they guilty of a greater abuse of that which they had usurped than on this occasion. Paulus Emilius, a citizen, senator and general, was named colleague to the new consul; experience soon convinced him that Rome had more to dread from Varro than even the enemy himself; he opposed him with gentleness, with argument, with the success of Fabius; nothing could turn him from his design of giving battle. This man intoxicated with his elevation, and vain of command, did not imagine that Hannibal would dare to face him. Eighty thousand foot and six thousand horse which composed his army would not allow him to entertain the least doubt of victory, which he announced openly. The whole of Hannibal's army was fifty thousand men, whereof ten thousand were cavalry.

This general pressed and embarrassed on all sides, had no longer any means of subsisting but in the resources of his own genius. Some historians assure us that he was reduced to such great extremity, that he more than once hesitated whether he should not sacrifice one part of the army to be able to retreat with the other, wherever he could. To have shut him up still more closely, would have been sufficient to demolish him, with certainty, and without risk. Want, and the difficulty of obtaining subsistence forced him to be continually moving to procure supplies. It was for this reason

* An. R. 536. Ante C. 216.

son that he went to encamp at Cannæ, purely with a design of refreshing his army, which had much need of it. Without succours, says Polybius,* without hope of receiving any, he was at a loss what part to take; he remained entrenched in his camp, and waited impatiently for winter quarters.

The consuls followed Hannibal; it was their only step. Paulus Emilius aimed at no higher glory, than that of destroying him by this means; but this glory, slow, and without éclat, would not satisfy a temper, too petulant to understand it, and too confined to feel it. Varro was for fighting and conquering, and incessantly repeated, that they protracted the evils of the Republic by deferring to attack, only because he wished it. The whole army whose idol as well as creature he was, echoed the same words, because the army judged only from the impression which he gave them.

We have already hinted that one of Hannibal's principal qualities was to draw as many advantages from the faults of the adversaries generals, as from his own abilities. He understood Varro, attacked him in all his detachments, insulted him even in his camp. Paulus Emilius in answer to all his passion, and impatience to engage, replied, That it would be sufficient to be upon his guard, and to beat off the Carthaginians; that a battle was unnecessary; that the event of one was uncertain. Varro being the general of the day listened only to the impatient murmurs of his army, which he himself had raised; at length he determined to punish, as he expressed it, the haughty insolence of Hannibal, and to vindicate the honor

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* Polyb. Hist. b. 4. 118.

of his troops. For this purpose he marched his army out of the camp, and took a field of battle so advantageous to the cavalry, that Hannibal could not have made a better choice had he marked it out himself.

The detail of the action is foreign to this history, it is enough to say that the Roman army was totally defeated, that Paulus Emilius was slain, that the two proconsuls perished; there were left on the field of battle, a vast number who were of consular dignity, twenty-one military tribunes, and four-score senators. Such was the event of this battle, says Polybius,* the valour of the vanquished and that of the conquerors was rendered equally famous. This bloody engagement cost the Romans more than sixty thousand men, and what is more surprizing Hannibal lost but six.—The fate of Varro was for several days unknown, at last he appeared, alone, but afterwards at the head of a body of collected troops, and he was thanked for having had the courage to appear; for being consul, he shewed by this conduct that he did not despair of the republic.—Dreadful necessity of circumstances! which forced the Senate to pay compliments to the man, to whom the most cruel and shameful death would not have been an adequate punishment. But Varro was a plebian, who from his hatred to the nobles and senate, was become the idol of the people, and raised even to the consulship. The misfortunes of Rome had more than enough avenged the senators, for the unworthy preference the people had given him, They sacrificed their own resentments to the necessity of attaching to themselves, as great a number of the nation as possible, and flattered its creature,

* Polyb. b. 4. 121.

ture, solely with this view. But for that, Varro would perhaps have passed from the field of battle to the Tarpeian rock.

The penetration and prudence of the senate is not less admirable in this conduct, than its greatness of spirit. By the re-union of the senate with the consul, the patricians and plebeians had only one mind. By this agreement and unanimous zeal, all Rome conspired to the re-establishment of her affairs, with the warmth of a faction. It must be confessed that the loss of the battle of Cannæ alarmed the nation; but that consternation which produces only dejection and cowardice in a vile populace, overwhelmed with the sense of their weakness, is always turned into courage in a warlike, valiant people. Such was the consternation of Rome at the battle of Cannæ. The real loss, the loss of 80,000 men, and so great a number of senators, was not the most considerable. The imaginary loss, that of their courage, which cuts off those resources which fortune suffers to remain in great evils, would have been much more so. The senate prevented at least this loss, by the wise vigour of their decrees. There were few of the Roman ladies who did not weep for a father, an husband, a son, a brother, a relation, or perhaps one still more dear, whom they durst not name; these tears might discourage the people. The senate who perceived their danger forbid the shedding them. All was sacrificed to the public good, even the expression of the most justifiable grief.

That famous question which still divides our modern historians, too timorous perhaps whenever they are under a necessity of quitting the opinion of the ancients, naturally offers itself here. Ought Hannibal, after the battle of Cannæ,* to have

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marched

* Anno R. 517. Ante. C. 215.

marched directly to Rome? The supper which one of his officers offered him in the capitol, was it a thing as easy and as sure as that officer imagined? Was he guilty of a fault in halting at Capua, and at last preferring to attack the allies of Rome rather than Rome itself? Is it necessary, to clear him of this supposed fault, to have recourse on the one hand to the imperfection of human nature, which always suffers some essential and decisive quality to be wanting in those to whom she seems to have been prodigal, and on the other to the inevitable sensibility which a heart that has experienced nothing but misfortunes and fatigues, must have to the delight of pleasures it meets with for the first time, as Hannibal did at Capua?

Will not all these reflections fall to the ground on examining the enterprize which Hannibal is in general reproached with not having attempted? He had left, after the battle of Cannæ, scarcely 40,000 men, infantry and cavalry included; and to prevent mistakes, it was no longer that army which gained the battles of Trebia, Thrasymene, and Cannæ, it was then an army of rich people, at least of such as were content, the greatest part of which desired nothing more than to enjoy peaceably the spoils of the Gauls, of Spain, and of Italy.

If we compare the situation of the Carthaginians and their spirit, with the spirit and situation of the Romans, it seems impossible to condemn Hannibal. The Carthaginians were far from home; it was at Rome they must have attacked the Romans; Carthage counteracted Hannibal in every thing; all agreed at Rome to serve the remains of their country. The riches which the Carthaginians were possessed of by conquest and pillage, had given them as great a dislike to the field

field as the defeats they experienced in the first Punic war, and they took up arms from interest only. These very riches were exhausted by successes, which necessarily were followed by a train of heavy expences. At Rome, their courage, which never failed or grew weak, gained fresh strength even from their misfortunes, by the vigorous constitution of the republic. The loss of above 60,000 men was undoubtedly immense; the Romans judged they had yet left wherewithal to repair it: they forgot it. Their despair of losing their country and their liberty, saw nothing but their resources; all ranks endeavoured to forget the greatness of the loss. Rome become insensible to, and independent of her misfortunes, suppressed every sentiment, except that of glory. Hannibal knew the two nations, he commanded one and opposed the other. Can we possibly suppose that he did not weigh and consider the most natural effects, both of their situation and of their spirit. Besides, what a force would have been requisite for the investing only of Rome! The army for the siege, Would not that also have required another of observation? Must not garrisons have been left in the towns where Hannibal had his provisions and magazines, and his last eventual retreat? Would it not, moreover, have taken up a vast number of men to guard the posts and passages, which it was necessary to Hannibal to secure, to assure himself a retreat in case he should not succeed? Can we then suppose, that so weak an army, divided almost into platoons, could hold out against the diversions the Romans would have made, as well in attacking them in all quarters, as in forming sieges? Had not Rome still at the head of his country, that same Fabius whose prudence had already saved it? Does the refusal she con-

stantly made of redeeming above 7000 men who had fled, or at least were not slain with the rest, admit a doubt, that she was not certain of being able immediately to raise another army?

If we consider still farther, that Hannibal, without assistance from his republic, was left solely to his own industry to provide for the expences of the war; that his infantry, much inferior to that of Rome, could promise him but small success in sieges; that to starve Rome by cutting off her provisions, would be a surer way to force her than a blockade: this blame which is thrown upon Hannibal for not marching for Rome directly after the battle of Cannæ, Can it be supported? The success of those violent steps which he had hitherto taken, was by no means a reason why he should not pursue others less in the extreme. It was not besides, under the very walls of Rome, that that success (which undoubtedly had already been much beyond his expectations) should have carried him; but even under the walls of Rome, should he have attacked her with all his forces? Should he have divided them to secure a retreat? Could he in dividing them have looked for success? Examine the question in every light it will bear, look into the nature of it and the difficulties attending it, and then determine.

Young Scipio shewed, immediately after this day, so terrible to his country, what the courage of a young man, governed by the prudence and steadiness of riper years is able to effect. He was one of the first resources of the misfortunes of Rome. The Carthaginian army, already softened by the fruits of their conquests, compleated their destruction in the winter quarters they had taken up at Capua. The heart of Hannibal quite new to the delights and luxuries which this town afforded,

forded, resigned itself as well as those of his officers and foldiers. They were different foldiers under another general, who took the field the following year. Hannibal befieged a fmall town and could not take it, another was befieged by Marcellus, another was ready to furrender; Marcellus threw a convoy into it in fight of Hannibal. A very confiderable party of Carthaginians waited for this fame Marcellus, it was defeated and cut in pieces; fuch was the event of the campaign which followed that of the battle of Cannæ. Nothing of confequence happened in Italy the following year, except that the republic continued to keep up their armies in Spain, in Sicily, and in Sardinia, and to fend recruits in the fame manner, as was done immediately after the battle of Cannæ. But the Romans furprifed perhaps the whole world as well as Hannibal, by what immediately follows: They declared war againft Philip, King of Macedon,* who had entered into treaty with the Carthaginians; they fent generals to attack him, they beat him both by fea and land, and reduced him at laft, to efcape their purfuit, to fave himfelf naked without any attendants.

We will here pafs over thofe years in which nothing important fell out, to come to thofe wherein there happened events that were decifive. Hannibal was ftill mafter of Campania. Capua the capital of this country afforded him at all times a retreat formidable to the Romans.† The confuls came before it with their army; feveral checks which their detachments received did not however prevent them from fitting down before the place. The inhabitants being preffed, informed Hannibal of their fituation; he came to their affiftance,

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attacked

* Anno R. 538. Ante C. 214. † Anno R. 541. Ante C. 211.

attacked the consuls, was beaten off, obliged to retire, and the siege was continued.

Nevertheless it was upon the fate of Capua that the security, and of course the fidelity of the Carthaginian allies in Italy depended. Hannibal to deliver it, had recourse to one of the finest stratagems he ever practised; for not being sure of the design which he seemed to have, I don't think we ought to give any other name to the conduct he held on this occasion. He announced to his allies the siege of Rome, and immediately directed the march of his troops for this purpose. But Rome, who knew as well his strength as his character, did not in quitting Capua, make the diversion he had flattered himself with; one of the consuls continued the siege, while the other at the head of an inconsiderable corps, went and took post between Rome and the Carthaginian army. Hannibal made a shew of giving battle; the consul was not backward to engage. When all was ready for it the Carthaginian general spread a report that the presages were unfavourable, and that a secret presentiment deterred him from his purpose. The two armies waiting in expectation of fighting, he ordered a retreat and hastily gained the country of the Brutians, situated in the extremity of Italy. There he remained many years in spite of the barrenness of the soil, which would hardly furnish him with subsistence. Capua was in the end taken; a part of the magistrates of the town prevented with their own hands that terrible execution which the victors inflicted on those treacherous allies, who knew not how to live in friendship with the Romans, nor to die as enemies worthy of them.

All Hannibal's success then tended only to the good fortune of finding a retreat amongst the
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rocks of the Brutians. His very conquests which it was impossible he could maintain, (as an author, as learned as he is singular, has remarked on the causes of the Roman grandeur) decided the fate of his enterprize against Italy. Whatever warlike talents may be allowed him, whatever resources he may have found in an inexhaustible genius, it appears that he ought to have foreseen that which did happen to him, only because it necessarily must. Abandoned by Carthage solely to his own successes, he must necessarily miscarry if they once failed him; and could he, with any prudence, promise himself continual success against the Romans? Let us pass on to the state of affairs in Sicily.

As soon as Rome had recovered herself she was no less attentive to the defence of her allies than she had been to her own security.* Marcellus, one of the consuls, was sent to Sicily by the senate with considerable forces, both for the sea and land service; the rapidity of Hannibal's conquests had brought under the dominion of Carthage the greatest part of the towns in that island. That of Syracuse the most important, from the number of its inhabitants, its fortifications and its wealth, had followed the general defection. Marcellus flattered himself, though in vain, that he should be able to bring it over to the Roman interest; the artifices of Hannibal though absent, destroyed the hope and efforts of the consul, who negotiated on the very spot. The command of Sicily seems reserved for that power who is mistress of Syracuse. Marcellus soon perceived it; and how difficult soever the siege of so large and well fortified a place must be, he invested it and pressed the attack

* An. R. 539. Ante C. 213.

tack with vigour. In this siege we see that remarkable struggle between a geometrician who defended it by the help of science only, and a soldier who employed against him nothing but valour and perseverance. All the attacks of Marcellus failed against the defence of Archimedes, all his machines of war were weakened, broken, or destroyed by those of a superior force, which the Syracusan prepared against them, and both the one and the other were constantly inventing new ones. Chance at last determined the point in favour of Marcellus. He observed that one of the towers of the city might be easily scaled, and resolved to make a last push this way. The Syracusans employed in the celebration of the feast of Diana, were careless in guarding this work; the Romans secretly, in the night, made a lodgment, and Marcellus crowded into it as many men as was possible. As soon as day-light appeared, the Romans, who penetrated safely into the town, made a dreadful carnage of its inhabitants, sunk in drunkenness, debauch, and sleep; the alarm, which was immediately spread by those who escaped the first attack, soon rendered the confusion general; the Roman trumpets which resounded through all the town, made it supposed that their whole army was entered. Marcellus touched with the misery of this superb city, about to be given up to pillage, could not contain his tears; tears that do honour to humanity, when they flow into the bosom of victory. The soldiers wanted utterly to destroy it, Marcellus prevailed with them to be satisfied with pillaging; which they did most effectually, and perhaps to this day no army ever met with so rich a booty. The capture of Syracuse determined the surrender of Sicily; it became a second time a Roman province;

vince; and if afterwards any troubles were raised there, they were quelled as soon as they broke out.

The ruin of Saguntum, and Hannibal's successes in Italy, had not prevented the Romans keeping their footing in Spain. The year following that which had been so very unfortunate to them, the two Scipio's, Publius and Cneus appeared at the head of an army, capable of facing that of the Carthaginians: these two generals, connected by blood, by affection, by talents and virtue, deservedly enjoyed the highest reputation. Asdrubal having received orders from Carthage, to carry his army into Italy, was in full march for it. The two brothers were sensible of the necessity of preventing a junction between him and Hannibal; with this view they resolved to hazard all, to oblige him to face about, or to conquer him. Asdrubal waited for them, determined to accept it if they should offer him battle. He did accept it, engaged with great valour, and was totally defeated. The action was so fierce and the loss on his side so great, that he gave up all thoughts of passing into Italy. The news of this victory, so decisive in its consequences, was the first which consoled the Romans for their misfortunes in Italy.

These successes brought back to the Roman interest, those with whom neither the eloquence, nor even the virtues of the Scipio's were able to prevail. A considerable body of Celtiberians, joined their army.* On the other hand, the Carthaginians received a re-inforcement of Numidian cavalry, under the command of a young African Prince of the highest hopes: this

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was Masinissa, whose impetuous activity would not allow the Romans the least rest. He appeared every where; he harraffed the enemy without respite, pursued them to their trenches, insulted sometimes even the advanced guards, who defended them: too young to see his own true interest, he detested the Romans whom he did not know, and served with ardour the Carthaginians, who deceived him with false hopes.

The Carthaginians had, at this time,* three armies commanded by three several generals; the two Scipio's who were united, had it in their power to attack that which was nearest to them; their superiority assured them of victory; they feared lest the other two, who could retire into places of difficult access with which Spain abounds, should lengthen out the war, which they were desirous of putting an end to. They resolved therefore to attack all three at once, and for this purpose they divided their forces, and marched at the same time against the three Carthaginian generals.

Cneus Scipio had in his army those Celtiberians who had renewed their alliance † with the Romans; the Carthaginian general who knew these people, had them sounded, and purchased their neutrality at such a rate, that they did not hesitate to desert the party they came to espouse. Interest was the soul of their conduct; besides, as they did not declare against the Romans, they could not think they had any thing to reproach them with. Their desertion determined the fate of this campaign. ‡ Cneus in no condition to
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* An. R. 539. Ante C. 213. † An. R. 540. Ante C. 212.

‡ An. R. 542. Ante C. 210.

face the enemy he went to attack, was forced to remain on the defensive, to avoid the plains, and to have recourse to all the arts of war, to enable him to re-join his brother.

Publius Scipio, shut up in his camp, upon the point of wanting subsistence, was not in a happier situation. If a detachment ever dared to stir out, Masinissa quickly obliged them to return. There was not, says Livy,* a single instant or any one place in which the enemy did not find him. Publius thus confined, had advice that Indibilis, a Spanish prince, was on the point of joining the Carthaginians with a corps of 8000 men. The superiority which this fresh succour would have given them induced him to attempt one of those desperate strokes, of which the success is wisdom or the failure imprudence. We ought, says Livy, to ascribe this resolution only to his unhappy circumstances. He provided for the security of his camp, and marched during the night against Indibilis. He met him, engaged him, had every advantage over him; when all at once the Numidian cavalry, headed without doubt by young Masinissa, charged him briskly on one side and the Carthaginians on the other. Publius performed in this dangerous crisis all that could be expected of a general, when he received a mortal wound. What was yet more unfortunate in this accident, they were unable to conceal it from his foldiers, who saw him fall from his horse and expire. They lost all courage, thought of nothing but flight, and the enemies who pursued them. The loss of the Romans was still greater in the pursuit than in the action; and possibly not a man would have survived, had not night obliged the Carthaginians to suffer them to escape.

Publius

* T. Liv. l. 25.

Publius defeated and slain, the Carthaginian generals marched without losing a moment against his brother Cneus, who was ignorant of all the disasters which had happened. He was at a loss to conceive how Publius could suffer the enemy to join their forces against him, however he conducted matters so skilfully that he held out before them for a whole month; but forced to engage in the day and decamp in the night, to halt at such posts as mere chance afforded him, without the power of choosing, he was at last surrounded on an eminence so bare, that he could not find wherewithal to form an intrenchment; the circumference he occupied was surrounded by his baggage only. The Carthaginians attacked him, beat him, dispersed the remains of his army, and he was himself killed in the battle. Rome lamented the loss of these great men, Spain regretted them, and even Carthage herself was touched at their unhappy fate. Beloved by their fellow-citizens, valued by the people whom they governed, equally esteemed as well as feared by their enemies, no Romans before them, says Livy, ever set forth the beauty of the manners of Rome in so amiable a light.

The scattered remains of these armies, so formidable but a little while before, wandered without a resource, without any object in view, or chief to direct them. The prudence of the Scipio's had formed in Lucius Martius, a general capable of rallying and inspiring them. They knew him, they took pleasure in instructing him. He had not the blood of the Patrician families, he was only blessed with their sentiments and virtues: his family was of the order of knights. Martius having collected the stragglers, was quickly at the head of a considerable body, to which he gave

gave hope and courage. He had the good luck to arrive with his corps at the camp of Publius Scipio, whose lieutenant, dispirited, expected nothing but chains or death. He offered to surrender the command to him, which indeed was his right, as the general's lieutenant. The army forced him to keep it, and were persuaded the Senate would approve their choice. Martius having attained the rank of general, studied only how to deserve it. Many of the fugitives were still in the neighbourhood: he remained in his camp to give them time to join him. He was informed that Asdrubal the son of Gisco was marching towards him, to cut off entirely the remnant of the Romans in Spain. He determined to give him battle, and communicated his resolution to his officers and soldiers. Cries of despair for the death of the two Scipio's was all the answer he could obtain. He exhorted his troops to testify to their generals the sincerity of the grief they felt for their loss, by revenge, and not by weak fruitless tears. In an instant they heard all the instruments of war in the enemy's army give the signal for battle. The Romans filled with indignation marched towards them with all the fury of resentment and despair. The Carthaginians who had reckoned they should conquer by only shewing themselves, were repulsed, broken, and routed on all sides. The only difficulty Martius now met with was to restrain the courage he had inspired: he did not wish to attack, but to remain on the defensive. The soldiers enticed by the advantage broke their ranks in pursuing the enemy without caution; the new general was forced to put himself at the head of his troops, and to take away their standards to oblige them to retreat.

Some

Some time after this first success,* Martius was informed by his spies that the Carthaginians observed no sort of discipline in their camp; they had such excessive confidence, that the officers upon guard were satisfied with sending their arms to their posts, instead of attending them in person. Martius proposed to his army one of those designs, the desperateness of which makes them eagerly embraced by minds whose confidence one is possessed of. He attacked the Carthaginians in their camp, forced their intrenchments, totally defeated them, and killed 37,000 men: the fight lasted two days and two nights. By this action all the consequence which the Carthaginians enjoyed in Spain, was restored to the Romans; a service so much the more important, as it was what the Republic had no right to expect from one who was only a knight, if it be true indeed that Nature has any respect to rank in distributing talents. Rome gratefully commemorated the obligations she owed to Martius, by placing his buckler in the capital near the statues of their greatest heroes.

Martius resigned the command to Claudius Nero,† whom the Republic sent into Spain in quality of proconsul: this general distinguished himself only by his blunders, the greatest of which was suffering himself to be amused and deceived by Asdrubal the son of Gisco. The Carthaginian shut up in defiles, out of which he had no possibility of escaping, promised the proconsul to evacuate all Spain, if he would permit him to do it. Several interviews under different pretences consumed several days. The Carthaginian, of whom Nero had not the least suspicion, watched an occasion


* An. R. 540. Ante C. 212. † An. R. 542. Ante C. 210.

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casion to execute a scheme he had meditated: he saved himself and all his people by means of a fog, which concealed his march. Thus Nero was covered with shame where Martius would have been crowned with glory. Such, says Livy, was the state of the Roman affairs in Spain. The ancient allies who abandoned them in their misfortunes never returned, those which they made afterwards remained firm to them.

Thus much was judged necessary to be said for the better understanding the following history. The reader by this preliminary discourse will avoid the trouble of having recourse to general historians, to inform himself of the situation of the affairs of the Roman republic in the several provinces where she was at war. If this is useless to the man of letters, it may at least be necessary to the man of the world, to whom the sciences are oftener an amusement than an employment; but who are also interested in the portrait of the great man whose history is here offered them.





THE
L I F E
O F
SCIPIO AFRICANUS.

BOOK THE FIRST.

PUBLIUS CORNELIUS SCIPIO, distinguished from the great men of his family by the surname of Africanus, was born at Rome in the 517th year from its foundation, 335 years before the birth of Christ. 24

The Cornelian family, of which he was the head, had ever joined abilities and virtues to the glory of a pedigree, which lost itself in antiquity. Publius Cornelius his father, and Cneus his uncle, lost their lives at the head of the armies of the Republic: the sequel of this history will show how worthy Scipio was to inherit the name of these heroes.

Scipio was but eighteen * when he had the happiness to distinguish himself by one of those singular

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gular

* An. R. 535. Ante C. 217.

gular actions which do as much honour to the *man* as the hero.

Publius Scipio his father permitted him to attend him in the first campaign he made against Hannibal in Italy; the Carthaginian and Roman armies met on the banks of the Tefinus, and the generals immediately joined battle. The Romans gave way on all sides, and nothing could rally them.* Scipio who commanded in quality of consul, in vain attempted every thing that could be expected from an able general; he was himself on the point of being made prisoner, when his son whom he had placed on a neighbouring eminence, with a sufficient guard, perceived his situation. The danger his father was in, would not suffer him to obey the injunction he had laid upon him, not to mix in the action: he rushed down at the head of his guard, whom he obliged to follow him, fell upon the enemy with all the impetuosity of that courage which nothing could resist, got to his father, disengaged him from the hands of the Carthaginians, and received from him, with embraces of the most lively tenderness, the glorious name of his *deliverer*.

The consul ordered a civic crown to be presented to his son; the young Scipio sufficiently rewarded by the action itself, refused to receive it. It is on occasion of this refusal that Pliny † makes this beautiful reflection on the materials of that crown, which consisted only of oaken branches. Other crowns were for the most part, says he, either composed of or enriched with the most fine and pure gold. The Romans thought it an affront to humanity to offer any other reward than that of glory, to a man who saved the life of a man;

* T. Liv. Polyb.

† Pliny, b. 3, c. 12.

man; they would have blushed at mixing views of interest with an action so natural.

This event was sufficient to rouse the ambition which a young Roman patrician would feel, and one of a name which encouraged him to aspire to every thing. It was to Scipio only an incitement to seize every occasion of signalizing himself, however dangerous.

The consternation of the soldiers, the officers, and the whole nation, after the loss of the battle of Cannæ, was the first that offered itself. The young Scipio was the resource of Rome in that dreadful day. He was only a tribune of a legion, and had retired with many other officers to Canusium, which still held out for the Romans. All unanimously elected him their chief until it should be in their power to rejoin their superior officers. He held a council in this capacity, to deliberate on the steps they should take, when Publius the son of a consular man, came to inform them of the most horrible news they could have to dread in the situation they were then in.* “ You cherish a fruitless hope,” says he to them, “ you deliberate in vain; Rome is abandoned by her own citizens. The chiefs of the best houses in Rome, the heads of what remains of the Patricians, are at this instant assembled in Metellus’s house, and take measures the very reverse of yours; they are resolved to quit Italy, and go with the remains of their fortunes to seek an asylum with some king allied to the republic.”

The desertion of the principal people of the nation, appeared to the assembly an evil yet more dreadful than even the loss of the battle. They were for discussing several opinions. Scipio rose

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up

* T. Liv. b. 22.

up precipitately, and without hearing any thing; "Such a rascally design," says he, "is unworthy of the least deliberation; consultations are useless, we must act; we must hazard all to save the republic: let those who regard the safety of Rome follow me." At these words he departed, and went to the house of Metellus, where he was informed these young men were met together. He entered sword in hand and his eyes sparkling with rage. "Is it you then, dastardly Romans," says he, who have determined upon flight? I swear, and my whole soul makes the oath, that I will never abandon Rome, nor will I suffer a single citizen to desert her. If ever I should be so wretchedly base as to betray her, oh! great Jupiter, may you crush me in that instant with a thunder-bolt, and with the same stroke annihilate my family and all that belongs to me! You, Cæcilius," added he, (he was the most considerable of the assembly) "and all of you who hear me, I insist that ye take the same oath. If any one hesitates, let him be assured that this sword is pointed particularly at his breast."

Scipio, says Livy, was another Hannibal to these mean deserters of their country. The boldness of his conduct and the firmness of his speech, struck them all at first with terror; but at last the sentiment of valour and of love for Rome being roused, all swore to fight to the last gasp, and surrendered themselves to the fortune and counsels of Scipio. Perhaps this recovery might be owing to the confidence which was generally placed in him at Rome from the notion of his miraculous birth, and intimate commerce with the gods.

However that was, Scipio remained at Canusium, with all he could collect of the broken remains

mains of the finest army Rome ever set on foot; and with these made head against the enemy. Marcellus who was employed in the same manner, having heard it, informed the senate, and sent Scipio a reinforcement of 15,000 men. In a short time he went there to take the command upon himself. The different parties of the Roman troops which straggled up and down Italy without leaders, without plan, and without hopes, were insensibly collected to him, and quickly formed an army fit for a consul. Thus it is that courage and prudence restore the most desperate and ruinous affairs. The event of the battle of Cannæ, added to that of the engagement of the Tefinus, acquired to Scipio the highest reputation a young man could pretend to.

As soon as the republic had secured Italy, in opposing every where to Hannibal such generals as were capable of checking him, she thought of pushing the war on with vigour in Sicily and Spain. The success of the Carthagenian generals had subjected almost the whole of the latter of these provinces. Rome had no generals too great for the recovery of it, and merit solely determined their appointment to an employ so difficult.

Publius and Cneus Scipio, the father and uncle of him whose history we are now writing, were chosen by the republic to command the armies in Spain. Scipio's youth, the uncertainty of success, the fatigues of the journey, and perhaps above all his boldness in fight, which bordered upon rashness, would not suffer them to take him with them. Their prudence however, and military abilities, rendered the war in Spain more prosperous than they had even hoped; and their first campaigns, as may be seen in the Introduction, were altogether victorious.

It was under favour of this success that Lucius Scipio, Publius's elder brother, proposed himself for the Edileship.* He was possessed of all the qualities which could entitle him to it, birth and age, the only qualifications necessary towards the obtaining it. One thing only he still wanted, in spite of the pains his mother took for his advancement during the absence of his father, the affections of the people. Whilst the Romans eagerly expressed their regard for Publius, the younger brother, they gave no mark of it to Lucius. His mother nevertheless ardently wished he might be named Edile; for this purpose to her solicitations she added prayers and sacrifices.

Publius, hurt as much as his mother with the difficulties their designs met with, artfully proposed to her an expedient which he had a mind to try to procure the accomplishment of her wishes. Behold, says he to her, I have already several times had the same dream; I fancied that my brother and I were made Ediles, and that afterwards presenting ourselves to you, you tenderly embraced us. The heart of a mother gave itself up with all its fondness, to so flattering an idea. Would God, she answered, would God, I might see that happy day! If you please, mother, continued Scipio, we will try for it; the people love me, and I will offer myself with my brother. His mother consented, supposing his intention to be rather the effect of his affection, than any settled resolution.

Scipio however ordered a robe, such as was worn by candidates for employments. According to law he was too young for the Edileship; but he was adored by the people, whose hearts he gained

* An. R. 538. Ante. C. 214.

gained by his complaisant behaviour, and by a natural air of grandeur, which sat so easy on him that he did not seem to know it: he judged that for all the objection to his age, he might assure himself of the marks of good-will which the people and nobles shewed him.

On the day of election he went and placed himself with a modest confidence in the line of candidates. His stature, his deportment, his figure, the sweetness of his looks, the beauty of his locks, the brightness of his youth, the hopes which the virtues he had already shewn, all prepossessed them in his favour.

The tribunes of the people, ever ready to accuse the patricians of a spirit of pride and independence, loudly condemned this rash step of Scipio: they declared they would never approve of his election; and with much eloquence shewed that it was unprecedented for any one to demand the Edileship, without being of the age prescribed by the laws. They concluded with a decree that Scipio was ineligible on account of that defect only.

The success of the first steps in life often fix a man's reputation; the circumstance was a very delicate one for a young man anxious to rise. If it was dangerous to oppose the tribunes, it was no less so to give way to them.

Scipio had made these reflections; but having cast his eyes round the assembly, he perceived them favourably disposed towards him, therefore he resolved to persist in his proceeding. He completely determined the people by saying, It is not for you, Tribunes, it is for the Roman Knights, it is for the people to pronounce, whether I am eligible to the office of Edile; I shall be old enough if I am so well beloved as to be appointed. It is
clear

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clear that this answer was full of haughtiness, but it was flattering to the people always fond of rising merit. The Tribunes having collected the votes, had the mortification to see Scipio named almost unanimously with his brother. By this he obtained the highest mark of favour and distinction he could possibly hope for at his age.

Scipio's dream which his mother had published abroad, followed by so immediate and happy an effect, made him generally pass for a man favoured with a special communication with the gods. He did not oppose this superstitious credulity; and in this part of his conduct Polybius finds a great resemblance between him and Lycurgus: for it was not, says he, by religiously consulting a priestess of Apollo, that Lycurgus established his laws in Lacedemon, neither was it by dreams and augurs that Scipio formed his designs; but both knew that the generality of men dread the dangers that attend extraordinary projects, and do not easily give into them unless you flatter them with hopes of the special assistance of heaven. In whatever Lycurgus proposed, he constantly appeared only as the interpreter of the Pythian; a character which increased his consequence as it made him more worthy of credit. Scipio (*a*) in suffering the Romans to believe that heaven was a party in all his designs, inspired them with greater zeal, confidence, and courage, than they would ever have had without it.

It is not known in what province Scipio was at first employed, and history relates nothing extraordinary of him from the time of the battle of Cannæ until he came to be commander in chief. All we know is, that eight years after he lost his father and uncle, who ended their lives as great generals, each of them being killed at the head of his

(*a*) Note I.

his army; they left Scipio, who was not then above three and twenty, only their examples to instruct him, and their reputation to assist him in soliciting the employments his birth gave him a title to.

Cato firnamed the Cenfor, who was employed in Spain when the two Scipio's were slain, was an ambitious, bold, philosophic citizen, and protected by Fabius, at that time a person of the first consequence in Rome. Though his conduct was irreproachable, the senate did not choose to trust him with the command in Spain.

The taking of Capua by the Romans had forced Hannibal to abandon Italy. As soon as this dreaded enemy suffered the senate to breathe, the first thing attended to at Rome was the re-establishment of their affairs in Spain. Claudius Nero, who commanded there, did not at all answer their expectations. The senate dissatisfied with his conduct, assembled to give him a successor. But who could be compared to the two Scipio's? Who could flatter himself, that he should be rather more able or more fortunate? These reflections checked the most aspiring. Not one of the senators had the courage to solicit so difficult a command, even the senate itself would not appoint a general to so very important and hazardous a station; the choice was referred to the people, and an assembly called for that purpose.

All the senators maintained, at the convocation, the same conduct they had adopted in the senate-house. No one demanded the post, to which each wished to make the nomination. The whole discourse of the assembly turned upon the virtues and misfortunes of the two Scipio's; they lamented them still, with the same regret as if they had but that instant received the news of their death;

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death; and the people shared in the grief of the patricians: they fixed their eyes, one by one, on the senators most worthy of confidence, and silently waited for some one to be proposed. It is evident that this backwardness so general and so obstinate, was an incontestible proof of the dismal situation the affairs of Spain were reduced to, by the death of the Scipio's.

Scipio, barely twenty-four*, encouraged, rather than daunted at the difficulties, had the boldness, or to speak more properly the patriotism, to take upon himself so heavy a burthen: eager to revenge his blood, his name, and his country, he offered himself for the command in Spain. In spite of the lustre of his reputation, his youth for some time kept the suffrages in suspense, but at length his zeal, his valour, natural resentment for the death of a father and an uncle, slain in that country of which he claimed the command, decided in his favour: the senate and the people complied with his request, and he was elected to go to Spain in quality of proconsul.

We may justly be surpris'd that so wise a republic should give the conduct of so important a war to so young a general. But it was great in Rome to teach the rest of the world by her example, that talents and virtue are a dispensation for age which a government ought ever to confirm. These were the steps by which Scipio rose to a command, at a time of life in which the patricians themselves filled only the lowest subaltern employments.

Scipio had the most powerful reasons not to defer his departure for Spain; Cato† distinguished himself there every day, and seemed to canvaſs for the

* An. R. 541. Ante C. 211. † Plut. in M. Cato.

the command, rather by his conduct, than solicitations. This Roman, famous for the austerity of his manners, had as much ambition as virtue; his strict stoicism allowed it, provided he coveted high employments, only to be still more useful to his country. All Spain was in the power of the Carthaginians; it was doubtless a fine opportunity to raise himself reputation. We may judge, from the reluctance with which Cato left it, that he had well-founded hopes of remaining there. However, he quitted it as soon as he knew that Scipio was appointed to the command, and marched towards Italy with an escort of five battalions of foot and five hundred horse. *

Many of the Spanish states who had taken part † with the Carthaginians attempted to oppose his passage; he either routed or subdued them. In one of their towns he found six hundred Roman deserters; he was inexorable, and whether from zeal for the re-establishment of discipline or from the natural severity of his temper, he rigorously executed every one of them.

Scipio met him, and regretting the loss of six hundred disciplined veterans, could not help reproaching him with the sacrifice he had made to his spleen at leaving Spain. Cato undoubtedly thought he perceived some haughtiness in these reproaches. Scipio was of one of the first families in Rome; Cato, if I may use the expression, was the first of his: he did not conceal his sensibility, and sternly answered Scipio, that talents and virtue never would be so highly esteemed at Rome, as when those who had the advantage of birth were anxious to prevent *new men* excelling them; and when on their part, the others should exert themselves

* Plut. in M. Cato. † Anno R. 542. Ante C. 210.

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themselves to vie with the nobles for the honours of command.

Cato on his return to Rome laid before the senate, the plans he had formed for the recovery of Spain. Fabius, whose prudence was mistrustful of Scipio's youth, and who had perhaps also some little jealousy of the reputation of the father and uncle, gave him the most marked approbation, and prevailed with the senate to adopt them. In consequence of this, Scipio received orders to conform entirely to them: A restraint or subjection, as dangerous to the state as it was distressing and humiliating to the general. Scipio lost no time to unshackle himself by success, and to oblige the senate to permit him to be master of the plan as well as of the execution. Thus it is that the enmities of individuals affect public affairs, with which however the public good requires they should have no connection.

The young proconsul being arrived in Spain, his first care was to examine how mens' tempers were affected towards him; Martius, whom he had ever been attentive to bind to him by every distinction and mark of esteem, was very serviceable in this business. He would possibly with much repugnance have made a sacrifice to any other general of the command of an army, which the republic owed solely to his zeal and pains; but the name of Scipio was to him so dear, so respectable, the character of the proconsul was already so great, the extent of his genius which Martius saw in spite of his youth and his modesty, gave him such extraordinary hopes, that he descended without uneasiness from his former rank, to that of lieutenant to the heir of the name and the valour of his old commanders. He communicated to Scipio, with that military frankness, which

which neither knows nor wishes to deceive, all the observations and reflections he had made on the present condition of Spain.

The Carthaginians, confident in their superiority, hardly kept any terms with the people of Spain; if the execution of treaties appeared inconvenient to them, they made no ceremony of violating their engagements. The conditions on which they had entered into the alliance were altered; each day brought fresh instances of further injustice and repeated outrages. A conduct so iniquitous and imprudent soon alienated their affections. Several of the Spanish princes concluded new treaties with the Romans, and those who still held with the Carthaginians only waited for some fortunate enterprize of the proconsul to abandon them entirely. *

Scipio perceiving that the severity and ill faith of the Carthaginians had driven the people to the very point of having that aversion for them, to which he aimed by his own conduct to bring them, thought it proper to take advantage of a crisis so favourable to his designs. He assembled his army, and acquainted them with the complaints of the natives against the Carthaginians. "It is done, soldiers," says he, "our enemies
" have fallen into the very error we wished, they
" have by their injustice drawn on themselves
" the hatred of the natives, they are on the point
" of being deserted by their allies, who in them
" have found only tyrants; these allies will abandon them to become our friends. Conceive
" hopes then worthy of yourselves, dare to attack your foes, and you will most assuredly
" beat them. All Spain longs for the sway of
" the

* T. Liv. Polyb.

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“ the republic ; you will in this war have as many
 “ friends as there are inhabitants. It is the son
 “ of a general whom you saw unhappily fall, who
 “ exhorts you this day to resume your former ar-
 “ dour ; be Roman soldiers, and you shall see
 “ that the son of Scipio is worthy of the blood
 “ which runs in his veins ; you recollect in me
 “ his features, his air, and his manner, I trust you
 “ will also perceive him in my courage, and zeal
 “ for my country.”

The misfortunes of the foregoing campaigns had occasioned a general consternation ; the first and most important object was to stop the progress of this evil, by remedies as speedy as efficacious. Before he undertook any thing, Scipio resolved to restore by degrees the confidence of his troops, and to persuade them that to conquer they had only to engage.

The misunderstanding and divisions among the Carthaginians gave him great hopes of success. They had at that time three generals, each of whom commanded a distinct body of troops. Mago was beyond the pillars of Hercules, among the people called Conians. Asdrubal the son of Gisco was encamped on the banks of the Tagus, near its mouth ; and the other Asdrubal, who is not distinguished from the son of Gisco, and from Asdrubal the brother of Hannibal, by any surname, carried on a siege in Carpetania.*

The opinion of the principal officers was to attack the army which lay nearest, and as soon as that was defeated, to march directly for the others ; but Scipio who had designs more sure, and better concerted, represented to them, that in attacking one of these armies the other two would immedi-
 ately

* T. Liv, Polyb.

ately join; and that therefore instead of forcing them to such a step, it was necessary to take advantage of their separation, and the distance they were asunder. However expeditious they might be, they were at least ten days march one from the other: Scipio was well informed of the distance between them. What he most of all dreaded was a junction; he had but barely twenty-five thousand foot, and ten thousand horse; and the Carthaginians were stronger by one half; so that, without engaging, they would have been able, by keeping close at his heels, to hem him in, and make a prisoner of him in his own camp, as was the case with his father and uncle.

Inaction was however no less dangerous to a young general with troops who were eager to resent former affronts.* Scipio's intent was not to remain so long; he had formed his plan, and taken as much care to conceal it, even from his most intimate confidants, as to conduct it well. They returned constantly to the charge, to persuade him to attack the Carthaginians, and they pointed out to him, almost a certain victory; but he was satisfied with hearing with attention, and seemingly with approbation, all their counsel, without making any use of it.

The time for the opening of his project arrived. Ever since his coming into Spain, he had incessantly inquired, as well of the old troops as of the inhabitants of the country, into the situation, the strength, and garrison of Carthagera, which the ancients called New Carthage: he made these inquiries in so careless a manner, that every body took it for the effect only of common curiosity, which led him to be inquisitive about the chief

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city

* Polyb.

city of a province. He was but a few days march from it, and he had the Iberus to cross in his way. Carthagera was the grand arsenal and general magazine of the Carthaginians. It was the town of the greatest importance in Spain, because it was the only port capable of receiving a fleet; it was conveniently situated for landing supplies from, and keeping up a communication with Africa. Arms, provisions, money, all were laid up here, as in a most secure asylum. Notwithstanding the importance of the place, the enemy blinded by a spirit of rash security, had been so imprudent as to leave in it a very weak and inadequate garrison, consisting at the most of not above a thousand men. Scipio well informed of all these particulars, resolved to attempt it by surprise.

He left Marcus Silanus, one of his lieutenants, on the banks of the Iberus with three thousand men, to guard his camp and its environs; he moved suddenly, * and crossed the river with his army, totally ignorant of their destination: their anxiety soon ceased, when after seven days march, they found themselves under the walls of Carthagera. Scipio had taken his measures so judiciously, that in the instant of his arrival, Lælius also invested the place with his fleet by sea, and while the inhabitants fancied themselves in the most perfect security, they were surrounded by the Romans both by land and water.

If Scipio knew how to employ the great talents nature had endowed him with, he was likewise full as expert at taking advantage of the foibles of others, to gain his point. The enterprise was great, but it might startle the Romans by
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*T. Liv. Polyb.

its very grandeur. Carthagera was defended by its situation; it was better peopled than the other towns in Spain; and the inhabitants might become soldiers. He was fearful his army might make these reflections and be alarmed by them, he therefore had recourse to the marvellous, to confirm and animate his troops. He was acquainted with the superstitious turn of his countrymen, he knew how much the Romans were affected with prodigies, he determined to take advantage of it, he paraded his troops and related to them an apparition of Neptune, which had assured him of the success of the siege. "Your courage, soldiers, the hope of mural crowns, the prospect of rewards and an immense booty, must doubtless engage you to attack Carthagera, with a firmness worthy of yourselves. This firmness alone can give you the victory, but a more sacred and more powerful motive will animate you on this occasion; the god Neptune appeared to me this night: Go, says he, in express terms, go, attack without fear, this redoubtable town, I will insure you the conquest of it, you shall be sensible in the heat of the action of the aiding presence of a god, who interests himself in the glory of your nation." *

All immediately called out for ladders to mount to the assault; the ardour with which they advanced is not to be described, they seemed to have heard the god himself speak by the mouth of his minister. Mago the governor of the place did for its defence, all that could be expected of a brave man and an experienced commander; he augmented his garrison with two thousand young men picked from the strongest and most active

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* T. Liv. Polyb.

in the town, he posted them at the gate fronting the Roman camp and army, and notwithstanding the inequality of numbers, they had the boldness to make several bloody sallies. On one side they fought for the preservation of the wealth of the country, which was lodged in Carthagera; on the other, for the glory of having part in an action the god of the sea had taken under his own immediate protection: all with equal eagerness and obstinacy. The Carthaginians were animated by the voice and presence of their fellow-citizens, their wives and children,* who exhorted them to die like brave men rather than give way. The Romans engaged under the eye of the proconsul, who was present wherever the danger was greatest, and the advantage was long disputed with equal courage on both sides.

During this engagement, there was one much more bloody between those who attacked, and those who defended the walls.† It was dreadful to behold so many brave men vying who should perish first. Hardly were the ladders fixed when the impatience of the soldiers overloading them, they broke, and those who had mounted to the assault fell down the whole height of the wall, upon such as were able to bear the weight. The inhabitants cast from the walls great stones and beams, which overset and crushed whatever stood in their way: these wretches were hardly down, but other soldiers ran to replace them. The death of their comrades, the desire of revenge, the shame of yielding to the Carthaginians, shut their eyes to danger, and their hearts to fear, the greater the danger the greater was their ardour to face it, the greater the glory of surmounting it.

Night

* Anno R. 542. Ante. C. 210.

† T. Liv. Polyb.

Night alone was able to put an end to a combat so obstinate, and a stop to the blood which ran on all sides, and which they seemed prodigally lavish of.

The second day of the assault, the animosity was still greater, and the Romans lost vast numbers. Scipio who had foreseen it, pretending to be repulsed by so vigorous a resistance, ordered to sound a retreat at mid-day; they doubted not at Carthagea but that the loss of his best soldiers had obliged him to alter his purpose, and that he had abandoned an enterprize which they already looked upon as the effect of a most inconsiderate temerity. Shouts of joy were heard from the walls, the Carthaginians insulted the Roman soldiers in the most contemptuous terms; these reluctantly obeyed the order to retreat, and fretted that the prey was thus snatched out of their hands. They knew not the secret motive of their general's conduct; he secured the victory by seeming to deprive them of it. The men who had been engaged in the morning were fatigued, and their numbers considerably diminished; Scipio ordered fresh and compleat troops to be in readiness on the first signal, and made the last decisive attempt, on which the capture of the town depended.

On the east and south Carthagea was washed by the sea, on the west and part of the south it was defended by a kind of lake of different depths, according to the ebb and flow of the tide, which was observed to be at regular hours every day. When the water in the lake began to ebb, Scipio commanded five hundred men to be ready to assault the town on the side covered by the lake; they came there when the height of the water was almost level with the banks: by degrees it subsided and the lake became insensibly

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fordable. All the Romans ignorant of the communication of the lake with the sea, by which through long windings the water returned, cried out a miracle, and took this event for a sure and clear token of Neptune's protection;* they had therefore only to execute the will of the Deity upon a town which they no longer doubted he meant to give up to the Romans. Courage supported by a spirit of superstition ever blind and cruel, knows no dangers which it will not attempt to surmount; the Carthaginians who guarded the gate opposite the camp being forced, those who defended the walls, surprised in a quarter from which they had not suspected an attack, lost instantly all courage, and were obliged at last to yield to superior force. On the side of the lake the walls were covered with Romans, on the camp side the gate was broken down, and Carthage saw herself in a moment filled with conquerors.

Nothing now remained to be carried but the citadel. Scipio at the head of a thousand men marched to the attack without giving the ardour and confidence of his soldiers time to cool. Mago who had retreated into it, thought at first of making some resistance; but the enemy being in possession of the town, and his troops but few, what could he hope from a resistance as rash as it would have been fruitless? He therefore determined to surrender, sent to capitulate with Scipio who granted him his life, and surrendered the citadel to the Romans.

As soon as Scipio was master of the town, he gave orders that all who were found in arms should be put to death without exception, until a signal was given for stopping the carnage, a common

* T. Liv. Polyb.

mon custom with the Romans in sacking towns taken by assault, intended to terrify all who might be tempted to stand the risk of such an attack; the signal being given it all ceased. Scipio however allowed the soldiers the pillage he had promised them, and it was immense in a place which contained the plunder of all Spain, and also much of the riches of Africa.*

All was brought to the square and given up to the military Tribunes to be distributed to the army, who divided it with great justice and impartiality. Those who were not present in the action, being sick or on other duty, had each their share; all was sold by auction, and the money arising from the sale distributed equally to each legion. As to the sums which were found in gold or silver, they were delivered to the questors to be put in the public treasury; they amounted to six hundred talents, which, added to four hundred Scipio had brought from Italy, enabled him to support without inconvenience the immense expence of a foreign war.

When Scipio had got rid of these cares, consequent upon a victory which required his immediate attention, he gave audience to the wife of Mandonius, brother of Indibilis, who was among the prisoners. This princess cast herself at his feet as soon as she saw him,† and with tears intreated him to have a little more respect for her and her attendants than the Carthaginians had shewn her. She was a woman of a mature age, and bore in her countenance those marks of a greatness of soul which no misfortunes could efface. Scipio touched with her behaviour, demanded in what those, to whom she had been entrusted, had failed to-

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wards

* Polyb.

† Anno R. 542. Ante C. 210.

wards her, and whether they had not treated her with all the respect due to her rank. While she remained silent, Scipio called for those who had the charge of her before he had taken Tarragona, and asked them if they had refused her any thing she desired: they assured him the Carthaginians had prevented all her wants and all her wishes. She threw herself at his feet a second time without speaking, but he raising her up, assured her he would give such strict orders that she should have nothing to desire. "You don't understand my complaints, O Scipio," says she, "as you seem to think they regard necessities only." Scipio having cast his eyes upon the ladies of her suite, whose beauty was equal to their youth, apprehended her meaning. "Be satisfied," says he tenderly, and taking her by the hand, "that the ladies your attendants need not be under the least apprehension, I shall have the same regard for you and them as I would for my children and my own sisters. I give you my honour, have not the least diffidence of those about you, I will be answerable for *them* to whose care I entrust you."

The victory had like to have been fatal to the whole army; two soldiers who were said to have first ascended the walls of the town, contended warmly for the mural crown: they were mutually supported by the officers and men of their several legions; the dispute went so far that Scipio was obliged to appoint officers to decide it: but the slowness and uncertainty of a judicial decision are not made for military quarrels, they were on the point of coming to blows. Scipio put an end to the disturbance by decreeing a mural crown to each, assuring the army that he found upon strict enquiry, the two claimants had mounted the wall in the very same instant.

Having

Having got rid of this danger he encountered another * much more delicate and difficult to be resisted. A party of his men hoping to catch him in a weakness the greatest men are but too subject to, brought to Scipio a young Spanish lady of quality, of such striking beauty that she charmed all beholders. Scipio was of an age in which the passions exert their empire with almost irresistible force, he was seven and twenty, his person noble and amiable; his soldiers doubted not but he would be sensible to the charms of this young beauty; they thought they presented him with an inestimable treasure. "You are not mistaken, soldiers," says he to them, fondly viewing the young Spaniard, "behold a present the most acceptable you could have made me at any other time; but taken up with the cares of my command, I have not a moment to give to pleasures."

Having afterwards received some account of this young captive, who with her mother was bathed in tears, he learnt that she was promised in marriage to a young prince of Spain named Allucio, whom she loved, and who sighed for her alone. He sent to enquire for Allucio, together with the young lady's relations. "Young prince," says he, "I know the regard this lovely girl has for you, I also am acquainted with your passion for her; she has been in safe hands ever since she has been in my power, and I now restore her to you as fond, as faithful, and as worthy of you as she was before she came under my protection; I am delighted in having it in my power to contribute to so sweet an union, upon which the happiness of both depends;

* T. Liv.

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“ depends; I trust I do each of you such a service as gives me a right to expect some return, and I expect that henceforwards you will become friends to the Roman people. If what I now do for you raises in your minds any favourable idea of me, believe that Rome is wholly peopled with citizens who would all do the same in the same circumstances.”

Allucio astonished with admiration, grasped Scipio's hands, beseeching the gods to assist his weak voice, in expressing the feelings and desires of his heart to repay the immense obligations he owed him. He had judged of the Romans by the Carthaginians, he thought them as rapacious; and in this persuasion had brought all his treasures with him, to redeem his greatest treasure, his love. Scipio long persisted to refuse them, but as Allucio still pressed his acceptance, he consented they should lay them down; “ but it is only,” added he, “ that I may be permitted to present them to your bride, and that they may be looked upon as part of her fortune, as much as if she had received them from her own family.”

After much friendly dispute the Spanish prince's generosity was obliged to submit to Scipio's, he therefore acquiesced and returned home with the young princess, publishing together the praises of their benefactor. “ He is not a mere man,” said they, “ to all they met, or if he is he equals the gods in grandeur and elevation of sentiment; he triumphs over his enemies by his arms, and when he has subdued them he engages their affections by his kindnesses.” He returned soon after to rejoin Scipio at the head of a corps of cavalry of fourteen hundred men, and
never

never left him during the continuance of the war in Spain.

Allucio not satisfied with these proofs of his zeal, wished to record his own gratitude and Scipio's generosity, by a testimony which might convey both the one and the other to prosperity; with this view he caused a votive shield to be made, on which he was represented receiving from Scipio's hands the young princess to whom he was engaged. I have seen this memorial, as remarkable as it is valuable, in the king's cabinet of medals, where it is at this day, after having lain almost nineteen hundred years in the river Rhone, where it is certain Scipio's baggage was lost on his return from Spain to Italy. This shield was found by a very extraordinary accident in the year 1659; it contains forty-six marks of pure silver, which is worth about thirteen hundred livres of our (French) money; it is twenty-six inches in diameter. The plain uniform taste which reigns through the whole design, in the attitudes and the contours, shews the simplicity of the arts in those days, when they avoided all foreign ornaments to be the more attentive to natural beauties.

Scipio by these actions gave proofs of his prudence, his virtue, and his disinterestedness; he delayed giving instances of his clemency only till occasions offered of shewing them; the hostages detained by the Carthaginians for the fidelity of the neighbouring nations at Carthagera, afforded him one. He ordered them before him, and addressed them with gentleness and good-breeding; he exhorted them not to repine at their situation, he added he intended to give them their liberty, and that they might inform their families of it; but that he expected as a grateful return, that their
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several states should enter into alliances with the republic; that he ardently wished it, and that they might acquaint their friends and relations, he impatiently waited their coming to conclude them with him. When he had finished his discourse he caused the younger of both sexes to approach him, and loaded them with presents suitable to their different ages and sexes. Thus did Scipio avail himself of his first victory in Spain. The virtues he exhibited excited more of love and esteem in all hearts than his arms did of fear and admiration.

Lastly, he called for the inhabitants whose lives had been spared, and whom the fate of Carthage taken by storm, had, according to the Roman laws, reduced to slavery. He picked out the youngest and most expert workmen, as well in the manufacture of arms as in the construction, armament, equipment, and manning of ships, in which line the Carthaginians were particularly excellent: he promised to make their condition as easy as possible, and even flattered them with hopes of attaining their liberty, in assuring them he would make no difference between them and the Roman citizens, if they would exert the same spirit and attach themselves sincerely to the republic,* of which they should never have cause to complain. The rest who amounted to near eight thousand men were sent to Rome as slaves, under the command of Lælius; he intended by this to give his fellow-citizens certain proofs of his great successes, and to raise their hopes of the entire recovery of Spain. The sight of Mago governor of Carthage, of fifteen senators who accompanied him, with a vast number of the most distinguished

* T. Liv. Polyb.

distinguished Carthaginians, tended greatly to revive the courage of the Romans, which so many defeats had cast down.

The advantages which Scipio reaped from the capture of Carthagera, were infinite from the number of sailors he found there: he augmented the compliment of men in the Roman fleet; of the Carthaginian ships he found in the port, he reserved eighteen of the best and lightest, which he manned with Romans, and which in a few days were ready to sail at a moment's warning; he added to them thirty-six, which Lælius had before under his command, and formed a fleet not afraid of any thing.

As the taking Carthagera had diminished, as well as fatigued his troops, he resolved to give them respite, and to spend the remainder of the summer in his new conquest; but he wished even in his leisure to make himself as useful to his country as in the heat of action: he exercised his fleet daily, made it put out to sea and go through all the different modes of attack and defence.

The land forces were out also incessantly, as well to prevent them from being corrupted by idleness, as to make them still more perfect in their business; the cavalry were on horseback several days in the week, and the infantry had every day some varied employment. Scipio was present at all these reviews; he made the legions go through all the different movements of war, such as wheeling evolutions, the manner of opening their ranks, of closing them again, of separating, of rejoining, of charging and of sustaining a charge; nothing was neglected in these military exercises.

While he was thus employed on the outside of Carthagera, the town was full of artists, at work
upon

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upon all sorts of instruments, of arms and utensils necessary both for the sea and land service.* The walls and fortifications had been considerably damaged in the siege; Scipio who was wanted elsewhere, took care to have them repaired before his departure: he left a good garrison in the place under the command of an able lieutenant, and moved at last for Tarragona, where he had appointed a general assembly of the allies.† He put himself at the head of his legions, the fleet following him by sea. On his march he met with several deputies who were coming to him to Carthagera; he dismissed those whose business was more easily settled, and sent the rest back to Tarragona, where he arrived soon after with the army. He formed alliances with the greater part of the neighbouring people, whom he kept firm to their engagements by performing rather more than he promised, and this town being more inland and nearer to the enemy, he here fixed his head quarters.

The Carthaginian generals wished much to conceal from their troops the loss of Carthagera, but in spite of their precautions an event of such a nature could not be long kept secret: they felt the importance of the loss they had sustained; they knew it was irreparable; they attempted however to keep their men ignorant of it by lessening to them the advantages of Scipio's success, and the detriment their own affairs would suffer by it. They gave out that the young proconsul boasted with much complacency of a trifling affair, and that the loss of Carthagera was of no consequence to them; besides, that the Romans did not get possession of it by an open attack, but by surprise,‡ and

* Polyb. † T. Liv. Polyb.

‡ Anno R. 542. Ante C. 210.

and that the conquest they obtained by such despicable means, was but little to their honour; that they hoped soon to have their revenge, and that they who had so often vanquished the Romans might make this young darer experience the like fate with his father and uncle.

Scipio secured his conquest by gaining, during the winter, which he passed at Tarragona, the affections of all the neighbouring nations. Edescon a famous Spanish captain, who was grown grey in arms and laurels, was the first who had the boldness to quit the Carthaginians. The conduct of this man, so high in repute, was a decisive example to most of the other chiefs of the country; Mandonius and Indibilis, two of the most powerful Princes of Spain, delayed not, after his desertion, to join the Romans.

Though these people were esteemed by the Romans as barbarians, they conducted themselves however with much prudence. These two princes having demanded a conference with Scipio before they took part with the Romans, Indibilis thus addressed him in the name of Mandonius and his whole nation. "We know," says he, "that the name of a deserter has ever been held in abhorrence by all people; he becomes odious to the party he quits, and suspected by that he joins. Consider, Sir, therefore," says he, "not the character under which we now appear before you, but the motives, and you will have such an idea of our change as it merits. We have long assisted the Carthaginians against your republic; troops, supplies, every succour they could expect of us, our very blood, was all at their service: in return we have received no-
" thing

“ thing but outrage, violence, the most atrocious perfidy; and what has been most grating of all to us, we have been obliged to bear in this tyranny with a most insulting pride.— Though we have not deserted them till to-day, we have all long since been Romans in our hearts; we would willingly attach ourselves only to men who have a sense of right and justice, we have not found them in the Carthaginians, we trust we shall be more fortunate with you: This is the sole reason which has determined us to change; time will prove the truth of this discourse, and the sincerity of our professions.”

Scipio who by this alliance was in a condition of being no longer afraid of the Carthaginians, received the two kings with all the distinction due to their rank; he assured them that far from thinking ill of them for deserting a people who paid no respect to laws human or divine, he conceived of them on the contrary such an advantageous idea as their proceeding would naturally excite. He had brought with him from Carthage their wives and children, whom the Carthaginians had kept as hostages for their fidelity. He was desirous of being a witness of the tenderness of their first meeting, after such a long separation, in which each had run so many risks and dangers. By the part he took in their happiness he seemed to stand in the same predicament, as if he had himself found his own friends and relations.

The next day after the arrival of Mandonius and Indibilis at Tarragona, the alliance was concluded; they took solemnly in the sight of the gods and the people, both those of Tarragona and the Romans, an oath to be inviolably attached to the Romans, and to serve them against their enemies;

enemies; they then departed to return again presently at the head of their troops. It was still winter, and the legions were yet in their quarters; thus did Scipio improve a season which admitted of no other advantages over the Carthaginians than those of negociation. While he stayed at Tarragona, his civility, his generosity, his attention to prevent, and favour the wishes of the whole Spanish nation, contributed as happily as his arms to compleat the conquest of Spain, which was so gloriously commenced by the taking of Carthage. He was esteemed in all the provinces not so much as a conqueror, as an universal benefactor, the deliverer of the people whom the Carthaginians had ever oppressed with the severest tyranny.

Winter being over the Roman generals opened the campaign at once in the several provinces. Fabius and Marcellus, in Italy, were employed in driving out Hannibal, who persisted in maintaining his ground there. Never were there two great men, who of tempers most opposite agreed so well together. It is notorious that the valour of Fabius often consisted in remaining inactive in the face of an enemy, whom to retard was to conquer. Able to beat him, he chose rather to save his men than expose them in an engagement which he looked upon as unnecessary. Hannibal could not escape; Fabius wished only to drive him out by constantly attending him; a most extraordinary conduct, the wisdom of which was proved by its success.

Marcellus on the other hand was for ever in action, his unwearied ardour would never suffer Hannibal to be at rest, he was constantly marching and countermarching, in action, in an attack,

or in a retreat: if he gained the victory, the next day was a day of fresh combat; if he was beat it was the same.* O, heavens! cried Hannibal, vexed with this unceasing pursuit, what conduct can I adopt with this man? Victorious, or vanquished, he neither gives nor takes any rest.—Must I resolve like him to be eternally in action.

Scipio, who knew how important it was in war to be early in the field, was eager to begin his operations.† Impatient as he was, he however thought proper to wait the return of Lælius, who had been sent to Rome with the prisoners taken at Carthagera. He was his dearest friend, his prudence made him his counsellor, and his valour the companion of his glory; he would not undertake any thing without him. As soon as he arrived Scipio drew the legions out of their quarters, and marched towards Asdrubal, brother to Hannibal, who commanded that army of the enemy which lay nearest. This general saw with regret the universal desertion of all Spain: he wished to restore the honour of his arms, and to confirm by some brilliant action the wavering faith of the few remaining allies. Scipio, to whom a continuation of success was equally necessary, to keep to his party a people whose fickleness he well knew, marched towards the Carthaginians, with as much ardour as Asdrubal approached the Roman army. Animated each by the same motives, they hastened to engage; the two armies met at Bæzula, or Bætula.

Upon hearing the Roman general had marched, Asdrubal pitched his camp in a very advantageous post in the plain of Castulo, where he made a stand.

* Plut. in Marc.

† Anno R. 543. Ante C. 209.

a stand. His rear was covered by a river, which protected it from insult; in his front was a plain inclosed by a rising ground: this plain was sufficiently sunk to keep him under cover, and yet of extent enough to contain an army drawn out in line of battle. Scipio came in sight of his camp. Asdrubal, secure in his situation, made no movement on his approach, well persuaded he would not dare attempt to force him.

The conduct of the Carthaginian, who contented himself with entrenching in sight of the Roman army, embarrassed Scipio exceedingly; he had not doubted but he would have been the first to offer battle. If it was dangerous to attack him on account of the strength of his post, it was not less so to delay it, or to retreat. If he delayed, Asdrubal might be joined by Mago, and Asdrubal the son of Gisco; if he determined to retire, he might be encountered by these two generals, and be surrounded by the three armies. In this extremity, Scipio resolved to trust a little to the fortune of war and the bravery of his men, and to attempt to force Asdrubal's camp.

He reminded his soldiers that the walls of Carthagera were much higher than the intrenchments of Asdrubal's camp, and yet the enemy was not able to repel them. He then observed to them that the weakness of the Carthaginians was evident, from their encamping, and that he plainly perceived they depended more on the situation and advantage of the ground than on their arms, or their courage. He went also through all the ranks with that air of confidence which was natural to him, and which raised the courage of the most timid; he even pointed at the Carthaginians with a kind of contempt.

Having thus encouraged his army, he sent some light armed troops to insult Asdrubal's advanced guard; he took one part of the legions, and gave the other to Lælius, directing him to turn the hill, to encrease the ardour of his men. Asdrubal remained for some time a tranquil spectator of the skirmish between the light armed and his advanced guard; but perceiving that Scipio followed them, and was advancing towards him, he moved at last and attempted to form his line. The legions would not give him time; while the Carthaginians were beginning to form, Scipio charged them so briskly in flank, and Lælius in the rear, that it had not so much the appearance of an engagement as of a rout and defeat.

Asdrubal's only resource, who could neither stop nor rally his men, was to cut his way through and retreat; this he had the good fortune to effect, and to arrive quickly at the banks of the Tagus, which he also passed with as many as were able to follow him. This retreat was well conducted. In case of a defeat, he had, before the battle, had the precaution to send the elephants, the treasure of the army, and every thing of value, on the other side the river; he then passed the Pyrenees, and was some time after killed in an engagement, while on his march to join Hannibal, as tenderly regretted by his brother and the Carthaginians, as he was generally esteemed by the Romans.

Scipio gave up the Carthaginian camp to pillage,* with an order however to avoid shedding blood, and that none should be put to death but such as refused quarter. In this affair he took 12000 prisoners, viz. 10000 foot and 2000 horse.

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* T. Liv. Polyb.

He caused all the Africans to be sold by the questors, they being slaves by their capture; as for the Spaniards he gave them their liberty, and whatever they could ascertain as their property in the plunder. His manner of granting these favours was still more engaging than the favours themselves; he seemed to feel a more lively joy than they who reaped the advantage; and this attached those hearts to him, which were capable of sentiment, by the strongest tie.

When these Spaniards, accustomed to the severity of the Carthaginians, were informed of the humane order which Scipio had issued in their favour, and were witnesses of the air of kindness with which it was pronounced, all with one universal shout saluted him their king, and conjured him to accept of the title which their gratitude conferred on him.

The offer was very flattering to a young man, who in the flower of his age, found himself at the head of an army much more numerous than that he had received from the republic; and at such a distance from Rome, the troubles of Italy would have favoured him, had he inclined to have worn the crown which was offered him; perhaps also he might have forced the senate and people of Rome to invest him with that absolute power, which they at last gave up to Cæsar.

But Cæsar was an ambitious man, more attached to self-interest than to the glory and welfare of his country. Scipio on the contrary, was a real patriot, who, born in a free republic, esteemed it most iniquitous to deprive it of its liberty, to subject it to sovereign power, and to avail himself, for the effecting such a treason, of the finances and forces of the state. He proclaimed silence by an

herald, to check the indiscreet zeal of the people, and gave them to understand by his discourse; that the only title grateful to him, was that of commander (imperator) which his soldiers had bestowed upon him; that royalty, so coveted in other nations, was at Rome abhorred; and that he intreated them not to give him any more a title so odious to a republican. He added, that the most honourable distinction between kings and other men, was that which was founded in virtue, viz. in the love of beneficence and justice, in which he would ever contend with them for the superiority.

The people at last desisted from calling him king. The steadiness with which he refused this proud title, while it made him the admiration of all Spain, gained him the entire love and esteem of the Romans, whom he wished to excel only in abilities and virtue.

While they were dividing the plunder, he ordered all the Spanish princes who had been with him in the battle to be called, and made presents to each, suitable to their rank and worthy of the Roman greatness. Indibilis had to his share twelve hundred horses, selected out of all that were taken.

The quaestor in selling the Africans, met with a youth who affected him by his beauty and sweetness of countenance; understanding that he was of royal blood, he sent him to the general.

Scipio asked the young prisoner who he was,* and what had brought him into the army at so early an age? He replied, with an openness suitable to his years, that he was a Numidian, that his name was Massiva, that he had lost his father, and was educated by Gala one of his uncles, a king of Numidia. He added, that he came over

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to Spain with Massinissa, another uncle, when he brought a reinforcement of cavalry to the Carthaginians; that Massinissa having constantly prevented his appearing in the field, on account of his youth, he had taken his arms, mounted his horse, and had actually assisted in the battle.—

“ My horse fell in the action,” added he, “ and the Romans made me a prisoner.” “ Would you like to return to your uncle ?” says Scipio tenderly to him. “ Should I wish it ? Should I like it ?” answered Massiva, “ there is no thing I so ardently desire.” Scipio embraced him, gave him a gold ring, a Spanish habit and armour, a horse magnificently caparisoned, with many other presents, and ordered an escort of cavalry to conduct him to the end of his wishes.

After the battle of Bæzula, Scipio was advised to pursue Asdrubal; he hesitated for some time, but at last the apprehension that Asdrubal might be joined by the other Carthaginian generals, checked him; he returned to Tarragona, where he employed the remainder of the summer in making further alliance with the Spaniards.*

Asdrubal in quitting Spain with the remains of his army, did not weaken the Carthaginian force so much, but that it was still superior to the Roman. The troops of Mago and the other Asdrubal, the son of Gisco, having joined, composed an army of 70000 foot and 4000 horse; besides which they had thirty-two elephants, which encouraged them the more, as the enemy had none. The Roman army was but 45000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, so that the forces on each side were very far from being equal.

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* An. R. 435. Ante C. 209.

The troops of Mandonius and Indibilis, which had so greatly augmented Scipio's army, gave him continual uneasiness. Whether his penetration had seen into the designs of these princes, which were soon after apparent, or that, in spite of their dissimulation, they were themselves betrayed, Scipio began to suspect their good-faith and constancy; but he was as cautious to conceal these suspicions as he was careful to justify them.

Asdrubal and Mago opening the campaign as soon as the season would permit, resolved to try again the fate of a battle, before they were weakened by the desertion of their allies, and Scipio had time to treat farther with them. With this view, they moved out of their quarters, and halted at Elinga, at the foot of a mountain, where they fortified their camp with an intrenchment, having in their front a plain fit to engage in.

As soon as Scipio was informed of their march, he collected in haste, with his allies, all the troops he could, and sent Sillanus to receive a reinforcement of three thousand foot and five hundred horse, which Coleas intended for him. This succour animated the army and the general, but did not do away the suspicions he had of the Spanish princes; however, the Roman forces without them were too weak to engage in a decisive battle.

On the other hand, it would not be prudent to hazard, on the doubtful faith of the allies, an action of such importance. In these critical circumstances it was that Scipio knew how to determine with a surprising quickness of mind, concealing at the same time from his soldiers, his real distress by an assumed confidence; he therefore took his measures instantly, and resolved to draw as considerable an advantage from the Spaniards,

as if they were in the engagement, yet without employing them.

As soon as he had determined upon this, he moved towards the enemy, and as he had foreseen that he could not fail of being attacked while he was pitching his camp, he placed three thousand men in ambush, behind a rising ground, and advanced with his army to encamp near it. Mago, who thought he could not expect a more favourable opportunity to charge the Romans, presently fell into the snare, persuaded that he should surprize the Romans by an attack which they could not be prepared for. He took with him Massinissa and almost all the cavalry, and fell with great impetuosity on the enemy's troops.

Scipio's cavalry came forward out of their ambush, and so terrified Mago and his soldiers, that the greatest part fled with such precipitation, that numbers of the horses fell. The Romans, remarkably expert at mounting and dismounting, cut these fugitives in pieces; there were some however who for a while kept together. The fight was irregular, and sustained with vigour on the part of the Carthaginians, until being taken in the rear, they broke and dispersed without any order. A trifling advantage in itself, but considerable in its consequences, as it encreased the courage of the Romans in proportion as it abated that of the Carthaginians, who no longer fought but they were conquered.

The armies drew out in order of battle for several days, but did not come to action; there were a few skirmishes between the light armed troops, but nothing decisive. Scipio to amuse the enemy, formed his order of battle as usual; the Romans occupied the center, and the Spaniards

niards the wings. Asdrubal regulating the arrangement of his troops by that of the Roman general, placed the Africans, who were the flower of his army, in the center; and in the wings, his allies and elephants. His conduct determined Scipio in a design of executing a stratagem, which succeeded as happily as it was conceived ingeniously.

The day which he fixed upon for bringing on a general engagement, he directed the Tribunes to order the army to take nourishment, and march out of the camp. Before the main body had got out, he caused the cavalry and light infantry to move, with orders to advance close under the enemy's lines, and enter boldly into action. The soldiers, who burned with impatience to engage, obeyed with ardour, and by their joy shewed the sure hope they had of victory. Scipio followed them closely, and found the fight begun. Asdrubal being surprised, was obliged to send his cavalry against the Romans, fasting: he ranged his troops as usual, not having time to observe Scipio's new disposition.

While the light infantry and cavalry were skirmishing, without any advantage gained on either side, the Romans made no movement; but the day advancing, Scipio made his infantry file off through the intervals of the cohorts, and placed them in the wings behind the light-armed and the cavalry, who were drawn up in order of battle, and marched immediately in front to the enemy, as if he meant to attack him in that manner; but before he came quite up to the Carthaginians, he caused his men to make such an evolution as embarrassed the opposite generals not a little.

The right, which Scipio commanded, wheeled
to

to the right; and the left, which was under Martius and Sillanus, wheeled to the left; in such a manner, that by these contrary movements, as if the two wings had marched one against the other, the right became the left, and the left the right, and by some subsequent motions, they who followed, being in a line with those who were foremost, the Roman army was formed in columns; and the Romans occupied the wings. As for the Spaniards, who were now in the center, Scipio had ordered them to advance slowly, and remain quiet in their post, and not to move till they received the signal from him.

The Carthaginian's wings, composed of their worst troops, who had seldom any thing to do except with the Spaniards, did not long sustain the effort of the legions, who attacked them with incredible fury; the elephants which were placed there incommoded greatly, and almost equally, both parties, in flying on all sides to avoid the attacks of the Roman cavalry. After some resistance, the wings at length gave way, and were broken to pieces. The Africans, who were in the center, saw their disorder with that shame and rage which valour inspires on such occasions; but they durst not quit their posts to give them assistance; the Spaniards who fronted them, and whom they all the while supposed to be Romans, kept them constantly in awe, the fear of being attacked when they moved not suffering them either to quit or weaken the center.

Asdrubal, assured of the defeat of his wings who had engaged, fasting, for a long time with the Romans, whom Scipio had enabled to sustain such an action with vigour, gave orders to sound a retreat,* which was made for some time regularly:

* An. R. 543. Ante C. 209.

larly : but Scipio who pursued him soon changed it into a general rout ; and had it not been for a violent storm, which arose most opportunely to save the Carthaginians, the Romans would have forced their camp, into which Asdrubal retired hastily with considerable loss.

Thus did Scipio gain the victory of Elinga, opposing art to numbers, and engaging the strongest part of his army with the weakest of the enemy's. This was the last regular engagement the Carthaginians had with the Romans in Spain. Asdrubal returned soon after into Africa ; and Mago, in spite of the repugnance he felt at abandoning so bright a conquest to the Roman republic, was forced, by orders from the senate of Carthage, to march into Italy with the remains of his troops, to strengthen Hannibal's army. (*b*)

The ferocity of the Astapians delivered them from the Roman power ; but it was by an expedient too extraordinary to be passed over in silence.

Astapa was a small town,* erected on a mountain, without either fortifications or garrison. Lucius Martius, he who acquired such reputation before the arrival of Scipio, and who commanded a separate corps of troops, summoned it to surrender ; to which no attention was paid. The inhabitants, accustomed to pillaging, were unwilling to submit to a power, under which they must have lived peaceably and on a good footing with their neighbours, without being allowed to commit any violence or injustice. They held the Romans in abhorrence, and fancying themselves sufficiently strong by their hatred alone, resolved to perish rather than surrender. They were not ignorant of the Roman usage towards towns taken
by

(*b*) Note II. * T. Liv.

by assault; they knew that all in them were either put to death or condemned to slavery, and that the places which they stormed were immediately given up to pillage. They had heaped together at Astapa the plunder of the whole country, and amassed immense riches by rapine and murders. Martius offered them their lives and liberties if they would give up their wealth; but it was dearer to them than life itself; they therefore refused it at such a price, and could not bring themselves to assent that the fruit of so many years employed in injustice and robbery, should pass into the possession of their mortal enemies. They caused their gold and silver money, and whatever they had of value, to be brought into the market-place; then, with a firmness worthy of a better motive, they placed upon this heap their old people, their wives and children; they enclosed them with a circle of faggots ready to be lighted, and placed a guard of fifty young men, with orders to set the whole on fire, and not suffer a single person to escape, if they were beaten in the sally they were then going to make upon the Romans.

Having taken these fatal precautions, they all devoted themselves to death by the most horrible imprecations, and swore to kill themselves if they were worsted in the combat, rather than submit to the republic. Full of this terrible resolution they briskly sallied out. Martius, who never thought them capable of this rashness, was surpris'd; the first posts were carried: they observed no order in the action, but fought with such fury that at first nothing could withstand them. Martius, towards whose lines they resolutely advanced, had time to form a body of veterans, who knew not how to retreat or give way though death stared them in the

110 LIFE OF SCIPIO AFRICANUS.

the face; they attacked them like men in despair, and, not being able to conquer, were all killed, so that not a single man remained.

The news of this defeat soon reached Astapa,* and produced in that town a most cruel tragedy: the fifty young men, being informed of the loss of their fellow citizens, set fire to the pile, which inclosed all that these wretched men had left that was most dear and valuable, a vast number of women and children, who were rash enough to subscribe to the barbarous resolution of their husbands and parents, yet had not constancy enough to bear the terrible attacks of the devouring flame; but the young men had the inhumanity to drive again into the blazing pile their half-burned bodies, and to cut in pieces those they were unable to force back. After so great a carnage, tired of living themselves as well as of killing their fellow citizens, reeking with the blood they had shed, they threw themselves into the midst of the flames to avoid the Romans. Thus perished the Astapians, by such an excess of pride and fury as makes humanity shudder at the relation. They shewed, in thus sacrificing themselves, the immoderate antipathy they bore to a nation which had loaded all their country with acts of kindness, and the excessive transport the human heart is susceptible of, when inflamed by its passions.

The conflagration disappointed Martius's army of their plunder. Some of the soldiers seeing the most precious metals running out of the pile, could not resist the desire to snatch from the flames the treasures they consumed; but the fire was so fierce that they could save nothing, even though some perished in the attempt. Martius received
the

* T. Liv.

LIFE OF SCIPIO AFRICANUS. 111

the submission of several towns, and returned to join Scipio at Carthagera.

In this winter it was that Scipio, who now looked upon Spain as entirely subdued, and carried his views into the heart of Africa, as Hannibal had directed his into the center of Italy, sent Lælius on an embassy to Syphax, the most powerful king in all Numidia, as well in wealth as troops, and above all in the goodness of his cavalry.* Syphax was at this time an ally of the Carthaginians; but Scipio made no doubt that his fidelity would depend much on the success of their arms; and their affairs in Spain being now desperate, he flattered himself he should find no great difficulty in engaging him in his interest. Lælius arrived at his court, charged with magnificent presents, which the prince seemed to receive with pleasure; but when he came to sound him on the proposed alliance, Syphax answered, that it was too great an honour for him to reject, but that he could not engage except with Scipio in person; that if he would come over, he should have no cause to repent of the journey.

This voyage was not a little dangerous;* Scipio perceived that he should greatly expose himself, in going to a prince whose character was not remarkable for his strict good faith: but then the alliance with Syphax was of such vast importance to his designs, that he thought the danger he should run by no means sufficient to deter him from his enterprise.

Deep reflection on Hannibal's successes, had discovered to him the cause of them. He justly attributed them to one essential point, the advantage

* An. R. 543. Ante C. 209. † T. Liv.

tage of his cavalry over that of the Romans; all that Italy and the allies could furnish, were in every respect inferior to the African horse, and especially to that of Numidia, which was the most perfect. The sole object of the alliance he proposed entering into with Syphax, or any other Numidian prince, was to deprive the Carthaginians of this advantage, by sharing it with them.

Such were the reasons, sufficiently decisive with those who feel the force of them, which induced this great man to lay aside his wonted prudence. Besides exposing his life and liberty to Syphax, he ran a still greater risk at Rome. Every general was restrained, under pain of death, from quitting his army, by moving out of his province. Thus Fabius, that austere observer of the laws,* reproached him some time after with having infringed this ordinance. Scipio was not ignorant of this, but while he rendered himself obnoxious to the republic, by the infraction of one of the most important laws of the state, the vastness of his projects, and the justness of his views, presented to him an assured pardon in the conquest of Africa. Carthage subdued, promised him the most brilliant triumph that had ever been decreed at Rome: and if any unforeseen event should happen to frustrate an enterprise so wisely concerted, he had resolution enough to destine himself, beforehand, to that banishment which he knew would be the sure wages of the ill success of his arms. Sentiments arising much less from a flattering forward ambition, than from his unbounded love of his country, for which he boldly exposed, by this voyage to the court of Syphax, his fame, his fortune, and his life. Full of these hopes and fears,

* An. R. 546. Ante C. 206.

fears, he appointed Martius to the government of Tarragona, and Sillanus to that of Carthagera, while Lælius and he, without suffering the least hint of their design to transpire, embarked privately, each of them in a galley of five ranks of rowers.

It happened that Asdrubal, the son of Gisco, led by the same motive as the Roman general, entered the port of the town where Syphax resided, on the same day with him. He was about to take in his sails, and let go his anchors, when he discovered the proconsul's galleys: he knew them to be Roman vessels; the soldiers and sailors of Asdrubal's ships immediately prepared to attack them, promising themselves an easy and sure conquest; but the wind proved so favourable to the Romans, and carried them so swiftly into the port, that they were in before the Carthaginians could get under way to attack them; and out of respect to the royal residence, they did not dare to attempt any thing further.

Asdrubal landed first, and soon after Scipio and Lælius went on shore, so that the two generals arrived nearly in the same instant at Syphax's palace. It was a most flattering day for this prince, who had thus with him the chiefs of the two greatest powers on earth, soliciting his alliance at the same time. He received them with every mark of respect, and lodged them in his palace; he also entertained them at the same table, without shewing the least distinction to either, even so far, that to avoid all appearance of preference, they were seated at table upon the same couch.

Scipio on one hand desirous of pleasing Syphax, and on the other unwilling to disoblige Asdrubal,

contrived to make the most of several subjects in themselves not at all interesting. To gain Syphax he had recourse only to a conversation, the graces and liveliness of which could not be sufficiently admired; he persuaded by pleasing; the air of his countenance, the sweetness of his expressions, a secret charm diffused into all he said, and the manner in which he said it, secured him the hearts of all his hearers. Syphax was not tired with listening, and Asdrubal, who had never seen him but at the head of his legions, became the most sincere admirer of the person who was his conqueror, and the most dangerous enemy of his country. This great general appeared to him equally great as a politician in the management of business; he was not surprised at the conquest of Spain: he even concluded, that all thoughts of recovering it must be given up while Scipio had the command; and that the Carthaginians would be very fortunate, if they could defend their own country against a young general, with so great an understanding, such engaging address, and such universal experience.

Scipio having had several private conferences with Syphax, gained him over so entirely, that he consented to make an alliance with the Roman republic; the treaty was signed, and after escaping a most violent gale of wind, Scipio returned to Carthagera the fourth day from his departure.

As well to divert the restless temper of the Spaniards, as to keep his soldiers employed, on his arrival he ordered shews of gladiators; the combatants were neither slaves nor convicts, but freemen who engaged purely for the glory of conquest.

The

The grand preparations, the magnificence and novelty of the fight, attracted all the neighbouring people; never was an amphitheatre better filled with actors or spectators.

Two princes of Spain, named Corbis and Ofua, both sons of one father, who was sovereign of Ibis, a small town of Spain,* could not agree about either the possession or government of the place. They resolved to determine their differences in the list, which was open to their animosity, and decide their claims sword in hand in the face of the whole nation.

The elder was the stronger and more vigorous, the younger the more active and expert. Scipio spared no pains to compromise their quarrel, and prevent their coming to blows: but each having protested that he would have no umpire but the god Mars, they entered the pit of the amphitheatre and fought with all the inveteracy and obstinacy of two brothers deaf to the voice of nature. The victory was long doubtful, the elder defending himself by his superior strength, the younger by his skill. At last the fortune of war decided in favour of the elder, who overcame his brother, and put him to death in sight of all the spectators; a victory equally shocking and shameful: a contempt of the most sacred ties of blood was the cause of it, and the abhorrence of the whole assembly, for the unnatural conqueror, was its just reward.†

Much about this time Scipio had occasion for great prudence, on account of a sedition and treason, as dangerous as they were unexpected.‡ He was taken ill at Carthagera, and the attack was

I 2

so

* T. Liv.

† An. R. 546. Ante C. 206.

‡ T. Liv. Polyb.

so violent that a report of his death was spread throughout Spain. The good and honest citizens were afflicted at the news; the bad and ill designing rejoiced, hoping such an event might bring about some change favourable to their interests.

Mandonius and Indibilis, who had entered into an alliance with Scipio, who had given him such fair promises, and made such large protestations of their fidelity, were two traitors concealed under the mask of honesty; their plan was, by taking part alternately with each of the republics, to weaken both, to make themselves masters and sovereigns of Spain, and divide it as soon as they were strong enough.

They complained, that in changing allies they did but change masters, and gained nothing by their new connection; the report of Scipio's death appeared a favourable occasion to revolt, they erected their standard, and set on foot a numerous army.

This defection of the two Spanish princes emboldened the discontented; the troops which Scipio had left on the other side the Iberus, to keep the country in subjection, mutinied. They consisted of 8000 men, who had their head quarters at Sucrona; Scipio's dangerous illness, and the report of his death, was the pretext for their revolt. The leaders of the sedition had formed their scheme long before. Accustomed to have every thing in abundance during the war, at the enemy's expence, they began with murmuring that they were left idle and useless in Spain: they alledged, that if it was conquered they ought to be discharged; but if not, they had a right to partake of the glory and plunder with the rest.

Their pay for some years was in arrear, they
insolently

insolently demanded it of their officers. Inaction had brought their licentiousness to such a pass, that they had no respect even for *them*; they called for their pay instantly, and openly threatened to revolt unless they had it. The Questors had no money, and it was impossible to satisfy them at that time. In vain did the military Tribunes represent the ruin they were running into, and declare that, as to themselves, they would not by any means join in the revolt; nothing could prevent them.

The first step taken was to them a kind of engagement to go on;* authority was trampled upon; a desire and taste of independence possessed all the soldiers, they would have new commanders, and proceeded immediately to the choice of them. Caius Albinus Cælenus and Caius Atticus Umbrus, were elected generals of the revolt. The ensigns of honour annexed to the post of military tribunes would not satisfy their ambition; they had the extravagance to arrogate to themselves the marks of dignity of the consul and proconsul, the battle axes and fasces, and to have them carried before them.

The report of Scipio's death, which had been falsely spread, and had confirmed them in so desperate an undertaking, subsided; they learned that he was recovered, and not without apprehensions of that severe punishment their mutiny deserved.

The conjuncture was very embarrassing to a general at a distance. It is easy to prevent accidents from without, which may be foreseen; but those which arise within, domestic evils, if I may so speak, against which we are less on our guard,

I 3

are

* T. Liv. Polyb.

are much more dangerous. Scipio had occasion for all his wisdom, all his prudence, and all his moderation, to smother this sedition in its birth.

The part he took was to appear ignorant of the crime, and assembling the military tribunes of the army which was at Carthagera, he told them it was but just to pay what was due to the soldiers at Sucrona; that they might come to Carthagera and they should be satisfied. He spoke to the same purpose to some officers, who might inform them of it, and prevail with them to repair to Carthagera; and ordered, in their hearing, great levies of money to reward, says he, the troops. At the same time, to prevent any suspicion, he gave notice to the army to take several days provision, and to hold themselves in readiness to march instantly against Mandonius and Indibilis.

All this was done only to cover his real intentions. He called a council, and therein it was resolved to pardon the many, and punish none but the authors and chiefs of the sedition.* The difficulty was to get them into their power; to employ force would have been dangerous, Scipio therefore was constrained to have recourse to artifice.

He picked out several military tribunes, and instructed them how they might contrive to seize the leaders of the revolt. He directed them to go and meet the mutineers on the day they were to arrive at Carthagera, to approach them with all the signs of friendship and joy at seeing them again; to endeavour to engage the chiefs to come and take up their quarters with them, and promise they should be well entertained; to bring with them each four or five, assuring them their
demands

* An. R. 546. Ante C. 206.

demands would be fully satisfied; to detain them after the entertainment, and have them closely watched by men stationed for that purpose, who should not appear until they seized, and put them in chains.

All Scipio's measures succeeded;* the revolted troops, flattering themselves they had obtained all their demands, repaired to Carthage by the day appointed. The military tribunes acted the part assigned them to perfection; all the chiefs were secured without the least disturbance; a guard placed at the gates of the town as soon as they were entered, prevented any one of them from escaping. Scipio, who had foreseen all this, strictly forbade the soldiers appearing out of their quarters, except those who were to acquaint him with all that passed.

The next day he assembled, on the parade, the 8000 men who arrived the night before, and ordered them to come without their arms. He placed himself in the midst of them, with that air of grandeur and confidence which strikes the guilty with awe, and causes a just terror to take place of an outrageous presumption. As soon as he was seated, the troops from Sucrona were surrounded by a much greater number of armed soldiers. On their appearing all were chilled with fear; Scipio's presence made them begin to reflect, and this terrible train of attendants completed their consternation.† After a profound silence he thus addressed them: "There is no crime which has not something for its object," says he to them, "What could possibly be yours in this revolt? You, who have solemnly sworn to shed the last drop of your blood for your coun-

I 4

" try,

* T. Liv. Polyb. † T. Liv.

“ try, you shamefully betray it : like unnatural
 “ children, you turn your arms against the most
 “ tender of parents ; your friends, your wives,
 “ your little ones, nothing was strong enough to
 “ restrain you. One Cælenus, one Umbrus, as-
 “ sumed the seat of the Scipio’s, and you placed
 “ them there ; they even dared to usurp the en-
 “ signs of their dignity. A Mandonius, an In-
 “ dibilis, perfidious souls ! were to have been
 “ your allies : And against whom did you seek
 “ this criminal alliance ? Against your country,
 “ against Rome ! When it rains stones, when
 “ beasts bring forth monsters, you cry out at the
 “ prodigy : your conduct is much more prodi-
 “ gious and unnatural, and such as cannot be ex-
 “ piated by sacrifice ; even the blood of the
 “ guilty is an insufficient atonement for so hor-
 “ rid a crime. The pay the republic was in ar-
 “ rear to you for your service, sufficed for a pre-
 “ tence ; is it then a spirit of interest that should
 “ animate a Roman to serve ? A whole legion,
 “ 4000 men, were heretofore executed at Rome
 “ for a like sedition ; what would ye then that
 “ I should pronounce on you, who have in the
 “ same manner violated the most sacred engage-
 “ ments ? Could you even imagine I would suf-
 “ fer such presumptuous rashness to go unpunish-
 “ ed ? You shew a sense of your disgrace, re-
 “ morse preys upon you, and announces to me
 “ your repentance ; may it be as sincere as my
 “ grief ; may an action so abominable be bu-
 “ ried in eternal oblivion. I am willing and
 “ happy to pardon the multitude ; but for the
 “ authors and advisers of the crime, they shall
 “ expiate it with their blood. Go, and be your-
 “ selves witnesses of the execution of those un-
 “ worthy

“ worthy chiefs, who owed their infamous elevation to your inconsiderate rashness.”

As soon as he had done speaking, the legions, who surrounded the assembly, terrified them all by the clashing of their arms. Cælenus and Umbrius, bound and naked, and with them one and thirty of the leading mutineers, were brought into the middle of the parade.* A herald read aloud their sentence, to be scourged and beheaded: the execution immediately followed; and while they underwent the punishment, the rest of the rebels took the oaths afresh, between the hands of Scipio and the officers. Thus was the mutiny of Sucrona quelled, which, but for Scipio’s prudence, might have been more prejudicial to the conquest of Spain than all the Carthaginian forces.

Mandonius and Indibilis had retired into their own territories, while the fate of the seditious was determining: when they heard of the punishment and death of the leaders, conscious of the same guilt, they dreaded the same treatment. The Romans having been put to death, there was no likelihood of favour being shewn to *them*, they therefore resolved to sustain the war, and risk all rather than fall into Scipio’s hands.

They assembled their army, composed of 20000 foot and 2500 horse, and advanced boldly into the borders of the Suesitani, allies of the Roman people; it was in this very spot the conspiracy was formed. Scipio knowing the inconstant temper of the nation, determined to attack them before they had time to increase their strength. He called his army together, briefly represented to them the weakness of the enemy, accustomed to attack only flocks and herds, to desolate the lands of defenceless

* An. R. 546. Ante C. 206.

less people, and to live by theft and rapine. "They
 " are not soldiers," says he, "whom we are going
 " to vanquish, but a gang of robbers, whom we will
 " punish for their perfidy.* In this undertaking I
 " am animated by a motive, very different from
 " that upon which I acted, when I was under the
 " necessity of purging away the crime of 8000
 " Romans, with the blood of our own citizens:
 " It was my own blood I shed, they were my own
 " bowels I tore, when I condemned them to
 " death; they were our brethren, a part of our-
 " selves, but these barbarians are connected with
 " us by none of these sacred ties; they are bound
 " to the Roman people only by the faith of
 " treaties, which they have shamefully violated.
 " I take cheerfully upon me the task of avenging
 " the insult they have offered us, in presuming
 " they could betray us with impunity. Yet again,
 " soldiers, do not at all esteem this expedition as
 " a regular war; we are going to assist at an exe-
 " cution, not to give battle.

He then declared he had entirely forgotten the crime of the offending Romans: assured the army of his friendship, and that the arrears due to them from the republic should be paid immediately. Having once more informed them of his design, he announced the morrow for their departure.

In a few days he reached the Iberus, which he passed, and the fourth day after encamped in sight of the two perfidious kings. Close to his camp was a valley, inclosed on all sides with hills; he thought it a convenient situation to prepare an ambush for the enemy: he ordered a number of cattle, many of which had been taken from them, to be driven into this valley: he knew their passion for plunder, and had no doubt but it would be taken with so
 great

* T. Liv.

great a bait. He ordered Lælius to lie hid, behind the hillocks, with a corps of cavalry, ready to charge as soon as the action commenced. The Illergetes (the name of the people over whom Mandonius and Indibilis reigned) ran in crouds and disorder to drive off the cattle. The Romans let them alone for some time; a few advanced singly and cast some darts at a distance; by degrees they joined, they encouraged each other, closed in the action, and the skirmish became a most bloody engagement. Neither had the advantage, and they fought desperately on both sides. Lælius, who fell furiously on the foragers, taking them in the rear, decided it; the Illergetes, who had only infantry, could not sustain the shock of a corps of cavalry quite fresh; the Romans broke them, beat them down, and made a most horrible carnage.

To cover this defeat with a good countenance, Mandonius and Indibilis appeared the next morning at day-break in order of battle; Scipio who longed to come to a decisive action, was not slow in answering their eagerness. Having observed they sent more troops into the valley, both horse and foot, than it could conveniently hold, to engage freely and without confusion, he gave them time to bring down all the foot they could. Not that he was doubtful of his cavalry, but besides that Lælius had a part of it, to surprise the enemy during the combat and cause a diversion, he wished to avail himself of the superiority of his infantry, before which he was sure the Spaniards would not stand long in a regular engagement, and in confined ground, where they were obliged, if I may so say, to fight man to man. A rare presence of mind in a general, in the confusion which
always

always precedes a battle. Scipio never lost it, as attentive to conduct himself by the rules of military art, as he was ever ready and watchful to draw every possible advantage from the errors and mistakes of his adversaries.

As soon as the numbers in the valley were sufficient to embarrass the action and the movements of the Spaniards, Scipio marched against those who were at the foot of the hill; at the same time he ordered four cohorts to move in as close order as possible against those who had imprudently crowded into the valley. He had already obtained great advantages, when Lælius coming on a full trot along the hills which extended from the Roman camp quite to the valley they were engaged in, took the enemy's cavalry in the rear and deprived them of the power or desire of succouring the infantry, by employing their whole attention on their own defence against him. The Spanish foot, who had depended on the support of their horse, deprived of this hope, were soon reduced to the last extremity. The cavalry surrounded and hampered on all sides, (as well by the Roman foot and horse, as by their own infantry) could not make a single movement for want of room; they gave way, fell back upon their own foot, disordered them, broke them, and unable to defend themselves against the Romans following in their rear, made greater havock in the Spanish army than the enemy could have done. The victorious Romans were from this time,* employed not in fighting but in putting to the sword all that came in their way, who could neither resist nor escape them. All who took the field with so great an air of confidence, were cut to pieces, and but a very small number of them got off.

Mando-

* Anno R. 545. Ante C. 206.

Mandonius and Indibilis, who were at the foot of the mountain and had been attacked by Scipio, made no better defence; they perceived in him a master who came to chastise them, rather than an enemy who came to fight with them. More fortunate than such traitors deserved, broken and routed on all sides, they found safety in a sudden flight; the blood of the wretched subjects alone, paid for the inconstancy and perfidy of their sovereigns.

They found at last, though too late, that war was not the most advantageous part for them to take. Made wise by their correction, they resolved to have recourse a second time to the Roman general, whose clemency they were well acquainted with. Mandonius came and cast himself at his feet; he excused his inconstancy by that fatal contagious spirit of revolt, from which even the Romans were not entirely exempt. Scipio, by the laws of war, had a right to disarm them, to require hostages, and to place garrisons in their towns; but having little to fear from them after their defeat, he chose rather to shew them favour, and generously to pardon their treason. He charged Mandonius solely with the whole disgrace, made him sensible that he and Indibilis deserved to perish with all their people; "but it is also becoming the dignity of the Roman people, continued he, to forget the perfidy, when you implore their forgiveness with a sincere repentance." He condemned them to pay the Roman soldiers a part of their arrears, telling them that if he did not take hostages for their fidelity, it was because he intended to punish them only, if they should be so treacherous and ungrateful as to revolt again.

All

All Spain was now subjected to the republic; the Carthaginians who escaped from the war had repassed the seas or were gone to join Hannibal. Scipio's good fortune and abilities had surmounted every obstacle he met with; several towns taken by assault, compleat victories gained in pitched battles against armies of 40 or 50000 men, continual advantages obtained over the Carthaginians, on all occasions, had acquired him the highest reputation which at his age he could possibly attain to: he had deserved too well of his country, not to have a just pretence to the most honourable rewards. The time of naming the consuls was not far off; he had thoughts of repairing to Rome before the election, and to offer himself a candidate for this first office in the republic, at the head of a victorious army. He took order for the security of Spain, placed officers of approved courage and prudence in the government of the principal towns, left garrisons in them proportioned to their strength and situation, and embarked with Lælius and his most particular intimates, to get to Rome by the time of creating consuls.

Massinissa formed a pretence to have an interview with him; the fame, the success of Scipio, the gratitude he owed him for his generosity in restoring his nephew, who was taken at the battle of Bæzula,* had long raised in him an eager desire to know the conqueror of the Carthaginians, and of Massinissa himself, and at the same time his particular benefactor.

This prince had nice terms to keep with the Carthaginians, whose part he had hitherto taken; but the advantages he hoped one day or other to reap from the friendship of Scipio, outweighed the

* Anno R. 546. Ante. C. 206.

the dread of his desertion being discovered in Africa. He used every caution which depended on himself to keep it secret; his messengers settled with Scipio the time and place of their meeting. The place being fixed in the route Scipio meant to take in passing from Spain into Italy, Massinissa repaired to it, with all the impatience of a prince weary of the Carthaginian yoke, to whom he was a vassal as well as a neighbour. He foresaw what the event would be; he judged that the republic of Carthage, already in its decline, could not long resist that of Rome, now in its full vigour, if the Romans were bold enough to attack them at home. Scipio's conduct gave him no room to doubt but that this was his design, and this it was which led him to offer his services to the Roman people, and seek an alliance with them.

Report had given him the highest idea of Scipio, his imagination had drawn him in the most flattering colours, and yet, for all these favourable prejudices, he did not do him justice, nor could he conceive for him that degree of esteem and admiration which he deserved, until this interview was over. He proposed an alliance, which Scipio, knowing his character, his courage, and the causes of discontent he had with the Carthaginians, accepted, and concluded with pleasure. Gratitude for the kind treatment Massinissa's nephew had received from the Roman general, was made the ostensible ground of the treaty; it was however only the pretext, and policy had the chief hand in it: the hope of aggrandizing himself in Africa, under the protection of the Roman power, was the prevailing incitement which determined the Numidian prince to take part with the republic.

However that was, the treaty was secretly concluded

cluded, and Massinissa stipulated to serve the Romans with all his forces on every occasion. He hinted to Scipio, that he doubted not, but that after such great success, the Roman republic would send him into Africa, to strike at the root of the war, by subduing Carthage. Thus to express at once his zeal for the Roman people, Scipio entered into this alliance the more cheerfully, as in the designs he had formed, Massinissa would be of infinite use to him: he was effectually so, as we shall see in the sequel; and if he rendered important services to Rome, he received the most valuable rewards for the inviolable attachment he always had to her.

Of all the Carthaginian forces there remained in Spain only one fleet commanded by Mago, who hoping much from the sedition which had broken out in the Roman army, and the revolt of Mandonius, had drawn near, to be ready to take advantage of events.* When the seditious were punished, and the Spanish princes defeated, the senate of Carthage came at last to the resolution of utterly abandoning Spain, and turning all their efforts against Italy. Mago, who could not bring himself to yield up Spain to the Romans, received positive orders to depart and join Hannibal in Italy. They sent him recruits of men and money for the army, and he collected much along the coasts he passed through, by laying all under contribution and plundering even the very temples. In passing before Carthagera, he had a mind to surprize it as Scipio had done a few years before; but the Romans were on their guard; there was a vigilant governor, and a good sufficient garrison. He was repulsed and had like to have lost a great
part

* An. R. 456. Ante C. 206.

LIFE OF SCIPIO AFRICANUS. 129

part of his soldiers and sailors. By his departure for Italy, Spain was entirely cleared of the Carthaginians; and Scipio, in rendering up an account of his command to the senate, might with strict truth say, he had not left a single enemy, of those he was sent against, in the province which had been committed to his care.

THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK.



VOL. I.

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THE

THE SCOTLAND YARD

The officers and men of the Scotland Yard were informed that a man named John Smith had been seen in the neighbourhood of the Yard on the 1st of January. The man was described as being about 30 years of age, of medium height, and of a fair complexion. He was wearing a dark coat and a light-colored shirt. The man was seen walking alone, and was carrying a bag in his hand. The officers were requested to keep a close watch on the man, and to report any further information to the Yard.

The man was seen on the 1st of January, and was carrying a bag in his hand.

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THE
L I F E
O F
SCIPIO AFRICANUS.

BOOK THE SECOND.

WHEN the news of Scipio's return was published at Rome,* curiosity to see the conqueror of Spain drew thither in crouds the inhabitants of the neighbouring towns and country; it was enough to be a Roman, or an ally of the republic, to partake of the general impatience. It must be very flattering to Scipio to have merited it by his great services to his country, at an age in which others hardly begin to be known.

The senate in a body went out of Rome to receive him at the temple of Bellona, which was without the town. Before he entered Rome, he gave, as was usual, an account of the expedition he had been charged with. He recited in a few words, the battles he had won in Spain, the towns he had taken, and the generals he had defeated. So many and such great successes, founded on such extraordinary abilities, were undoubtedly intitled to the honours of a triumph; but there was no

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precedent

* An. R. 546. Ante C. 206. Livy.

precedent in the republic of their having been decreed to a general who had not been consul.— Scipio's respect and attachment to the laws, easily prevailed with him to give up pretensions which would have shocked them. He entered Rome with the senate, amidst the acclamations of joy and admiration of all orders, both the patricians and plebeians: Marks of love and esteem, more sincere, more eloquent and more honorable than the frivolous magnificence of the most celebrated pompous triumphs, of which they are ever the most pleasing ornaments. Never was such a concourse seen in Rome, they came from all parts, not so much to give their suffrages at the creation of consuls as for the satisfaction of seeing the young conqueror.

Though it is not exactly known in what year Scipio married Emilia, there is room to believe it was during the course of this.* He had deservedly a great character; he perceived this of itself was enough to create him many enemies, and he judged it necessary to strengthen the credit of his own house with that of the family of Paulus Emilius, who, like his own father, had, on the commencement of this war, fallen at the head of his army. Rome could have offered Scipio a variety of Roman ladies, as worthy of his choice as Emilia, but Rome had not another citizen whose hand would confer so much honour as Scipio's. We may judge of Emilia's merit, otherwise little noticed in history, by her daughter's, who joined to maternal tenderness, the sentiments, the genius, and firmness of the greatest men; she was the famous Cornelia, mother to the Gracchi. The daughter's fame may let us into
the

* Anno R. 547. Ante C. 205.

the character of the mother, who had the forming of her mind and heart.

Scipio was soon sensible of the advantages accruing from his connection with the house of Emilius. The election of consuls being at hand, he offered himself for that magistracy, and obtained it with the general consent of all orders: they gave him for colleague Publius Licinius Crassus, sovereign pontiff. When the election was over, and the assembly dismissed, Scipio returned to his house to enjoy the pleasure of seeing his family and friends.

The impatience of the multitude soon disturbed his pleasures and tranquillity, they could not be satisfied with seeing him, and expressing to him the joy they felt; he was obliged to order his doors to be opened, and to admit a croud of people, whose zeal was yet more flattering than troublesome.

He had made a vow in Spain to sacrifice an hecatomb to Jupiter, if he returned with conquest; this sacrifice was proclaimed, and all Rome followed him to the capitol, where he solemnly fulfilled his promise. It was said universally, that if Luctatius had the advantage of finishing the first Punic war, the glory of putting an end to that which they now waged against the Carthaginians, was reserved for Scipio; that he would as easily chase the Carthaginians out of Italy as he had driven them out of Spain. They looked upon these successes as so certain, that they already numbered Africa amongst the provinces of the republic, and appointed him to the government of it by anticipation.

The usual practice of the consuls was, to take their provinces by lot; the senate, ever jealous of

the observations of ancient customs, and ready to oppose the continual encroachments of the people and their tribunes upon their authority, could not see, without concern, Africa decreed to Scipio by the people before it was determined by lot. But he, persuaded there were no other means of finishing the war, declared boldly he accepted the choice the people had made of him to the new province; that it was at Carthage they must attack the Carthaginians; and that if the senate opposed the design, he would carry it before the people. The senate was called by the young consul to deliberate on this business.

That famous dictator, who by preventing Hannibal from conquering the Romans, had enabled the Romans to conquer in their turn, was the first whom Scipio consulted on the plan he proposed of carrying the war into Africa. Fabius openly rejected it, as dangerous to the republic, and impracticable in the execution. He said Africa was not as yet a province of the republic, and therefore the people had no right to name a governor; that the consul ought not to accept the nomination; and that he could not approve of the impatience Scipio shewed to pass into Africa, while Hannibal was still in Italy; that no one should ever persuade him that he despised so redoubtable an enemy; that on the contrary, he should think he avoided him through fear of being unable to maintain his reputation against him; besides, without wishing to lessen the consul's glory, and the good opinion they conceived of him, he could not help saying that Scipio deceived himself, if he imagined he had done more in delivering Spain from the Carthaginians, than remained for the republic to do in driving them out of Italy. Therefore, he concluded,

cluded, before they crossed the sea it was absolutely necessary to begin by ridding themselves of Hannibal; that then, perhaps, it might be advisable to follow him into his own country---sooner, it would be madness to think of it.

"In one word, senators," added he in concluding, "the Roman legions shall never pass over to Africa with my consent, till the war is ended in Italy, and Hannibal has quitted it.*" "You, Cornelius Scipio," says he again, "be not offended at my opposition, and think not I esteem you the less; I do justice to your valour and worth. If your talents and capacity were weaker, I should be less anxious to keep you in Italy. It is not for your sake but her own, that the republic has created you consul; her advantages should never be put in competition with your glory."

Fabius's reputation, and the air of authority with which he spoke, gave great weight to his discourse; they were rather disposed to follow the advice of an old officer of consummate prudence, than the enterprising ambition of a young consul.

Scipio giving his reasons in a few words, shewed that Africa was not at present more difficult to conquer than Spain; which was in so desperate a state, when he solicited the government of it, that no one could be found bold enough to take the command; that they had not in Africa either more numerous armies, or more able generals; and that he himself was, by three year's experience, more capable of conducting the war than he was when he entered Spain; that Hannibal's own conduct justified his project; that this ge-

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neral,

* An. R. 547. Ante C. 205. Liv.

neral, so dreaded, would never have brought Rome to the eve of her last day, had he not come into Italy; that the Carthaginians had in Africa only the very worst troops, who had not seen any service, mercenaries rather than soldiers, who could not sustain the perils and fatigues of a war, and who would desert on the first occasion; that the alliance with Syphax and Massinissa was founded on the interest of these princes, which was to diminish, and if possible annihilate, the power of Carthage; that therefore he might venture to reckon upon their fidelity.*

In short, he was persuaded his own fortune as well as that of Rome called him to Africa, and he should esteem it resisting his destiny to decline going. “ I shall have Hannibal to engage equally, but I wish rather to force him to follow *me* than be obliged to go in quest of *him*. Why should not *I* hope to make as many allies in Africa as *he* has in Italy? The bad faith of the Carthaginians, the severity of their government, have not they often caused those allies, who seemed most firmly attached to them, to revolt? On the arrival of the Romans in Africa, the people in the neighbourhood of Carthage, informed by report of the good treatment of the Spaniards by the republic, will fly to our standards to free themselves from a tyranny as unjust as it is insupportable. Thus Hannibal will be forced to come to the relief of his own country; whence it is easy to perceive, that the surest if not the only means of driving him out of Italy, is to march directly against Carthage. Landed on the territory of that republic, we shall not be long before we

“ hear

* An. R. 547. Antè C. 205.

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“ hear that Hannibal has repassed the sea, and is
“ come to defend Carthage, after having fruit-
“ lessly menaced Rome. The republic besides
“ will not suffer any loss from my absence. If
“ Fabius, advanced in years, was able to make
“ head against the Carthaginian general, at the
“ time when he was most formidable, is it not to
“ be presumed that Publius Licinius, my col-
“ league, whose valour Rome well knows, will
“ be able to stop him, being in the flower of
“ his age, and when the Carthaginian party is
“ almost destroyed? Is it not unbecoming the
“ grandeur of Rome, conscript fathers, to
“ think of only defending themselves against the
“ Carthaginians, without daring to attack them
“ at home? Enough, and too long, has Italy
“ been wasted with fire and sword; it is time she
“ should breathe, that she may repair the many
“ losses she has experienced; let Africa, in her
“ turn, become the seat and theatre of war,
“ as our country has been for almost fourteen
“ years. Is it not just that the harvests of our
“ enemies should in their turn be ravaged? Car-
“ ry devastation thither, and all the mischiefs we
“ have endured ever since Hannibal has been in
“ our country.”

As they were already convinced that Scipio would bring the affair before the people, if the senate opposed him, his discourse had not that effect it would otherwise have produced. The senate, jealous of an authority which it with infinite pains preserved against the envy and continual attacks of the people and their tribunes, saw with grief a patrician and a consul threatening this august assembly, to appeal from their decrees to the tribunal of the people. They regarded
this

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this menace as an attack upon their rights, and could not forgive his drawing them into a dispute, through a desire of carrying it against them.

Quintus Fulvius, who had been both consul and censor, rising, demanded of Scipio, whether, if the senate made an appointment of the provinces, he would submit to it, or appeal to the people? The consul answered, he would do what he judged most beneficial to the republic. Upon this answer, Fulvius observed, that it was useless to deliberate, and desired the tribunes of the people to interpose. The consul replied, it was not fair in the tribunes to interrupt the senators in giving their judgment. Then the tribunes said, that if the consul would leave the disposal of the provinces to the senate, they would support their decision, and not suffer the business to be carried to the people; but if, on the other hand, he would not submit to the senate, they would support whoever should refuse to vote. The consul desired he might be permitted to confer with his colleague.

The senators upon that broke up, and the two consuls summoned a meeting of the senate for the next day. At last they agreed, with one voice, to give Scipio the government of Sicily, with liberty to pass into Africa if he judged it for the interest of the republic. Publius Licinius, his colleague, had for his department the provinces bordering upon Rome, and the command of the war against Hannibal. They at the same time observed, his office of chief pontiff would not allow him to leave Italy.

Scipio wanted no more, it was left to him to determine, at the head of his army, whether it would be adviseable to go against Carthage; and by

by this qualification he had it in his power to pass into Africa. Before his departure he celebrated public games with extraordinary magnificence; and went immediately for Tuscany to order the building of a fleet. The inhabitants supplied him abundantly with what timber, workmen, and money was necessary.

These people had such a veneration for his virtues, and such an opinion of his attention for the public good, that they complied most readily with all his demands.

Some engaged to provide corn, one district furnished iron, another cordage and sail-cloth; the towns noted for the most expert workmen in that branch undertook to furnish arms. They went so heartily to work upon the shipping, their armament, and equipment, that in forty-five days from the felling the timber the fleet was launched.

Scipio having obtained permission of the senate to receive volunteers into his army,* embarked 7000 who offered their service, desiring only the honour to attend him, and gain instructions under his orders. As soon as the fleet was ready he sailed for Syracuse, where a body of Roman soldiers had, in defiance of the decree of the senate, refused to restore to the inhabitants the plunder taken from them. Scipio issued an order requiring them to obey instantly, under pain of the most exemplary punishment; the consul's presence made his order respected, every thing was immediately restored. By this instance of justice he so recommended himself to that town, and all Sicily in general, that every one was eager to contribute what was wanted for the invasion of Africa.

Lælius,

* An. R. 547. Ante C. 205.

Lælius, who had crossed out of Spain into Africa with his fleet, to cruize against the Carthaginians, and improve the alliances with the Numidian princes, returned about this time with his ships loaded with an immense booty. He had seen Massinissa, who complained of Scipio's tardiness, and reproached him with losing the most favourable opportunity of attacking the Carthaginians. He intreated him warmly to press his departure from Sicily, and promised powerful succours both of horse and foot; above all, he recommended to Lælius to warn Scipio how little he ought to depend on the alliance with Syphax; who, as soon as he was freed from a considerable war he was now engaged in, would return to the interest of the Carthaginians. Lælius related the whole minutely to the consul, whose wishes were too strongly set upon crossing the sea to need pressing; but the affairs of Sicily still detained him for some time.*

The Locrians, who had joined in the general revolt on the first irruption of the Carthaginians into Italy, offered to give up their citadel to the Romans; Scipio gave the command of this expedition to Pleminius, one of his lieutenants, and sent him to the Locrians in the character of pretor. Every thing was so well concerted, that the Roman soldiers, being let into the citadel by night, put the Carthaginian garrison to the sword, before they knew any thing of their arrival. The Locrians returned to their obedience to the republic, and Pleminius was made governor of the castle.

The pretor was an artful man, who knew how to gain Scipio's confidence by dissembling his real character:

* An. R. 547. Ante C. 205.

character: supple and ready in paying court to his general, he lost no opportunity of displaying his courage and attachment. He was also as skilful in concealing his real faults as in setting forth his apparent good qualities, under which he harboured the grossest vices and the vilest inclinations. He deceived Scipio by his address; he almost ruined him by his bad conduct. He treated the Locrians with so much cruelty and injustice, that they regretted the Carthaginian bondage, under which their condition, hard as it had been, was however not so very wretched; every day was accompanied with some fresh act of oppression either from the governor or the army. The citizens were robbed of their property; those who had the courage to resist them, were put to death without any form of justice; their wives and daughters were dishonoured with impunity. Riches, innocence, beauty, had no asylum; the very temples were defiled with the most abominable profanation. Pleminius found means to prevent the cries of these wretched people reaching the ears of his general; they had no alternative, but either to perish by degrees under the weight of their oppressions, or to have recourse to arms. The cruelty of Pleminius drove them at last to extremities; they revolted, massacred the garrison, seized the governor, insulted him in the rudest manner, and left him covered with wounds, after having cut off his nose and ears.

This insurrection of the Locrians brought Scipio back to their country. Pleminius was still able to deceive his general, and to justify himself in his opinion; Scipio punished the authors of the sedition, and reinstated him in his command, with orders to the inhabitants to look upon him as the

man

man of the republic. Having settled this disturbance by his presence, he returned to Syracuse; and Pleminius, not thinking himself sufficiently revenged, caused the chief men of the town to be arrested, condemned them to be ignominiously scourged, and executed with tortures.

They were obliged at last to have recourse to the senate to relieve their misery.* Ten of the first people among the Locrians were deputed to Rome. They arrived there while the senate was sitting: their appearance had in it every mark of the most sad and shocking wretchedness. Their eyes fixed to the ground, their countenance fallen, they explained themselves only by their groans. They bore in their hands olive branches in token of peace, and had their heads covered, which never was done but when under the greatest misfortunes. The senate having ordered them to be admitted, and demanding the cause of their coming, they answered, sighing, they came to declare at Rome, that the Romans had treated them worse than the Carthaginians, whose cruelty was notorious to the world. They made a speech in which they drew the most lively picture of what Pleminius had made them suffer; they confirmed with one voice, and by incontestible proofs, all they advanced, and concluded with imploring the authority of the senate. When they had done speaking they were ordered to retire, with a promise of speedy relief and justice; and the senate consulted on the measures they should pursue.

Fabius voted, without hesitation, that Pleminius should be brought to Rome, sent to prison, and treated with the utmost rigour. As for Scipio, after having blamed his neglect of military discipline,

* An. R. 548. Ante C. 204.

discipline, and his too great indulgence to his men, he was of opinion he should be recalled, and that the people should suspend him from his functions.

Scipio's enemies eagerly seized this occasion to hurt his credit by the blackest calumnies. The great Fabius and Cato were at the head of this party; the former dreaded in the young consul the rashness of his youth, and perhaps still more the fame of his successes. As for Cato, who was wholly attached to Fabius, the ground of his enmity to Scipio might be discovered in his character only, were there no other causes for it. The austerity of his life, his fondness for the ancient simplicity of the Roman manners, his severe maxims of government, and military discipline, would not suffer him to approve of a conduct diametrically opposite to his own. He had formerly been questor in Scipio's army, but he was for ever finding fault with the general's liberality; his magnificence in the games, in feasts, and his household, appeared to him a most ruinous example of expence and luxury.* He took the liberty to make some remonstrances to Scipio on this subject, who soon let him know they were to little or no purpose. "It is not at the head of armies," says he, "that the œconomy you recommend to me is to be practised.† It is of the exploits I shall perform, and not the expence with which they are carried into execution, that I must give the senate an account." Cato seeing that his counsels would not be followed, resigned the questorship and returned to Rome. He ceased not, ever after, to misconstrue Scipio's conduct. Cato incessantly

* An. R. 548. Ante C. 204.

† Plut. in M. Cato.

incessantly made continued declamations, which he repeated to all orders of the republic. We may judge, from a particular circumstance which escaped him some years after, how little he was influenced by the nobleness of Scipio's sentiments. After having commanded the armies in Spain in quality of consul, he would never consent to the expence of transporting his own horse into Italy. A little action in a great man, which only shews how very anxious he was to convince his nation of the necessity of œconomy.

Scipio added to a greater elevation of mind, political views more extensive and more just. The wealth which the conquest of Sicily, atchieved by Marcellus, brought to Rome, had destroyed the ancient manners of that city by augmenting its power; he perceived that changes so considerable in the state of the republic, must inevitably alter the spirit of it.

They had then only to preserve the same character of primitive manners, by relaxing a little of their rigour, which could no longer subsist. His conduct was ever a model to others; Rome was corrupted, and, as two eminent writers tell us, the corruptor remained chaste. Adored and respected by his officers and soldiers, he treated them in his turn with that regard and military friendship,* which leaves so little room for the exertion of the authority of the general, obeyed because beloved. The rigour of discipline having become unnecessary in his army, was seldom employed in it. The senate, on the contrary, who had even added to that rigour, after the battle of Cannæ, used all their endeavours to support it. But in vain did the senate require of the nation, what the present state

* An. R. 548. Ante C. 204.

of the nation would not admit of. Scipio, who had no occasion for such severe discipline, made the yoke as easy as possible; and the greatest actions were so free in his army, that the officers would have taken the merit to themselves, had they not been sensible that this very liberty was the gift of their general.

These necessary and unavoidable changes in the military discipline, appeared to Fabius, to Cato, and their followers, as so many attempts to destroy it; the sedition of the legions in Spain was quoted as a manifest proof of it. They trembled for the republic, in their apprehensions for that subordination which they judged to be its best safeguard.

The senate was about to make a decree to recall Scipio, when Quintus Marcellus, speaking as an impartial man, proposed to send upon the spot the pretor of the province, with ten deputies, to know if all these disorders were real; and if Scipio knew and approved of the conduct of Pleminius. The advice was approved by a majority of voices; Pomponius, pretor of Sicily, was ordered to repair to Scipio at Syracuse, where he would find him, if not already embarked for Africa.

Pomponius being come to Locri, informed himself of Scipio's conduct. All the inhabitants acquitted him of the charges brought against him; they protested that all the cruelties they had suffered had not come to his knowledge, but that a little too much indulgence, and rather too good an opinion of the worst of men, was all they could reproach him with. This justification eased the deputies of the most disagreeable part of their errand; all were delighted with learning Scipio's innocence, and seeing the malice of his enemies

confounded. But Pleminius, whose crimes were proved, was loaded with irons, and with several of his accomplices sent to Rome, where he died in prison.

Nothing remained of the grievances imputed to Scipio, but the licentiousness and disorder of his army. The deputies, to be the better able to judge in person, sailed from Locri to Syracuse, where they understood Scipio still remained. Disdaining to answer to the accusations he had been aspersed with, he was satisfied with shewing Pomponius and his associates his army and fleet. He paraded his land forces in order of battle in the way they were to pass by; never did soldiers appear better disciplined, they went through all their different manœuvres with wonderful readiness and exactness. He conducted the deputies to his fleet, which he had ordered out of the harbour, to give them a representation of a naval engagement. The lightness of the vessels, the activity of the sailors, the great order that reigned under such apparent confusion, struck them with astonishment. From the fleet he carried them to his magazines of provisions, of ammunition, and to his arsenal; never had they before seen such a noble preparation for war, every thing declared it, every thing seemed to menace Carthage. The deputies left him, not only convinced of his innocence, but so filled with esteem for him, that they declared if Carthage could be conquered it must be by him, who had in so short a time made such vast preparations; they promised to report faithfully to the senate all they had seen, and advised him to delay his departure as little as possible.

Thus Scipio acquitted himself of the calumnies which a few jealous persons had charged him with.

with. The judges of his conduct became his advocates, and his enemies had the mortification to hear nothing but recitals in his praise, which made his conduct still more glorious.

While all Rome echoed with the consul's praises, the Carthaginians, who every day expected him to come upon their coast, were dreadfully alarmed. After several fruitless attempts, they prevailed at last by their artifices, and brought Syphax back to their interest. The beauty of Sophonisba, daughter of Asdrubal, the son of Gisco, having smitten him, his marriage with her had been put off for several years, and was now to be celebrated as soon as she was of a proper age. Syphax went to Carthage, where his alliance with the Romans was a secret, he hastened the time of his marriage, and to the particular family alliance he added that of the public. He engaged to esteem as his friends all those of the republic of Carthage, and to reckon as his enemies, all who had declared, or should declare, themselves against her.

To the attraction of an engaging beauty Sophonisba added a strength of genius much above her years; naturally attentive to find out men's foibles, and still more artful in making the best advantage of them; subtile, insinuating, cunning, bred up with a hatred to the Romans, it became, I may say, her ruling passion; it sprung from her patriotism, and ended only with her life.

Blinded by his passion, Syphax could not perceive the scandalous perfidy he was about to shew the Romans, he however thought himself obliged to inform them, that he did not intend to hold to the alliance he had made with them, and that it was annulled by that he had since contracted with the Carthaginians. He therefore sent ambassa-

dors into Sicily,* to the consul, to inform him of this change, and to beseech him not to think of passing into Africa; adding, that if he persisted in his design, he should be obliged to take part against him; being unable to give up his country, and that of the queen his consort, to attach himself to the Romans.

The ambassadors arrived at Syracuse, they apprised Scipio of their master's intentions. This resolution staggered him a little, but did not in any wise make him lose courage. He replied to Syphax, that he could hardly believe what he had signified to him; that he hoped he would consider of the faith they had mutually sworn to each other, of the rights of hospitality which he had promised him in his dominions, and the alliance he had made with the Roman people; that he had too good an opinion of him to believe that the faith of treaties, honour, and probity, were motives too weak to influence him. Having delivered his answer to the ambassadors, he dismissed them privately, and without delay, probably lest the subject of their voyage should come to the knowledge of his army.

As soon as they were out of reach, he told his officers, that Massinissa had informed him some time before, by Lælius, that he waited for him with impatience; that Syphax had now sent to him ambassadors, expressing the same earnestness; that he accused him of being too tardy; and that he begged to be informed, if he had changed his design, that he might take his own measures with the Carthaginians.

It was of the last consequence to conceal from the Romans, this change in Syphax. Scipio had constantly

* Ann. R. 548. Ant. C. 204.

constantly boasted to them the friendship of this prince, the most powerful in Africa. He had assured them, that all would declare for them on their landing, and that they would have no enemy but the Carthaginians. He ordered the troops to march to Lilibæum, to embark instantly. The soldiers and vessels had repaired thither in such vast numbers, that the town and port were not able to contain them. Scipio knew so well how to inspire into others the confidence he was himself filled with, that they seemed to be going to a sure victory, in which every one was desirous of partaking.

The veteran soldiers of the fifth and sixth legions, who had endured the heat of the war in Italy, and who had escaped from the battle of Cannæ, fought some years before, came to present themselves to the consul, and to offer him their service; they were a body of men inured to fatigue and labour, and who had given proof of their valour in action. Scipio received them with much joy and respect, compleated their legions, and embarked them with the rest of his army. Authors are not agreed in the number of troops which composed it; but Livy assures us that there never was seen to go out of the port of Lilibæum so fine a fleet, so well equipped, and so numerous; although some years before they had seen two consuls embark with two fleets and two armies.

The troops having slept on board, and all being ready to sail, Scipio embarked on board the admiral, and ordered an herald to proclaim silence. Pomponius, pretor of the province, was on the shore with the legions which remained in Sicily, and were come to see their comrades de-

part; all the people likewise were brought down, drawn either by the grandeur or novelty of the sight. A profound silence reigning both in the fleet and on the shore, Scipio elevated his voice. "Ye gods," says he, "and ye goddesses of the heavens, the earth, and the seas, attend to the prayer I now make to you, in the name of my whole army; I put it under your almighty protection, and beseech you that my enterprize may turn out to the glory of the republic, and our allies: ye know that this is the ultimate end of all my actions. Grant, great gods, that we may return from this expedition conquerors, and loaded with plunder and riches; grant that, more fortunate than the Carthaginians, we may execute upon their capital the fatal design which they ineffectually attempted against Rome." At these words he took the foaming entrails of the victim, which was just sacrificed, and cast them into the sea; and at the same instant the whole fleet set sail with a fair wind, amidst the shouts of the multitude which covered the shore.

The passage was lucky, and Scipio at last saw, after a few days sail, the wished for land, for which he had so long sighed, and from which had issued the most dreadful attacks his country had ever experienced. He arrived at the promontory called Pulcher, (or Cape Fair) disembarked his troops, and encamped upon the heights. The report of the descent of the Romans in Africa was soon spread through the neighbouring towns, all were struck with consternation at the news; the roads were filled with men, women, and children, who had abandoned their habitations; the peasants drove off in haste as many of their cattle as they could

could get together; it looked as if all Africa was about to be deserted by its inhabitants.

The alarm was not less at Carthage, they seemed to think Scipio already at their gates, which were all shut, and guards placed around for the security of the town; but what would all these precautions avail them? an army was necessary to stop the Romans, and they had but a handful of the worst troops, raised in a hurry. A general was wanted to oppose Scipio, and they had only Asdrubal the son of Gisco, who was confessedly the first in the town for his valour, his birth, his reputation, his wealth, and his alliance with Syphax; but yet one whom Scipio, with all these honours, had beaten on every occasion, and whom he had fairly driven out of Spain.

The junction of Massinissa, who repaired to Scipio as soon as he was informed of his arrival, greatly encouraged the army, who were assured, by seeing him, that their general had not deceived them, in promising them allies and friends in this foreign country.

A king who trusted his person, his troops, and his title to his kingdom, to the fortune of the Roman arms, inspired by his presence all the soldiers with the same confidence he was himself full of. It was evident by his conduct that he had great hopes of success, and each Roman conceived them by his example.

As the history of this Numidian prince is in itself very interesting, and besides, as he acted the most important part in this war next to Scipio, to whom he rendered the most essential services, I have thought it in some measure necessary to give a short account of his life and adventures, from

the commencement of them, in order to enable the reader to form some idea of him.

Massinissa was a prince, who from his infancy had experienced every change of fortune, bold, courageous, rather encouraged than depressed by ill success. His first effort in the field, was in the conquest of his own kingdom from an usurper. Asdrubal had known him in Spain before Scipio came there, had been an eye-witness of his valour, and made him dreaded by Syphax, who was not very anxious under whose government the little kingdom of his neighbours the Massilians fell. Asdrubal informed him, that Massinissa was not of a temper to be content with the kingdom of his ancestors; that he would soon know it from sad experience, if he delayed attacking him; and that he was a dangerous brand, capable of setting all Africa in a flame, if not prevented in time.

Determined on a war by Asdrubal, Syphax attacked and vanquished Massinissa; his defeat only raised his courage. Having escaped with a small body of troops from the battle, the loss of which was followed with that of his kingdom, he soon after sallied forth, out of the caverns of mount Balbus, to which he had retired, and ravaged the territories of the Carthaginians, the authors of his disgrace. They complained to Syphax, who thinking it beneath his dignity to go in person against a prince, whom he esteemed only as the chief of a gang of banditti, sent Boccar, one of his generals, with a promise of the greatest rewards if he could either take Massinissa alive, or bring him his head. Boccar came up with him on the mountains to which he had retreated, attacked and routed him; Massinissa fled, followed
only

only by fifty horsemen. Boccar did not lose sight of him, and pursuing without loss of time, overtook him in a narrow valley, bounded by a rapid river, where he inclosed him on every side. Massinissa was dangerously wounded in the action, six and forty out of the fifty horsemen who had followed him, were killed; he seemed to be cut off from all possibility of escaping.* The Numidian prince had but one effort to make to avoid being taken, and that was to pass the river, the violence of whose current, and the steepness of its banks, would hardly let one think he would dare to attempt it. Massinissa came there with his four horsemen, pushed on his horse, and had the misfortune to see two of his brave faithful subjects perish by his side in the water. He was supposed to be one of those that were drowned, and this saved his life.

As soon as his wound was healed, and he was able to march, he appeared again, and surprized all the world. Love for his subjects roused him, his reputation encouraged them. He was in a short time at the head of an army of 10,000 men, and made fresh inroads into the territories of the Carthaginians. At this time Syphax went against him in person. Massinissa, as unfortunate as he was indefatigable and bold, was vanquished a third time, by a vast superiority of numbers, and his army cut to pieces. He had sufficiently performed the duty of a prince, in defending his kingdom, and endeavouring to recover it, he resolved to wait among the neighbouring people for some favourable opportunity to assert his rights. Scipio's arrival offered one. If the Romans were delighted with seeing an African prince in their camp,

* An. R. 548. Ante C. 204.

camp, Massinissa was not less so at beholding in his enemy's dominions an army of Romans, by whose assistance he hoped to regain possession of his own.

Scipio, ravaging the country as he advanced, came in sight of Utica, a strong and important place. The Carthaginians, who had not, I may say, either general or soldiers, sent courier after courier to Asdrubal the son of Gisco, then at the court of his son in law, with orders to come and put himself at the head of the few troops they were able to muster; at the same time, they made the most pressing requests to Syphax not to abandon them in this time of danger, and intreated him to hasten to their assistance as fast as possible.

Hanno in the mean time, having got together a corps of cavalry, of between three and four thousand Carthaginians and Numidians, hurried to Salera, which was not above fifteen miles from the camp of the Romans, with intent to check their progress. Scipio was informed by his scouts of the number of the enemy and the conduct of the general, who fearing to expose his horses, though it was the height of summer, took care they should retire every night into the nearest houses; they added, that they were 4000. Would they were many more, says Scipio, under such a chief.

This flying camp did not prevent his making inroads into all the adjacent country, and destroying every thing. He hoped Hanno would make some attempt to oblige him to keep within his camp; but when he saw that he remained quiet at Salera, he sent Massinissa with a small force, charging him to bring Hanno to action cost what it would. The service was dangerous, but Massinissa

niffa was not one of those who shrink from danger; he advanced with his detachment to the very gates of Salera. When they were ready to pursue him, he retreated on full gallop, and presently turned about to skirmish afresh; Hanno renewed the charge, Massiniffa again retreated, and by this conduct piqued the honour of the Carthaginians, who seeing he had but an handful of men, resolved to pursue him to the last extremity. At last they came to a regular engagement; Massiniffa made a stand for some time, and then feigned to give ground, as was before agreed with Scipio, who lay in ambush in the narrow passes of the mountains which surround the neighbourhood of Salera.

The Carthaginians emboldened, thought they ought not to suffer Massiniffa, to whom they were so superior in numbers, to escape; they therefore entangled themselves in the narrow passes to which he had retreated on full speed. Scipio immediately cut them off, and fell upon them with his cavalry, which being quite fresh easily routed a body of men surprised and harrassed, and whose horses were tired. Hanno, who had imprudently advanced, was inclosed and killed in the ambush, where 1000 men fell with him. Scipio pursued the vanquished, and killed or took 2000 more, among whom were several of the richest and first people of Carthage.

The consul, to make the most of his victory, marched strait to Salera, in which he placed a garrison; and the seventh day from his landing in Africa, after having put cities, towns, and villages to fire and sword, after having in his march spread around him all the horrors of war, he returned to his camp loaded with the spoils of the Carthaginians.

The

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The victory gained over Hanno, and the shocking desolation his army made through the country, were exploits of no great importance. It was necessary to avail himself of the alarm of the Carthaginians and the ardour of his soldiers, animated by these early successes. For this purpose, he went and laid siege to Utica, a place of consequence on account of the goodness of its port. By taking this town, Scipio would secure a retreat both for his fleet and army. It was immediately blocked up by sea and land, they had even begun to raise batteries, and erect machines for carrying on the siege, without Asdrubal the son of Gisco, who had assembled an army of 30,000 foot and 3000 horse, attempting to relieve it, though their only dependence was upon him. To avoid hazarding any thing, he waited for Syphax, who at last joined him, with an army of 60,000 men: they left Carthage together as soon as Syphax arrived, and marched to the relief of Utica. The town was well fortified, the inhabitants defended it with resolution, Scipio after a siege of forty-five days could neither storm it, nor force it to surrender.

It is praise worthy to form great designs, it is not less so to know how to give them up when prudence directs. In persisting to carry Utica, Scipio would have risked his own destruction without resource. In spite of his reluctance he raised the siege, and went to encamp on a neck of land stretching into the sea, which re-united his fleet and army. He undertook nothing farther this year: the winter in Africa being mild, he resolved, that he might keep near his fleet, to pass it in his camp, which he surrounded with strong lines, that secured him from surprise or insult. The Carthaginians

Carthaginians not daring to attempt to force it, sent on their side a part of their troops into winter quarters, and kept the main body in their camp.* The campaign ended without their gaining the least advantage over the Roman army.

Scipio had not given up all hopes of regaining Syphax to his interest,† and of breaking the enchantment in which Sophonisba held him. He knew the hearts of the Numidians were easily susceptible of love, but he was not ignorant that the ardor of their most violent passions was often succeeded by disgust and inconstancy, when they were once gratified; he therefore sent ambassadors to Syphax to remind him of the alliance they had entered into. Syphax answered that Scipio must not look for any assistance from him against his countrymen, and that he advised him to depart out of Africa; he moreover offered freely his mediation to the Romans, and said he hoped to be able to engage the Carthaginians to quit Italy, if they would abandon Africa.

Scipio, though determined to reject this proposal, nevertheless perceived the advantages he might draw from a negotiation which would last some time. He told Syphax that a peace was not impossible, and that if they first entered into a truce, perhaps the means of effecting it might be found out. Syphax consented, and the truce was gladly concluded on by each party. Scipio, who wished to know the manner in which the enemies tents were constructed, and the disposition of their camp, sent ambassadors to Syphax to confer about a peace. The consul affected to give them a suite suitable to the dignity of the nation they represented;

* Anno R. 549. Ante. C. 203.

† T. Liv. Polyb.

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sented; but he was far from thinking of pomp and parade in making their train so numerous. Those whom they took for slaves and domestics, which they effectually appeared to be, were the most brave and prudent amongst the officers of the Roman army. They were thus disguised, the more easily to reconnoitre the enemy's camp, and take an exact plan of its disposition, without raising suspicions.

The ambassadors were conducted to Syphax's tent, and entered into conferences with him on the prospect of peace between the two republics. While they were thus busied in their negociation, their suite spread themselves carelessly over the whole camp; some examined the gates and sally-ports, others the situation of the ground and disposition of the troops. When they had taken a general survey of the camp, they found out what part was occupied by the Carthaginians under Asdrubal, and which by Syphax and his Numidians, and the interval and distance between them. Being looked upon only as the ambassador's followers, their conduct was not suspected, and their curiosity seemed very natural. Scipio had chiefly enjoined them to discover, as far as the observations they could make would enable them, at what time of the day or night the several camps might be attacked with most advantage. They effected the whole with equal address and good fortune, in such a manner that Scipio, secure in his own camp, was informed of every thing that passed in that of his enemy, and knew all as perfectly as themselves.

To give the spies as much time as was necessary, the ambassadors endeavoured to amuse Syphax day after day with new plans of peace. This prince

prince persisted constantly in asserting it was absolutely essential that the Romans should be content with their possessions in Italy, and the Carthaginians rest satisfied with what they enjoyed in Africa; that the one should confine their pretensions to this side the water, and the other be equally content with what they had on their side; that it would be impossible to come to any terms while they remained in each others territories; in a word, that the only certain step to a lasting and firm peace was, that Hannibal should quit Italy, and the Romans depart out of Africa; that on this condition only could his alliance with the Roman republic subsist, and without it he must ever declare against them. The ambassadors failed not to make other demands, and offer new propositions. Syphax communicated them to Asdrubal, and he to his republic, which necessarily prolonged the negociation, and gave Scipio time to prepare every thing for the execution of his design.

When the ambassadors received advice that all was ready, and Scipio had got all the information he desired, they pretended to be tired with these delays, and told Syphax they had received an order to demand a categorical answer, and in case he refused it to withdraw immediately. From their eagerness it was concluded at Carthage, they had offered peace only because they were not in a condition to carry on the war. Syphax at last told them, the Carthaginians would no longer hear of peace, and that he had in vain flattered himself with the hopes of bringing about an agreement. As to himself, so long as the Romans had to do with the Carthaginians, they must look for nothing

thing from him; for he would never abandon his countrymen, and join with strangers against them.

Scipio could not have had a more agreeable answer; the ambassadors reported it to him, and this was a fresh declaration of war. The truce consequently was at an end, and hostilities commenced on each side.

By the residence of the ambassadors in the enemy's camp, he found out that the two were separated from one another only by a very small space; that the tents of Asdrubal's men were constructed of wood and small boughs, and that those of Syphax's army were formed of reeds and rushes; this was what he wanted to know, and upon which he built his project.

As soon as the ambassadors were on their return, he brought out with great parade all the machines he had in his camp, and ordered them to be conducted towards Utica, as if he intended to recommence the siege in the face of the two armies. He sent a detachment of 2000 horse to take possession of a neighbouring height which commanded the town; these troops entrenched themselves the better to deceive Asdrubal and Syphax, and surrounded the new camp with palisades. Scipio had two difficulties to surmount before he could succeed in the enterprise he meditated; the first was to avoid giving the adverse army the least suspicion that he meant to attack it; the second, to keep in awe the inhabitants of Utica, who might fall upon his camp while he was employed elsewhere, and who might easily overpower the few troops he intended to leave for its defence. It was therefore necessary to oblige the inhabitants of Utica to remain on the defensive, and to prevent all mistrust in the Carthaginians,

nians, who were so far from apprehending an attack by surprize, that they hoped to force him to descend into the plain, where the superiority of numbers would have given them every advantage.

Massinissa and the principal officers were in the secret, but the body of the army had no notion of it, and supposed they were marching to the siege of Utica. At noon, the day before the army was to decamp, Scipio called together all the military tribunes, brave and prudent men, in whom he had the greatest confidence. The council was assembled; he received them there, and ordered the spies themselves to give an account of every thing. Massinissa, whose opinion had great weight, (for being a native he was best acquainted with the country) assured them, nothing could be better concerted or more easily executed, than setting fire to the enemy's camps. The military tribunes were ordered to see that the soldiers took nourishment before the usual hour, and to hold them in readiness to march as soon as the trumpets should sound the retreat. This prevented all suspicion in the Carthaginians; for every day, at the hour of supper, all the musick assembled at head quarters, where they sounded the retreat, whilst orders were given out, and the guards for the ensuing night marched off.

All was done agreeable to Scipio's intention; he moved out of his own camp, in which he left but a weak guard, and reached the enemy's as the night set in; he briefly exhorted his troops, to prevent the disorder and confusion which must unavoidably happen in the night, to separate as little as possible. He divided his army into two bodies, the command of one he gave to Lælius and Massinissa, with orders to attack Syphax's

camp, and with the other he went himself to Asdrubal's. He recommended to Lælius to make all the haste he could, as *he* should not act against the Carthaginians until he saw the flames arise from the camp of the Numidians.

They lost no time in announcing to him the success of their enterprise. Hardly had they set fire to the nearest tents, but by the help of the wind it was communicated to the next; the Roman soldiers throwing fire wherever they passed, made the conflagration general. The enemy at first, supposing it was only an accident, every one ran out of his tent half naked, and without arms, to offer his assistance to quench the fire, which was become outrageous; he fell thus into the hands of the Romans, who in spreading the flames made a most horrible carnage. They were not satisfied with killing only those who appeared, they entered the tents which were least damaged, and these unhappy wretches being instantly put to the sword, their sleep was but a passage to that death of which they could have neither sense nor knowledge. The greatest havock was made at the sally-ports, where Massinissa had posted his best troops.

The flames, the terror, the confusion, the massacres, the cries of the dying, soon obliged the Numidians to abandon their camp; but when they thought to escape death they fell directly on the swords of the Romans, who made a most dreadful slaughter of them, and ceased not until the greater part had either fallen or fled.

The Carthaginians seeing Syphax's camp in flames, thought it was only an ordinary accident; they imputed the cries and noise they heard to the tumult and disorder inseparable from such events. Curiosity brought the most restless, who were
awake,

awake, out of their tents; but they were much surprised when they found it necessary to defend themselves against the same evil. Their whole camp was in flames in an instant; they attempted to quench them, and fell into the like snare as the Numidians; all were either put to the sword or devoured by the flames. Death surprised some asleep, others endeavouring to avoid the fire fell by the sword; there were some who passing the night in jollity, their table served them for a tomb. Death, which they met with every where under different forms, spared but a very small number. The horses, the elephants, the beasts intended for victualling, felt the horrors of this fatal night. There fell either by fire or sword more than 40000 men, 6000 were made prisoners, among whom were eleven senators of the famous council of one hundred; they took above 150 colours or standards, 11000 Numidian horses, the best in the country, and a vast many elephants. As for their arms Scipio ordered them to be burned, and offered in sacrifice to the god Vulcan.

The two commanders had the good fortune to escape; Asdrubal fled with the small part of his army that was able to follow him into the nearest town; Syphax passed the night about eight miles from the Romans, in a small place of strength into which he threw himself.

This was the first victory Scipio gained over the Carthaginians in their own country; it was of the same kind, and full as complete, as that which Hannibal had obtained a few years before over the Romans at Cannæ. The night of the burning the camps revenged them for the disgrace and disaster of that woful day. Polybius does not scruple to prefer this victory to all Scipio's successes be-

fore or after, as well for the boldness and importance of the project, as the difficulty of executing it. It was undoubtedly a great exploit to demolish an army of above 40000 men without hardly any risk, and with such a trifling loss as the historians have not thought worthy of notice.

Scipio, who knew how to conquer as well as Hannibal, shewed on this occasion that he knew much better how to make the most of his victory; he sent out detachments in pursuit of Syphax and Asdrubal. Syphax had made forced marches, and got a considerable way towards his own kingdom; Asdrubal had retreated, as we have said, into the first town he came to. His original intention was to hold out there as long as he could, to give the Carthaginians time to levy fresh troops; but when he found himself so closely pursued, and considered that the inhabitants would hardly expose themselves so far as to see their town taken by assault, he gave it up, and returned to Carthage, to confirm by his presence the woeful news of his defeat.

The Suffeti (somewhat similar to the consuls at Rome) convoked the council to deliberate on what was to be done in this grievous conjuncture. Their various opinions were reduced to two: One party declared it was necessary to ask a truce of the Roman general, to proceed sincerely to a durable peace, which they looked upon as the only remedy for such great misfortunes. The favourers of the war were of opinion that the council of one hundred, should send a peremptory order to Hannibal to return into Africa with what troops he had, fully persuaded that this great commander was alone able to make head against Scipio, and to deliver Carthage from so dangerous an enemy. After

ter long debate it was concluded, that they should not as yet recall Hannibal; that ambassadors should be sent again to Syphax; and that the Carthaginian generals should immediately get together all the troops they possibly could, to march against the Romans.

Syphax had already severely felt what the Carthaginian alliance would cost him; he wished to be excused taking any farther part in the war. The continual prayers and entreaties with which the historians relate his consort Sophonisba teased him to assist the Carthaginians, shew plainly the repugnance he had to be any more engaged.

However that was, he was too desperately in love with Sophonisba to be able to refuse what she so ardently desired. She had the address to make this war as personal to him as it was to the Carthaginians; and this prince, as complaisant as he was amorous, at her request set on foot all the troops he was able to levy in a hurry.

A body of 4000 Gauls, which the Carthaginians had taken into their pay, absolutely determined him; it is true indeed they deceived him, and made him believe they were 10000; but this reinforcement inspired him with such hopes, that he instantly departed to join Asdrubal with his new army. This junction was made in a very short time after the burning of the camps; their armies together amounted to 30000 men, and as Scipio had not many more, they doubted not but their soldiers, exasperated by their late defeat, would avenge themselves for the reproach and misfortune of the last action.

Scipio, who thought they had been defeated without resource for the present year, had returned to the siege of Utica, which he began to press;

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but the news of the march of the enemy's army obliged him a second time to give up this enterprize; he left before the town such a force only as was absolutely requisite to secure the machines, and defend the works, and moved with the bulk of his army to engage the enemy.

The fifth day's march brought him to a height near their camp, on which he pitched his own; the first, second, and third days passed in skirmishes on both sides; each claimed equal advantages. On the part of the Carthaginians desire of revenge, on that of the Romans of preserving their honour, occasioned several little combats of trifling importance; at last, on the fourth day from Scipio's arrival, the generals on each side resolving to give battle, the two armies moved out of their camps and marched towards each other.

Scipio's disposition was as follows: the Roman cavalry on the right wing, commanded by Lælius, the friend and companion of the Roman general; Massinissa with his Numidians on the left; and Scipio himself in the center, where he was more at hand to resort to any part in which he might be wanted. The Numidians of the adverse army, who were opposed to the Roman cavalry, were broken with the first charge; the defeat of their countrymen on the night of the camps, and Scipio's fame, had entirely disheartened them; they were more than half vanquished before they began to engage. Massinissa had the same advantage over the Carthaginians; they were as much dismayed as Syphax's Numidians, and made hardly any resistance. The combat was more obstinate and longer in deciding at the center, occupied by the Roman infantry in Scipio's army,
and

and by the Gauls in the Carthaginian. Hitherto they had been allies of the Romans, and if they followed the opposite interest it was not from any dissatisfaction with Scipio or the republic, but allured and gained solely by the offers and promises which had been made them. At present they found themselves in a strange country, where they had not had the prudence to secure themselves a retreat in case of necessity; they could expect no safety in flight, because they had no place to retire to; they could hope for no favour from the Romans on account of their perfidy; they fought therefore like men whose only resource was in victory. They disputed it long, supported by their natural valour, and that courage which despair inspires; but the enemy's two wings being defeated and dispersed, they were surrounded on all sides. At last they gave ground, and the length of their resistance having enraged the Roman soldiers against them, they left not a man alive. The inveteracy of the legions against them gave Asdrubal and Syphax time to get away; they happily escaped from the conquerors with what troops were able to follow them, and owed their liberty, and possibly their lives, to the brave resistance of the Gauls.

As for Scipio, after dividing the spoil and plunder amongst his soldiers, he called a council, to deliberate, without loss of time, upon what was proper to be done, to draw the greatest advantages possible from the defeat of the enemy. It was determined that Massinissa, at the head of his Numidians, and Lælius with a part of the legions, should march with all speed after Syphax, without giving him time to rest; and that Scipio, with the remainder of the army, should take pos-

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session of all the small towns which covered Carthage, and at the same time lay waste the whole country: all three marched immediately for their several destinations. There were few towns in Africa that durst stand an assault. Scipio, according to the custom of the Romans, treated those that resisted with rigour, the greatest part opened their gates and surrendered on terms. It seemed as if Africa courted a revolution, which would put an end to the course of such great evils, and staunch the blood which was shed on all sides.—The continuance of a war, which Carthage had kept up so long, as well in Italy and Spain as in her own territories, had rendered a country, abundant in itself, and still more enriched by commerce, the habitation of desolation. The people were unable to pay the subsidies they were loaded with; all the young men had perished; the plains were cultivated, only that the labourers might deplore their fairest hopes, which they saw harvested by the flames, or the swords of the Romans; the ruin was universal, and the public misery drew almost as great floods of tears from the Carthaginians, who were unable to bear arms, as it did of blood from those who had strength to carry them for their defence,

At Carthage the desolation, despair and disorder, which ever follows any great and sudden change, were not less extreme. Many expedients were proposed; no one was adhered to; part of the council was for peace, some for a truce, and others from an invincible animosity, were for carrying on the war to the last extremity, and for recalling Hannibal, who they supposed, would, of himself, be sufficient to change the face of affairs by his return into Africa. In this confusion
and

and general uncertainty, some one proposed to go and attack a part of the Roman fleet, which Scipio had left at Utica, while he went to take possession of Tunis. They were only vessels of burden, not at all fit, on account of their construction and unwieldiness, to sustain an action. For all the superiority of the Carthaginians over the Romans in naval matters, their courage was so lowered, that they hesitated a long time whether they should undertake this enterprize. They at last determined upon it, and after a slight encounter they beheld seven ships, the Carthaginians had taken from the Romans, enter the port.

This success, trifling as it was, appeared great from its novelty, and was much boasted of among the multitude, one would have thought they had either taken or destroyed the whole Roman fleet. It was indeed in much danger, and would not perhaps have escaped, had not Scipio, hastening from Tunis, come to its relief. The bare report of his arrival drove off the Carthaginian fleet. They began to think that the fortune of the Romans was so attached to his person that he need only appear to conquer.

While these things passed, Lælius and Massinissa reached Numidia, after a forced march of fifteen days. Massinissa, hitherto constantly unfortunate, at last saw once more, the kingdom of his ancestors, and saw it victorious over Syphax, by whom he had been driven out of it. He was equally beloved and esteemed by his subjects; they repaired in crowds to him, acknowledged him for their king, and testified by the most sincere joy, how happy they counted themselves in coming again under the government of their true master,

Syphax

Syphax had withdrawn the garrisons he had placed in Massinissa's country; the losses he sustained, made all his troops necessary to him, and he carefully collected them from every part of his dominions. Asdrubal, the son of Gisco, his father in law, used every means to inspire him with all his own hatred and animosity against the Romans. The queen, Sophonisba, young, charming, adored, did not cease to conjure him by all their tenderness, and as a proof of his love for her, not to abandon her country. Her intreaties were commands to a heart enslaved, which her beauty captivated more and more. Syphax, who in the ardour of his passion knew no happiness but that of pleasing Sophonisba, could not resist the tears with which his inconsolable consort enforced her demand. He shut his eyes to the great danger his blind compliance would expose him to; love armed his kingdom a third time against the Romans.

The many and great losses this prince had suffered in so short a time were hardly perceptible in his dominions: he had lost near 100000 men, in horse and foot; but his kingdom was so rich and populous that there did not appear the least diminution of men or horses. He quickly made so considerable a levy, that he was at the head of a respectable army when Lælius and Massinissa entered his country. It was as numerous as the others, and as well equipped; but they were not soldiers: It was composed of dull heavy men from the plough, men unused to war, without order, without valour, without discipline. Syphax, blinded by his passion and desire of revenge, had the weakness to depend on this mob of new levies, who had nothing of the soldier except the dress
and

and the arms, destitute both of courage and experience. He had even the rashness (so much had his fatal fondness overcome his reason) to march against a disciplined army, grown grey in battles and successes, and whose valour he had already twice proved to his cost.

Sophonisba, or rather his complaisance for this absolute queen, who had no affection for any thing but Carthage, and whose whole enmity was directed against Rome, lost him his kingdom, and his liberty; his army was routed at the first onset: in vain did he fly through the ranks, and make every effort to confirm their frightened spirits. His horse having received several wounds fell, and he was taken prisoner by the Romans, whilst his scattered soldiers fled on all sides to escape from them. He had on his part 50000 killed, and about half as many taken prisoners; the rest made for Cirtis, the capital of his dominions, as fast as possible. Massinissa, who knew the country, having obtained Lælius's consent to march thither before the fugitives and inhabitants should have time to recollect themselves, repaired there with extraordinary dispatch. Lælius, whose legions were not accustomed to such rapid marches, followed slowly after.

As soon as Massinissa arrived at the gates, he summoned the princes of the blood, and the chief officers of Syphax's court. He was attended by his brave Numidians, who had triumphed now, the third time, over Syphax, ready to subdue by force all who should refuse to obey. The great men in Cirtis submitted to his orders, and attended at the gate he appointed. He employed neither threats nor promises to reduce it, he only ordered Syphax to be brought before them loaded with irons.

irons. At this sight the whole assembly melted into tears; the voice of grief and despair, cries and lamentations, were heard from all quarters. This king so powerful a few days ago, the conqueror of Massinissa, to whom he left no retreat, except the desolate caverns of the desert mountains of Numidia; Syphax, the support of Carthage and the rival of the Romans, who had courted his alliance; Syphax in chains, threw the whole court into such consternation as made them distrust almost their own eyes. The few faithful subjects he had banished themselves from an unfortunate city, which had been the scene of their master's humiliation; the greater number endeavoured to find a resource in the clemency of the conqueror. They opened the gates of Cirtis to Massinissa, who sent detachments to take possession of the palace and fortifications.

When he had set every thing in order, and placed guards at the gates, he rode full gallop to the palace to find out Sophonisba, whose exquisite beauty had made so much noise in Africa.

This princess having been informed of the defeat and captivity of Syphax, and the arrival of Massinissa in the capital, waited for the conqueror in her palace. She knew the power of her spirit and beauty, she desired to employ only their charms, to make her own terms with a triumphant enemy, whom the king her consort had constantly persecuted. She was in the vestibule of the palace when she saw a large body of troops advancing; from the brightness of his arms, the richness of his dress, and a certain air of dignity which sometimes distinguishes sovereigns from their subjects, she thought she could discern Massinissa, and in effect did discern him. She

She moved trembling towards him, fell on her knees, seized his hand, which, while she grasped, she bathed with her tears, and in a broken voice, "Prince," says she, "the gods, your valour, your good fortune, have at last given you the advantage over us; you are the arbiter of my days; your conquest makes you master of my life. In the zenith of your glory, may it be permitted a queen loaded with misfortunes, to hope for one favour of you? I ask it in the name of that royal majesty in which you know I have always lived since my marriage, in the name of the same gods we both worship; and may these propitious gods bring you here under happier auspices than the unfortunate Syphax. Dispose of me, Prince, I am ready to execute whatever sentence you pronounce; you are my king, my master, my sovereign lord; I am your captive, ready to follow you any where, and to obey all your commands. But, Prince, I conjure you, I beseech you, do not give me up to the Romans. You know what the wife of Syphax, and daughter of Asdrubal, has to expect; dare I hope you will not deliver me into the hands of my mortal enemies? But if there is no other way to escape, will you permit me to free myself from their arrogant tyranny, by an immediate death? It is the only favour an unhappy queen has to beg of your clemency and generosity."

Sophonisba's beauty was unequalled; she had no ornaments but the attractions of youth in full bloom. Unhappy with so many charms, still heightened by her grief, she was sure to please and soften. The same flame which had consumed Syphax, ran swiftly through Massinissa's veins.

veins. The constitution of the Africans resembles the scorching heat of their climate. The voice, the prayers of Sophonisba softened the heart of her conqueror, and made every impression she could wish. She requested of Massinissa his promise not to deliver her up to the Romans. This promise was not only given her, but the prince, whose passion made him ingenious, endeavoured to find out the means of justifying it. He could find none so plausible as proposing to Sophonisba to marry him. The desire of succouring Carthage, and being avenged of the Romans, made her consent to any thing. Syphax in chains was esteemed as dead; this faithless queen saw no resource for herself, but in Massinissa's passion. Become the wife of their ally, she thought herself secure from the pursuit of the Romans by her second marriage; perhaps she even hoped to be able, one day or other, to create to Scipio a formidable adversary out of the most faithful of his allies.

Hardly had a few days glided away in a round of pleasures, when Lælius reached Cirtis. How great was his astonishment to hear the news of his marriage from Massinissa himself! He was so enraged that in the first transport of his passion he would have forced Sophonisba from her palace, and sent her under a guard to Scipio; but Massinissa appeased him by his intreaties, and prevailed with him to wait the judgment of Scipio. Lælius consented with regret, and sent Syphax, with the prisoners taken in the last battle, and at the surrender of Cirtis, to the Roman camp. Completely to reconcile Lælius, Massinissa offered to leave Cirtis, and attend him in the reduction of the rest of Syphax's kingdom, to bring this expedition

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pedition to an end without loss of time. The sacrifice he made in tearing himself from the charms of a beloved wife must have cost his heart a great deal : but it was above all things his interest to preserve the good opinion of the Romans; he therefore departed from Cirtis with Lælius, to go and reduce the places which still held out for Syphax ; and ran with him through all Numidia, passing from town to town, until the whole was subjected to the Romans.

While they were completing the conquest of Syphax's kingdom, that dethroned prince, with every person of his court, of any rank or distinction, was carried to Scipio. He arrived at length at the Roman camp. The sight of a king, of late so powerful, whose alliance the Roman chiefs had courted, and whom they now beheld a captive and in chains, threw the spectators into that excessive astonishment which great revolutions are apt to occasion. Scipio could not withhold that natural compassion which great evils always excite. " Prince," says he to him " you receive the due reward of your treachery. How could you bring yourself, not only to break the alliance we had entered into, but moreover to declare against us? What were your views?" " I acknowledge now," answered Syphax, " I see all my imprudence, and the whole extent of my fault. I filled the measure of it, when I took up arms against you ; but the source of my misfortunes must be looked for farther back. I was undone when I took a wife from Carthage. This execrable fury, who by her fatal careffes, and the invincible ascendancy my passion gave her over me, made me partake of her hate against Rome, and did not cease
" per-

“ persecuting me, until I consented to come into
 “ her sentiments. I have lost my glory, and my
 “ throne, for having listened to her. How sen-
 “ sibly soever I may feel the stroke, I bear it the
 “ more patiently, since I understand that Massi-
 “ nissa, my mortal enemy, partakes of my weak-
 “ nefs; and that this fatal pestilence has entered
 “ into his house by means of her allurements. I
 “ trust his passion will avenge me of the mis-
 “ chievous effects of my own. He has ever had
 “ less prudence than myself, and less command
 “ of his passions; his marriage with the faithless
 “ Sophonisba is a fresh proof of it; my only con-
 “ solation is the hope of his fall, which cannot
 “ be long delayed.

Scipio, greatly astonished at what he heard,
 could hardly give credit to it; but from Syphax's
 grief, his tears, his rage, above all from the de-
 tail he gave of the marriage of Massinissa with
 Sophonisba, and the hurry with which that prince
 had concluded the alliance, without waiting for
 Lælius, he had no longer any room to doubt of
 the truth of this alarming news. He ordered
 Syphax to be conducted to a tent, provided for
 him, till Lælius's return from Numidia, being
 unwilling to trust to any other person the con-
 ducting a prisoner of such importance to Rome.

The sudden birth and dangerous effects of
 Massinissa's passion, embarrassed Scipio very much.
 The fidelity of this prince was essential to the Ro-
 mans, to accomplish the reduction of Africa;
 being married to a princess who esteemed her ha-
 tred to Rome her greatest virtue, it was to be
 feared the empire she had so quickly gained over
 him, would enable her to draw him into all her
 views and sentiments. Syphax was a recent ex-
 ample

ample of the power she had over a heart subdued by her charms. Scipio dreaded, with reason, lest she should seduce Massinissa by the same arts: he saw with much uneasiness, that the Prince, too impetuous in his desires, had fallen into this trap set for him by Sophonisba; not so much from the regard she had for him, as her inveterate hatred to the Romans. He was in this agitation, and uncertain how to act, when Lælius and Massinissa returning from their expedition entered his tent, with the principal officers who had attended them. He received them with transports of joy, and publicly made them all the compliments due to their success; but dismissing them, he stopped Massinissa, and addressed him thus:

“ Your conduct, Massinissa, hitherto has convinced me that you have some regard for me. You met me in Spain to form an alliance with me; in Africa you have attached your hopes to my fortune: you have evidently thought me prudent and valiant enough to procure you that justice you are entitled to. You are a young man, I am so too; be assured the pleasing and flattering allurements with which the passions present themselves, are much more to be dreaded by you and me, than the tumult and dangers of war. In keeping a constant command over yourself, you will acquire more honour, and appear greater than in defeating Syphax, or subduing his kingdom. It is a pleasure to me, as well as my duty, to give you the praises you deserve; if there is any thing in your conduct unworthy of you, I would rather you should feel it than put you to the blush with my reproaches.

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N

“ Syphax

“ Syphax has been vanquished and made a
 “ prisoner under the auspices of the Roman peo-
 “ ple; his dominions, his kingdom, his towns,
 “ their inhabitants, his very consort; in short,
 “ every thing which did belong to Syphax be-
 “ longs this day, by right of conquest, to the
 “ Roman people; therefore, though Sophonisba
 “ were not a Carthaginian, though she were not
 “ the daughter of a general of Carthage, I could
 “ not avoid sending her to Rome. It is for the
 “ senate, it is for the people of Rome, to deter-
 “ mine the fate of this ambitious queen, to whom
 “ they impute Syphax’s treachery. You colour,
 “ Massinissa; tears fall from you. You must tri-
 “ umph over yourself. Consider that a weak de-
 “ grading passion, has no relation to all the vir-
 “ tues you have hitherto exhibited. Think now
 “ you will tarnish their lustre if you do not reso-
 “ lutely subdue a passion unbecoming you, and
 “ tending to your utter destruction.”

A stroke of a dagger would not have affected
 Massinissa’s heart more sensibly; he answered sigh-
 ing, “ Scipio, you have a right to act as you think
 “ proper; but however great my imprudence may
 “ have been in marrying Sophonisba, however
 “ great my indiscretion in giving my honour not
 “ to deliver her up to the Romans, I desire you
 “ to consider that I have pledged it to her. I am
 “ too much affected to be able to say more; yet
 “ again, Sir, reflect on what I have promised.”
 At these words he left him, and retired hastily to
 his tent, where he gave himself up wholly to grief
 and despair.

His attendants, afraid of the consequences, did
 all in their power not to leave him to himself;
 but there are situations in which every attention
 afflicts

afflicts and teazes instead of consoling. One wishes to have the whole world to oneself, if it were possible, and grief finds charms in such a frightful solitude.

Massinissa therefore dismissed all his attendants, and gave himself up to the most afflicting reflections. He must either ruin himself, in quarrelling with the Romans by endeavouring ineffectually to save Sophonisba, or consent to lose her, if he wished to preserve his interest with them. Love, the charms of Sophonisba, pleaded that he should sacrifice Scipio's friendship to her. Glory, gratitude, the preservation of his dominions, demanded the delivery of this princess to Scipio. In this extremity he had only the choice of two difficulties, equally afflictive to a fond heart; the loss of his sceptre, or that of his wife, whom he passionately loved.

He hesitated a long time, distracted by his contending thoughts, without uttering a word. He was only heard to sigh from time to time, and to pronounce the name of Sophonisba in a tone full of compassion. At length, after many struggles, he groaned so deeply as to be heard by all who were at the tent door, and feeling how vain it would be to oppose Scipio, he called a slave in whom he had ever placed the greatest confidence.

It was he who had the care of the fatal poison, which Massinissa charily kept to deliver him, in case of necessity, by a speedy death, from a life of shame. Massinissa ordered him to prepare the poison in his presence; the slave obeyed, trembling, and anxious for the life of his master. —
 "Take courage," says he to him, "it is for me
 "to feel all the horrors of this fatal draught, but
 "not to drink it. Put it into a safe vase, and

“ carry it from me to Sophonisba; tell her, I had
 “ hoped to fulfil with her all the duties of the con-
 “ jugal vow I have made, that no one ever loved
 “ her so sincerely, that my life will be too short to
 “ lament her, and that perhaps I may be so happy
 “ as to end my mourning by a speedy death,—
 “ But tell her, the Romans are inflexible. I have
 “ promised she shall not fall into their hands;
 “ tell her this cup contains the only means by
 “ which I can prevent it. Go,” says he, “ she is
 “ the daughter of a general of Carthage, she is
 “ the wife of two kings; I cannot save her, her
 “ fate will be in her own hands; she shall have it
 “ in her power to preserve her own glory, the
 “ glory of her country, and that of her wretched
 “ husband.”

The slave obeyed, and immediately departed
 for Cirtis, where he soon arrived. He executed
 his masters orders, related all he had in charge,
 and at last presented the poison. “ I accept it
 “ with joy,” says Sophonisba, clearly perceiving
 she had no other resource. “ I might have ex-
 “ pected different presents from the hand of an
 “ husband; but since he has none else to give, he
 “ shall not send this in vain. Since he had it not
 “ in his power to do more for me, I will at least
 “ benefit from this favour. Death is my refuge.
 “ I should perhaps have died better satisfied,”
 added she, “ had I not dishonoured myself by
 “ this marriage, as disgraceful as it has been in-
 “ effectual to my designs. Heaven will bear me
 “ witness that I suffer the pain without repug-
 “ nance, and that I cheerfully quit life without
 “ giving up my affection for my own country, or
 “ my aversion to the Romans.”

When

When she had finished speaking, she looked calmly on all who were present when the slave arrived, and without raising her voice, without changing colour, even without uttering a single complaint, she drank the poison, and soon after expired!

Thus fell the celebrated Sophonisba, the daughter of Asdrubal the son of Gisco, one of the greatest generals of the republic of Carthage. Born in that town, the rival and implacable enemy of Rome, she imbibed in her infancy all its enmity; she employed her charms, and all her address, to procure her country powerful defenders, and the Romans formidable enemies. Her animosity cost her her crown in the person of Syphax, her honour in her marriage with Massinissa; and at last her life, when she despaired of disputing with the Romans the empire of the globe.

The slave on his return from Cirtis waited upon Scipio, informed him of all that had passed, and apprized him of the death of Sophonisba. Scipio went immediately to Massinissa's tent, reproached him with the cruel resolution he had taken, and above all for taking it without consulting him. In short, if Massinissa's imprudence had been great, the remedy was not less violent. Prepared as he was to lose Sophonisba, the relation of her death affected him most severely. Scipio behaved to him with the most attentive friendship; he did not leave him till he had calmed the furious agitation of his soul; and after having for some time indulged his grief, he prevailed with him to come out of his tent and to dispel his gloomy thoughts by assisting at a general council he had called.

Scipio, who was well acquainted with the human heart, knew that in great souls the strong passions succeed one another, and that the noblest will ever prevail. Massinissa's ruling passion was the love of fame; perhaps he had a fondness for those praises which commonly attend it, which self-love is too apt to prevent even the best deserving from getting the better of.

When Massinissa appeared in the council, Scipio in the presence of the whole army was lavish in his encomiums on the valour, activity and vigilance of the Numidian prince. He then made him most magnificent presents of arms and accoutrements; and as a very high and special favour, permitted him to bear the insignia of the first dignities of the republic: the patrician purple, the consular fasces, and every thing which at Rome distinguished the magistrates in office, were all united in the person of Massinissa. This prince was the first on whom the Romans had conferred such great honours: they produced the desired effect. The enjoyment of all these flattering marks of distinction, insensibly effaced the impressions of his grief; the present Scipio made him of Syphax's dominions, which he united to his own kingdom, entirely dissipated it; his heart, wholly taken up with the vastness of his new grandeur, could hardly support it. He gave Scipio the most lively marks of gratitude due to his bounty, and repaired from his camp to his dominions.

Scipio returned to Tunis, to complete the works he had begun; and Lælius was sent with Syphax, and the rest of the prisoners taken in this war, to Rome,

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The firmest pillar of the Carthaginian state was broken by this total defeat of Syphax; a general consternation was spread through the town. The council deputed thirty senators to Scipio, to solicit peace; and to give the embassy more weight and a greater air of sincerity, they chose the most respectable for their age, and the important posts they filled.

Being admitted into Scipio's tent, they fell prostrate before him, and remained long in that humiliating posture. Their discourse was as submissive as their behaviour; without attempting to justify themselves, they charged the fault and the misfortune of Carthage on Hannibal, and the influence of his faction on the minds of the multitude. "The Roman people," continued they, "do not wish to extirpate their enemies, but to conquer them; we are come to acknowledge, in the name of the republic and of the state, that we are subdued, and ready to receive the law of our conquerors. Announce our destiny, we are ready to obey in all things, and to bear with patience whatever you chuse to lay upon us." *

Scipio answered, that he came into their country to conquer, and not to treat; that, thanks to the gods, fortune had favoured his hopes: But though on the point of subduing Carthage, which had not a single resource left, he would yet consent to a peace they seemed so sincerely to implore.

"But on these conditions," added he. "You must restore all the prisoners, give up all defences, withdraw your troops from Gaul and Italy,"

N 4

* An. R. 549. Ante C. 203:

“ Italy, renounce Spain, and cede to us the isles
 “ that lie between Africa and Italy. Moreover,
 “ you must deliver up all your ships, except
 “ twenty, which the republic will permit you to
 “ keep; you shall pay the republic five hundred
 “ thousand bushels of wheat, and three hundred
 “ thousand of barley. Lastly, you shall pay her
 “ fifty thousand talents within such time as shall
 “ be agreed upon. Behold the articles of the
 “ peace you solicit; acquaint your senate with
 “ them; deliberate, and resolve. If you chuse
 “ peace at this price, send ambassadors to Rome
 “ to conclude it with the senate, and in the mean
 “ time I will grant you a general truce.”

The conditions were too hard to be accepted
 by a nation accustomed to give laws to others.
 The deputies did not positively reject them: But
 to gain time till the return of Hannibal, (who
 had received orders to hasten to the relief of Car-
 thage) upon Scipio's answer being reported to
 the senate, they resolved to send deputies again
 to Scipio, to conclude a truce, and ambassadors
 to Rome to treat of peace. To appear moreover
 to act consistently, they sent with their ambassa-
 dors the prisoners and deserters; but the number
 was so small, that the senate suspected Carthage
 had a mind to temporize rather than finish the
 business.

Just before the Carthaginian ambassadors reach-
 ed Rome, Syphax and the other prisoners had ar-
 rived with Lælius; they were sure proofs of Sci-
 pio's success. Lælius on coming out of the se-
 nate, repaired to the Forum, to communicate
 these good tidings to the people. He was inter-
 rupted incessantly with shouts of joy, which re-
 sounded from all parts. They gave unbounded

scope

scope to their transports, and were eager to express them by every means in their power. They ordained a supplication for four days; all the temples were filled with Romans anxious to show their gratitude for such great and repeated blessings, and to implore the continuance of the Divine favour.

The day after his arrival, Lælius presented to the senate Massinissa's ambassadors, who requested a confirmation of Syphax's kingdom, granted him in the name of the republic by Scipio; they added, that if their master could obtain the liberty of the Numidians, who were prisoners at Rome, he might hope to gain the affections of his new subjects, and that they were instructed to ask this favour of them.

The senate confirmed all that Scipio had done for Massinissa, and granted his ambassadors all they requested. The republic received them with a state suitable to their dignity, and defrayed all their expences. The Numidian slaves were given up to them: the pretor had orders immediately to provide the most magnificent horse furniture, arms, and armour; to which were added, tents and other field equipage, such as the republic usually furnished a consul with. These were distinctions very honourable to Massinissa; but he had purchased them by an invincible fidelity to the Romans, and the vast succours he had furnished them with in a distant country. The liberality of the republic extended to the ambassadors, and took a pleasure in loading them with the richest presents.

As soon as those intended for Massinissa were ready, the ambassadors departed, with Lælius, to return to Africa. They were hardly embarked, when

when the Carthaginian deputies arrived at Rome. The senate confiding much in Lælius, were unwilling to come to any determination without consulting him; they therefore sent an express after him, and he returned to Rome. The absurd offer of the Carthaginians to keep strictly to the treaty of Luctatius, which was made at the conclusion of the first Punic war, set every one against them. It was known at Rome that Hannibal had received orders to repair to Carthage, and the crafty conduct of the Carthaginians only served to expose their insincerity; they were therefore no longer regarded but as spies, come to reconnoitre the state of Rome and Italy. It was even proposed to send them back directly, under a guard which should attend them to their ships.

Metellus, who had been consul and dictator, being consulted on the answer to be given them, said he had long been acquainted with the artifices of the Carthaginians, and the tricking faithless character of that people; that they only shewed this eagerness for peace, which, if concluded on the terms in the treaty of Luctatius, would disgrace the Romans, to gain time to get over their troops and general who were still in Italy. He added, that his advice was for the senate to refer the management of the whole business to Scipio, who being under the walls of Carthage, was better able to examine into the situation and strength of that republic, and to judge of her sincerity; that in short, no person was so capable of concluding this peace advantageously, as he who had been so fortunate as to reduce the Carthaginians to the necessity of soliciting it. His advice was followed; they sent the ambassadors back without agreeing to any thing; and told them that Scipio, being at
the

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
the head of the legions in their country, was entrusted with every thing relating to the republic of Carthage, and they must treat with him.

The Carthaginians waited for arms, soldiers, and the most formidable enemy of Rome, Hannibal, who had received orders from the senate to hasten to the relief of his country. Exasperated with shame, jealousy, and hatred of the Romans, who forced from them the empire of the world, they rather dreaded than wished for peace. In all the several propositions they made of accommodation, the heart had no concern; they were determined either to perish themselves, or destroy the Romans; and they meant only to amuse them with a negotiation, for such time as would be necessary for Hannibal to bring the troops from Italy over into Africa. They succeeded in their design; the sequel of this history will shew what was the fruit of their artifice and dissimulation.

THE END OF THE SECOND BOOK.



THE



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SCIPIO AFRICANUS.

BOOK THE THIRD.

TWO memorable events marked this year,* the departure of Hannibal out of Italy, and the death of Fabius. The Genius of Rome seemed to delight in prolonging the life of this great man until the retreat of the mortal enemy of his country. Fabius lived near a century, according to some historians; according to others, a few years less: the Romans gave him two surnames, that of Cunctator, which he acquired by constantly declining to come to action with Hannibal; and that of Maximus, which was the reward of a conduct in war so judicious, that it disconcerted all the designs of the Carthaginians, who could not subsist in an enemy's country but by means of victories and conquests, and who could have no hope against Rome but by a coup de main, which yet they did not dare to attempt when it was in their power. Fabius thwarted all Scipio's projects by constant opposition, arising perhaps in
some

* An. R. 549. Ante C. 203. Polyb. Liv.

some measure from jealousy : Scipio divided with him the attention of Rome, and this division might seem an actual robbery to a man who before had enjoyed it solely, and that deservedly. Perhaps also Fabius's prudence was the only cause of this opposition, which has been attributed to envy; he had saved Rome without drawing the sword, as we may say; Scipio restored her to her ancient possessions and glory, as well in Spain as Africa, by repeated victories. This means of success ever appeared dangerous to Fabius, when they had an Hannibal to engage with. All the advantages which were gained seemed only to excite his fears that they might cease to continue, and if that happened he would have thought Rome in danger. Scipio, on the contrary, was persuaded that it was doing nothing to drive Hannibal out of Italy, and that it was absolutely necessary to reduce the republic of Carthage to such a state, that it should never have the power to give Rome the like alarms again, by subduing her, and making her feel all the evils with which she had menaced the Romans. Thus different principles make the greatest men think and act differently, who yet aim only at the same object, the good of their country.

The retreat of Hannibal consoled Rome for the death of Fabius. The Roman general did not cease pursuing him a single instant, and had obliged him to retire to the confines of Italy. Deserted by all his allies, without money to subsist his troops, without hope of receiving any from Carthage, not in a condition to afford him any, this famous general found continual resources in the extent of his own capacity. Convinced that in Italy alone the Romans could be overcome, and
ever

ever flattering himself that he should at last be able to persuade the senate of Carthage to be of the same opinion, he chose rather to languish there, and endure every want, than lose sight of his favourite object.

The country of the Brutians where he now was, naturally poor, and harrassed by the long stay he made there, presented on all sides nothing but the appearance of misery and desolation. In this wretched situation, pleasanter to him than the most superb palaces of Carthage, the deputies of that republic came to signify to him his recall on the part of the senate, and the order to march instantly with his army to the relief of his country. He raved with rage, he groaned with grief, and hardly refrained from tears. "Carthage then at last speaks out," says he to the deputies, "she recalls with an absolute order. She has long since began to do it when she refused me succours of men, money, and provisions; she was then preparing for this disgraceful stroke, she has now compleated the business; Hannibal is at last obliged to abandon Italy. It is not the Romans who have forced me; I have routed, I have defeated them almost as often as I have engaged them; it is the very senate of Carthage which compels me; my own base countrymen, who have given themselves up to the ruinous councils of Hanno and a vile cabal, envious of my success. However disgraceful my return may be to the Carthaginian name, Scipio will not rejoice so much at it as the jealous overbearing Hanno, who has ever opposed me, and who could no otherwise get the better of my party, than by effecting at the same time the ruin of Carthage."

In

In spite of all his regret and repugnance, he at last resolved to obey the senate. He discharged all the useless troops from whom he expected little or no service in Africa, and who he knew were attached to his standard from fear only. He had in his army a great number of soldiers who were natives of Italy; some were enrolled by force, others had been taken in several actions, and incorporated with his troops; he had also some who had been led to join him by hopes of plunder. He was very desirous of carrying the Italians over into Africa, but the greatest part refused to follow him, and could not be persuaded to leave their country. He attempted to force; they retreated into a temple of Juno which was near the camp, hoping to find there an asylum against his violence: but as these troops, formed by his hands, would have been of infinite use to the Romans, he sacrificed them to his hatred to Rome; and lest after his departure they should enter into the legions, he cruelly ordered the temple to be set on fire, and made them all perish in the flames.

His first footsteps on the territories of Italy were marked with streams of Roman blood; his last view of that hostile land saw the flames devour the neighbours and allies of the Romans, by the doubly inexcusable crime of ingratitude and sacrilege.

After this horrible execution he embarked with his army, and at last quitted those beloved shores where he had caused the Romans such alarms, and made such devastation. No exile ever felt so much grief and regret at leaving the land of his nativity, as he did in departing from this hostile country. As the vessels moved off he kept his eyes fixed upon the shores of Italy; he turned
about

about perpetually towards them, he cast threatening looks at them, groaned most bitterly, and did not lose sight of them without expressing the most poignant despair.

After the order which had been sent him in the name of the senate of Carthage, they impatiently expected his return; but they were yet ignorant of the success of the ambassadors who had been sent to negotiate a peace at Rome.

The truce agreed on between Scipio and the council of Carthage was to have continued till their return; the shipwreck of a fleet of 200 transport vessels, which the pretor Octavius conducted from Sicily to Africa, gave the Carthaginians an occasion of breaking it. These vessels meeting with a violent gale of wind were dispersed; some were cast upon the coast of Ægimura, a small island which terminates the gulf towards the sea, and the rest were driven almost into the very port of Carthage.

A convoy of all sorts of provisions and ammunition, which they could so easily take possession of, put the good faith of the Carthaginians to a proof it was not equal to. The people quickly assembled tumultuously in the Forum, and burning with a desire of plundering the Roman fleet, openly threatened to go and make themselves masters of it, if the senate refused to send and seize it. A few attempted to oppose the torrent, by remonstrating that the truce was not yet expired, and it would be offending the gods as well as the Romans to violate the most sacred engagements.

The two Suffeti called a council extraordinary to deliberate on what was to be done; the people fearing lest they should snatch out of their hands

a prey they already devoured with their eyes, could not endure this delay; but raving with impatience for their determination they even forced into the council. The spirit of sedition, of disorder, of animosity, and above all, the perfidious temper of the nation, were alone attended to, in prejudice to a truce which they had earnestly solicited. Asdrubal received an order to seize all the vessels and bring them into the port: they found them without either soldiers or sailors; those whom the shipwreck had spared had got away by a timely flight, so that all were brought without any resistance to Carthage.

This proceeding of the Carthaginians was doubtless inexcusable, nor could they possibly justify their conduct on this occasion; their mistaken interest in taking possession of the Roman fleet contrary to every kind of law, completely exasperated the minds of all against Carthage, when moderation and equity might have gained them the friendship of their enemies. But Hannibal coming to their relief, they imprudently concluded they had no occasion to fear the Romans any longer, or to keep any terms with them, no not so much as to observe the treaties they had made.

Scipio, justly incensed at the insult which had been offered to the Roman people, at a time when all hostilities were suspended, and still more vexed that Carthage should be benefited by the supplies of provisions and money which the convoy had brought, sent ambassadors to the republic of Carthage to demand satisfaction. They were introduced to the council of one hundred, whom they reproached for an action so shameful to the state, with all the Roman majesty and boldness. They represented to the Carthaginians the earnestness
with

with which their deputies came, a little while before to Utica, to implore peace of Scipio: "Ye
 " then confessed the Romans had a right to treat
 " you with the greatest rigour, and you only implored, you said, their clemency, that it might
 " shine as an example to the whole universe, of
 " the lenity which they shewed to their greatest
 " enemies when they were vanquished. Our general, whom ye intreated in terms the most abject, and with the most affecting submissiveness, has not yet forgotten them: Why then
 " have ye not recollected them? By what right
 " have ye violated your promises, on a suspension
 " of arms solemnly sworn to before the gods?
 " Such rashness without doubt proceeds from the
 " confidence you have in the return of Hannibal,
 " and the troops which you fancy accompany
 " him; you will soon see your error. But should
 " he return with a numerous army, would that
 " give you a right to break the most sacred bonds
 " of human society? Take care, Carthaginians,
 " if ye refuse to restore what your imprudent
 " greediness has seized, lest you destroy the small
 " degree of hope left you, of experiencing the
 " clemency of the Romans."

Having said this, they left the council to wait for their answer. There was scarcely a senator who voted for observing the truce, so greatly did a spirit of deceit, treachery, and unjust avarice reign in the senate. Those who were at the head of affairs, and had the most authority, shocked at the hard conditions of peace, advised to continue the war, and to declare it by confirming this fresh act of hostility. The motion was carried by a majority of voices, and it was determined in the council that they should not restore any part of

the fleet which had been driven into the port, and of which they had made themselves masters.

They therefore sent back the ambassadors without giving them any satisfaction; their malice ran so high, that it was with difficulty they respected their character: they did not dare to violate it openly, but the leaders of the council who were determined upon war, having given the ambassadors an escort, under pretence of securing them from the insults of an unruly multitude, whom they said they could not controul, gave secret orders to Asdrubal to conceal himself so as to be ready to attack their gallies as soon as the convoy had left them. This convoy took leave of them, as they were ordered, at the mouth of the river Bragada; it was hardly gone off when Asdrubal fell violently upon the ambassador's galley with a much superior force.

In spite of this advantage the Romans defended themselves with inexpressible resolution against this unexpected attack. The fight was bloody, and continued even to the shore, where the Romans came from their camp to the relief of their ambassadors. They were so fortunate as to escape from this great danger, and the loss was confined to the large number of soldiers which the galley carried, who almost all perished in the action.

Thus it was that the Carthaginians declared war afresh against the Romans, and commenced it with a double perfidy. This completed the hatred and rage of the two nations against each other. The Romans breathed nothing but vengeance for the insults they had received: the Carthaginians, having given up all hopes of peace, resolved to shed the last drop of their blood rather than fall into the hands of their enemies. The

two nations were no longer animated by the interests of the republics, an implacable desire of the most horrible revenge became personal to each individual. Such was the disposition of mind they were in, when Lælius arrived in Scipio's camp with the Carthaginian ambassadors, who had been at Rome during the truce, under pretence of suing for peace. This appeared a favourable opportunity of returning Carthage insult for insult; but Scipio, though pressed by several to take so easy a revenge, answered with that equal magnanimity so natural to him, that the crime the Carthaginians had been guilty of, in despising the most sacred and respected rights, would not justify him in following their example; and, in short, that however iniquitously the Carthaginians might behave towards the Romans, nothing should induce him to act in contradiction to those principles of equity and religion, which directed the government of his republic.

An action so noble, at the time that Carthage was covered with shame, opened the eyes of the Carthaginian senate, blinded by the violence of passion. The Roman general's greatness of soul discovered to them their own baseness. Hannibal himself, who was now arrived in Africa, full of admiration of such generous moderation, began to dread a rival who punished the bad faith of his enemies only by observing towards them an inviolable rectitude.

The return of the famous Carthaginian conqueror, balanced the hopes which had arisen from Scipio's victories, and made the success of the war doubtful; Africa, Spain, Sardinia, Rome, Italy, all had their eyes fixed upon these two celebrated generals. All the several allies of the two

republics were in that kind of suspense which usually precedes great events; Scipio at the head of the Romans, Hannibal commanding the Carthaginians, divided the attention of the universe, as yet unable to judge in whose favour fortune would decide the vast pretensions of the two nations.

At Rome, if their hopes augmented daily, their anxiety increased equally; they dreaded Hannibal, withdrawn into Africa, as much as if he were still in Italy; they made solemn supplications to the gods to obtain their protection; the blood of victims streamed from the altars; all the temples were opened, and filled with that general earnestness which the apprehension of great evils usually inspires. It was said the danger of the republic was not over, by the departure of Hannibal; that he had only changed provinces. Every one recollected the predictions and fears of Fabius, that sage dictator, to whom his profound experience seemed to lay futurity open; they thought death had taken him off only to prevent him the pain of beholding the misfortunes of his country. It is no longer, said they, with the people of Carthage, the Moors, the undisciplined Numidians the legions have to engage, it is with an army of experienced soldiers, of whom some have worn mural crowns, others have with their own hands slain our consuls, and all of whom have shed Roman blood. It is no longer with officers and generals without genius and without experience that Scipio has to dispute the victory, it is with the bravest of the Carthaginians, formed by the hand and under the eyes of Hannibal; it is with this very Hannibal himself, born as we may say in his father's camp, a soldier from his infancy, a general from his youth; superior to all events,

events, in a habit of conquering, and never conquered even in his greatest reverse of fortune; indefatigable in war, fruitful in projects, inexhaustible in resources; Spain and all Italy are full of the marks of his courage and of his skill.

If at Rome they trembled at the bare mention of Hannibal's name,* that of Scipio was not less dreaded at Carthage. It is true Hannibal's exploits and abilities had raised the spirits of his country, but Syphax vanquished and a prisoner, three victories gained successively over him and the Carthaginians, occasioned fresh alarms; add to this, that this same Hannibal had been forced to quit Italy in consequence of Scipio's great successes. The fate of this war seemed attached to the person and fortune of this Roman general, and one party among the Carthaginians was apprehensive that he was destined not only for the conquest, but even the utter ruin and total destruction of Carthage.

While they thus gave themselves up on each side, sometimes to their fears and sometimes to their hopes, Hannibal remained with his troops encamped at Adrumetum. Here he intended to make some stay to recover from the fatigues of the voyage, and to animate his soldiers by his address and eloquence. His republic sent deputies to him again, to beseech him to hasten his march, and not lose a moment in coming to the relief of Carthage; they informed him the enemy was at the very gates, that all the neighbouring towns were in his possession, and that the least delay might prove fatal.

Hannibal answered, that he only waited for an
O 4 opportunity

* Anno R. 550. Ante C. 202.

opportunity of coming to a general engagement, and would seize the first that offered. He decamped in obedience to the orders of the senate, and came by forced marches to Zama, distant from Carthage about five days march; he there pitched his camp and fortified it with strong intrenchments, and considered how he could inform himself of the situation and condition of Scipio's. To get the best intelligence possible, he fixed upon three officers whom he could confide in, and ordered them to endeavour to gain admittance into the Roman camp, to observe its situation, how matters were conducted, and chiefly how the troops were governed.

It was not against Scipio that these Carthaginian stratagems, from which Hannibal had frequently reaped such great advantages, were likely to succeed. The Roman camp was well guarded on all sides, all the important posts, the gates and sally-ports, were never without centinels. The spies fell into their hands and were brought to Scipio: he had a right to punish them, and it was the usual practice; but great men must be allowed to be singular to enable them to do great actions. The officers having confessed to Scipio that they were sent by their general to observe his camp, he ordered the military tribunes to conduct them round it, to shew them the troops, the guards, the intrenchments, and conceal nothing from them.

Having gone through the whole, they were brought back to Scipio, who asked if they were satisfied, and if they had executed their orders? they answered they were charmed; he added that they would oblige him in rendering their general an exact account of the disposition of his camp.

of

of all that had befallen them, and of the manner in which they had been received. He then dismissed them, having first ordered they should have every assistance towards regaining their own camp, and be escorted as far as they desired.

The spies arrived at the Carthaginian camp, and amazed Hannibal with the recital of their adventure; but what alarmed him most was the intelligence, that while they were in the Roman camp, Massinissa arrived there with a reinforcement of 6000 horse and 4000 foot.

Such greatness of soul, a conduct so generous, a confidence so marked, raised in Hannibal a curiosity to see Scipio, and have a conference with him. He sent an herald to propose one; Scipio accepted the invitation, and answered that he would immediately appoint the time and place of their meeting.

Scipio waited only for the junction with Massinissa to attack Hannibal, he therefore moved out of his camp, and the Carthaginian general did the same, that they might approach each other. They both halted within sight of Nadagara, a small town in the neighbourhood. Scipio pitched his camp in the plain, where he chose a situation the most advantageous, as well for the general security of it, as for the particular conveniency of his cavalry; he had plenty of water within bow shot of his trenches. Hannibal placed himself upon an eminence, the scite of which was equally good, but his water was at a distance, which fatigued his cavalry greatly. In the vacant space between the two camps, which was not above four miles over, happened that remarkable interview between two of the greatest captains that perhaps ever existed. They had agreed upon the

the number of guards they should bring with them; when they were at a proper distance their suite fell back, and left them with interpreters, who remained near in case they should be wanted.

At the first sight of each other, these two great men, penetrated with reciprocal respect and admiration, looked at one another for some moments without uttering a word.* At length, after mutual salutations, Hannibal broke silence and delivered himself as follows.

“ If it were possible to restore things to their
 “ former state, it were to be wished that the Ro-
 “ mans would be contented with what they pos-
 “ sess in Italy, and that the Carthaginians had
 “ never dreamt of extending their conquests out
 “ of Africa. Nature and the sea seem to have
 “ made a partition of the universe between them;
 “ but Sicily at first armed us against each other:
 “ the war in Spain succeeded that of Sicily. For-
 “ tune favoured our first attempts against you; we
 “ forced you to contend not only for the preserva-
 “ tion of your conquests, but for the safety of Rome.
 “ At length the situation you were lately in is now
 “ become ours; Carthage sees you under her
 “ very walls, a conqueror and triumphant, as
 “ Rome has formerly beheld me under hers. In-
 “ structed by both good and ill success, I have
 “ learned that fortune is a bad judge, and I should
 “ be happy if to-day reason and equity might
 “ determine our difference without her.

“ Experience has taught me the little depend-
 “ ance there is to be placed upon her favours;
 “ she cruelly sports with the greatest events and
 “ the greatest men: an accident, an unexpected
 “ change, hurries at pleasure her happiest fa-
 “ vourites

* T. Liv. Polyb.

" yourites from the highest pinnacle of glory and
 " of greatness, to the lowest pitch of shame and
 " misery. You are young, Scipio, every thing
 " has hitherto succeeded with you; victory ac-
 " companied your arms in Spain; she has attend-
 " ed you into Africa; you are now what I have
 " been: you have known only the favours of for-
 " tune, perhaps they may induce you to reject
 " peace. But to see her fickleness, to be assured
 " of the great reverse she is capable of, cast your
 " eyes upon the course of my life; examine what
 " Hannibal was a few years ago, master of Italy,
 " the conqueror of your armies, upon the point
 " of laying siege to Rome, and consider what this
 " same Hannibal is at this day; fortune is the
 " sole cause of this difference.

" Yet again, Publius Cornelius, I exhort you,
 " not to suffer yourself to be lifted up by prof-
 " perity, and lose sight of the instability of all
 " things here below. Rather advert to what e-
 " quity and prudence direct. What is one vic-
 " tory more to you? It will add little or nothing
 " to your reputation, it will hardly be more be-
 " neficial to your country than a glorious peace,
 " of which you have only to name the conditions.
 " On the other hand, a defeat, which you cer-
 " tainly hazard by a battle, may in one day tar-
 " nish all your laurels, and rob you of all your
 " conquests. On these considerations determine
 " to prefer peace; she will ensure your glory
 " much better than a doubtful victory. The one
 " depends on yourself, the other is in the hands
 " of the gods. You will run no risk in granting
 " us peace, in refusing it you will expose to the
 " precarious success of a battle, the good fortune
 " and glory of several years labour. Call to
 " mind

“ mind the fate of the famous Regulus in this
 “ very country ; you are in the same circum-
 “ stances. He lost his army, his reputation, and
 “ his life, by refusing a peace from which he
 “ would have derived as much honour as from a
 “ victory. Who can say that the gods have not
 “ reserved the same fate for you if you persist in
 “ the same inflexibility ?

“ I know that fear of the uncertainty of events
 “ has but little influence on the heart of such a
 “ Roman as you ; but I also know, that the
 “ surest and least perilous means of securing your
 “ glory is to decide our quarrel, not by arms, but
 “ by a treaty of peace, of which we are ready to
 “ accept all the conditions ; you shall name them,
 “ you shall prescribe the terms. Enjoy quietly Si-
 “ cily, Sardinia, Spain, and all the Isles between
 “ Africa and Italy ; I will be bold to engage that our
 “ republic shall cede to you all the right we have
 “ in those countries : they have been the grounds
 “ of all the trouble and disputes which have hi-
 “ therto happened between us. The possession
 “ which shall be given up to you, will put an end
 “ to our mutual animosities. The extent of these
 “ advantages is to you a sure guarantee of our
 “ fidelity in keeping to our engagements ; but
 “ by these sacrifices we secure the repose of Car-
 “ thage : and I am persuaded nothing can be of-
 “ fered more glorious to the Roman people in
 “ general, and to you in particular, than the plan
 “ I now propose. Perhaps the inconstancy and
 “ past perfidies of my fellow citizens, may make
 “ you cautious for the future ; but consider, it is
 “ Hannibal who solicits peace of you, that he
 “ becomes himself your guarantee, and engages
 “ for the observance of all the articles with the
 “ most

" most scrupulous exactness. I have no more to
 " add, and trust you have nothing more to ask.
 " May the gods so ordain, that the Carthaginians,
 " contented with their ancient territories, may
 " confine themselves within the shores of Africa,
 " and see, without envy, the Romans vanquish
 " and subdue the most distant countries and the
 " most warlike nations. Can you wish *them* a
 " more severe punishment? can you covet a more
 " glorious triumph *yourselves*?

Hannibal could add nothing stronger to incline
 Scipio to peace. So many misfortunes and suc-
 cessive disgraces, had deprived this Carthaginian
 general of the confidence he had in his former
 fortune. He was agitated with the most ill-boding
 presentiments; he had nothing left but the hopes
 of peace, which he flattered himself he might be
 able to obtain at the head of his army. There
 appears in this discourse all the Carthaginian art
 and address; he loads Scipio with compliments on
 the past, endeavours to alarm him with the un-
 certainty of the future, and flatters him with the
 glory and advantages of the present, of which he
 is master. But Scipio was not caught with all
 these baits; and replying with dignity: " It is
 " true," says he, " that Sicily and Spain have
 " been the subject of the war between the Ro-
 " mans and the Carthaginians; but you, Han-
 " nibal, best of all men, know who were the
 " aggressors, you or we. You attacked the Sa-
 " guntines, our allies in Spain; we did not begin
 " hostilities, we only repelled force by force; and
 " the gods, who were witnesses, seem to have
 " regarded the justice of our conduct by the pro-
 " tection they have afforded our arms.

" As

“ As to the caprices of fate, and the fickleness
 “ of fortune, the weakness and infirmity of man-
 “ kind, private meditations on events and on
 “ myself, they may serve to instruct me, but can
 “ have no influence in deterring me from the
 “ pursuit of a just war.

“ Your ambassadors have been at Rome to
 “ treat of the peace you desire: the conditions
 “ you offer, and several more were the basis of it.
 “ Had you then been in Africa, I doubt not but
 “ we should have concluded it: but the face of
 “ affairs is much changed since that time. The
 “ Carthaginians have broken a truce they begged
 “ of us; they have treated our ambassadors with
 “ the most flagrant injustice, and pursued them
 “ even within sight of our camp, while we were
 “ promising ourselves a speedy union, and thought
 “ only of a peace we were delighted with grant-
 “ ing them.

“ Put yourself for a moment in my place; can
 “ there be conditions too rigid for a people so
 “ ungrateful and perfidious? Instead of striking
 “ out those which shock you, ought I not to
 “ add others still more rigorous? Ought I not to
 “ teach the Carthaginians, by their chastisement,
 “ to be more faithful to their engagements; and
 “ to respect the alliance of a republic which
 “ wishes for their friendship? You will tell me
 “ their gratitude will be the greater, if they now
 “ obtain what a few days since they rejected, be-
 “ cause they are less deserving of it. How can
 “ I possibly depend on their word? Hardly had
 “ they, by the most humiliating submissions, and
 “ in sacred garments, obtained a truce, but they
 “ paid no regard to it, when they found an ad-
 “ vantage in breaking it.

“ In

“ In a word, Hannibal, it is in vain to talk of
 “ peace, at least till you consent to add to the
 “ new treaty, conditions more beneficial to my
 “ republic and more grievous to yours, than those
 “ of the former plan, thereby to punish your ci-
 “ tizens for their inconstancy and perfidiousness.
 “ While you wish to strike out some of the first
 “ articles, instead of suffering new ones to be in-
 “ serted, hope not for any effect from our inter-
 “ view. I have only one proposal to make you:
 “ Surrender to the Romans, at discretion, your-
 “ selves, your troops, your towns; in short, all
 “ that you have: on these terms alone will the
 “ republic treat with you. If you are of opinion
 “ that you ought to act otherwise, let the fate of
 “ a battle determine which of us is in the right;
 “ let victory decide the dispute between the Ro-
 “ mans and the Carthaginians.

Hannibal could not think of accepting the conditions proposed by Scipio; they parted full of esteem and admiration for each other, but without concluding any thing, and prepared on both sides to give battle the next day.

Very few battles have had so great a stake depending on them as that of Zama. The contest was not barely for Africa or Italy, but the empire of the world, which these two nations, the best governed, the most warlike, and the most powerful then in being, had so long disputed for. If the Romans remained conquerors, they would for ever secure their glory and the safety of their country; on the contrary, if they were beaten, they had no retreat, no favour to hope for in a foreign country, where they would soon find themselves shut in on all sides;—powerful motives to induce them to fight obstinately.

On

On the other hand, the Carthaginian troops had no resource but in this engagement ; their country and their allies were exhausted of men and money. Hannibal's army was the only hope of the republic of Carthage, and the last effort of her power against that of Rome ; their men were going to fight, not for their honour only, but for their lives, their liberty, their property, and the existence of their country. Hannibal depended more on the extremity to which they were reduced than on their natural courage.

The morrow after the interview, the two armies appeared in order of battle at day-break. Scipio had one great advantage over his adversary. The Roman army was composed of Romans and Numidians only ; Hannibal's, on the contrary, consisted of all the different nations he had been able to collect together, Carthaginians, Africans, Moors, Ligurians, Gauls, Italians, Numidians ; he had enrolled all he could possibly get, to make head against the Romans on this decisive day, which he saw could not be far off. He took with this mob of different nations, who neither understood one another nor agreed in their discipline, the best course a great general could pursue. He chose the field of battle, he availed himself of circumstances, and formed his troops like a consummate commander.

He knew the legions to be so steady in their posts and so close in their ranks, that it would be extremely difficult to force them. He placed in the front of his army fourscore elephants, with orders to their conductors to penetrate as far as they could into the enemy's infantry, to enable him the more easily to disorder them when they had been broken through. The Ligurians, Gauls,
and

and Africans, whom Hannibal esteemed as of no use but to take off the edge of the Roman swords, were placed in the first line; the Carthaginians immediately followed, with only a small space between them, that the foreign troops might not have room to fall back. By this means he hoped to force them to engage with spirit; and when they had stood the first brunt with the Romans, he intended to relieve them with Carthaginians, who being quite fresh, and equally brave, must have a vast advantage over troops fatigued with the heat of their first charge. As for the Italians, who had been forced to follow him, he stationed them in the rear of his army, being doubtful of their fidelity. By this disposition he put it out of their power to hurt him, should they be tempted to declare for the Romans. His infantry being thus formed, he placed his Carthaginian cavalry on the right, and the Numidian on the left wing.

Scipio disposed of his army in nearly the same manner, he put the cavalry in the two wings; Lælius commanded the left, composed of Romans, and Massinissa the right with his Numidian horse. Scipio had always, hitherto, been careful that the battalions should form in as close order as possible, persuaded that it would then be more difficult to penetrate them; but having observed the disposal of the elephants in the enemy's army, and concluding that these animals might cause great confusion in his infantry, if he followed his ordinary method of closing his ranks, he not only made his battalions take more ground, but moreover have vacant spaces between the several regiments, that the soldiers, in avoiding the elephants, might have room to retire by quick evolutions, and form again without creating confusion;

sion; and that the elephants meeting with no resistance, might advance the more readily, and so be more open to the darts of his men. Such was the order of the two armies in that memorable battle which was to decide, after seventeen years of war and continual combats, under the eyes and command of Scipio and Hannibal, which should at last get the better, Rome or Carthage.

The armies being thus in sight of each other, the two generals went through their ranks, to encourage them to fight with that bravery and constancy which the importance of success required. Scipio, to inspire his men, reminded them of his victories in Spain, as well as of those he had gained in Africa. He represented to them that the question was not the conquest of Africa only, but of the whole world. He stopped every now and then, and observed to his army the weakness of the enemy, who had sued to him for peace, which he had refused to grant, because he had much higher expectations from a victory which their courage promised him. He delivered himself with such an air of confidence, that he seemed to be assured of conquest; and he inspired the same sentiments into all his soldiers. "As
" to the rest," added he, "if thirst of glory, if
" the love of your country, are not sufficient to
" rouse your valour, a motive yet more powerful
" cannot fail to excite it on this occasion. You
" are under an absolute necessity either to con-
" quer or die; since if you are beaten, you have,
" you can expect no asylum in an enemy's coun-
" try, and from whence your conquerors will
" easily prevent your escaping."

Hannibal, on his part, recounted to the Carthaginians, with equal fire and eloquence, the
great

great advantages he had gained over the very enemies they now beheld in order of battle. The successful engagements of Trebia, the lake of Thrasimene, and of Cannæ, were represented to them in all the brightness of their glory. He observed to his troops, that it could not be that the adverse army should be so numerous or consist of such brave men as they had heretofore had to do with; for that they were only the children of those old legionaries, whom they had slain in Italy, and the remains of those old corps they had beaten and put to flight almost as often as they had met them in the field. He concluded with pointing to the walls of Carthage. "Cast your eyes," says he, "upon that dear town, in which are your domestic gods, the ashes of your ancestors, your wives, your children, your aged men, whom years only keep from following you; their fate depends upon your valour: there is no alternative; the empire of the universe, if you conquer; chains and slavery will be the immediate consequence of a defeat."

While Hannibal was thus exhorting his men, the commanders of the several corps of different nations, were employed in the same manner; when all at once they heard the trumpets and other warlike instruments give the signal for engaging, on the part of the Romans; their whole army set up at the same instant such shouts of joy, as frightened the elephants in the left wing so much, that the conductors were no longer masters of them, they turned upon Hannibal's Numidian horse, and so disordered them, that Massinissa observing it, charged and totally routed it. He fell on with such fury that the body of the army was wholly exposed on that side.

Several of the elephants however reached the Roman army, where they would have occasioned irreparable confusion, but for Scipio's sage precaution; but as soon as they saw them advance, they opened their files, made a passage for them, and incessantly assailed them with clouds of darts. It happened to the right wing as it had to the left; the beasts, wounded with the weapons which came on all sides from the Romans, turned upon the Carthaginians, from whom they received none. By this means their ranks were broken, and the terror of these enraged animals kept them from rallying, in spite of all the threats and efforts of Hannibal, who was present every where.

Lælius availed himself of this disorder with the same success as Massinissa had done; he opportunely charged the Carthaginian cavalry, broke them, put them to flight, cut them down, and pressed so hard upon them that they had not time to recover.

At last the infantry of the two armies, who formed the center, advanced slowly towards each other. As soon as they were near enough to give the onset, the Romans drew their swords, struck them upon their bucklers, and gave a dreadful shout, as was their custom when they began the engagement.

The first line of the opposite army was composed, as we have said, of Gauls, Ligurians and Africans, who presented such a good countenance that at first they had the advantage of the Romans; they attacked them with an intrepidity which Hannibal had never expected; they then recovered their ranks with infinite readiness and alertness. Scipio had a vast many men wounded in this first shock; but the Romans, encouraged by

by his voice and example, and supported by their comrades, soon got the better.

These brave Ligurians seeing the Romans supported and relieved by those who followed, but that the Carthaginians did not stir a step to their assistance, were at last obliged to give way and fly. Enraged by despair, and thinking themselves betrayed by the Carthaginians, they fell furiously upon *them*, and opened a passage sword in hand to escape from the field of battle: this occasioned a double fight in Hannibal's army, of which Scipio took advantage with that quickness and ability which was natural to him.

The Ligurians, stopped by the Carthaginians, who would not suffer them to retreat, and pressed by the Romans, who pursued them, attempted to throw themselves into Hannibal's body of reserve; but this general, knowing of what detriment it might be, to receive men wearied and wounded, and unacquainted with the Carthaginian language, into a corps of troops in whose freshness, union, and concert he had placed his last resource, ordered to open a passage, and to keep them off with pikes and swords.

Scipio, who had fallen upon the enemy's army when this mistake happened, made such havock that the ground was covered with dead and wounded, who fell so thick, and in such numbers, that it was more difficult to pass where the Ligurians lay dead, than to force through the Carthaginians themselves. The Romans, eager for carnage and revenge, pursued them with rage, unwilling to suffer one to escape. Their ardour, which nothing could restrain, had nearly produced an universal disorder. They broke their ranks, paid no attention to the commands of their officers,

left their colours, and their regiments, and the whole army was on the point of falling into a general confusion, if Scipio had not applied an instant remedy. As soon as he perceived the danger which threatened him, he gave orders to sound a retreat; and by this means the soldiers rallied, recovered their ranks, and formed in order, as if the battle was but beginning.

Almost the whole body of the Carthaginians still remained, which Hannibal had reserved purposely for the close of the action, when the Romans were weakened, or employed in pursuit of the fugitives, from which he would have derived all the advantage he expected, but for Scipio's vigilance, and the readiness with which his army obeyed his orders. These troops were to decide the combat; they were the real enemies of the Romans, the most worthy of them, and the most formidable, from the manner in which they were armed, their long experience in war, their reputation, and above all the extremity they were reduced to: the presence of Hannibal, whom they saw at their head, and who had hitherto performed the part of a bold soldier, as well as that of an able general, raised their hopes and their courage.

The Romans, after what they had suffered in an engagement which they had wholly maintained, were yet equal in numbers to the Carthaginians. The Carthaginian cavalry having been put to flight, their first advantages promised them others: the enemy's wings and first line had been defeated, the center only remained; but it was more difficult to conquer than all the rest. It was now valour against valour, hate against hate; Scipio, in short, against Hannibal, which were to engage in
this

this fresh action. Each side performed prodigies of valour, both generals and soldiers outdid themselves; the Carthaginians stood to be run through the body rather than recede; the Romans attempted both with pikes and swords to break through them: victory seemed to hesitate in favour of which side she should declare; they fought a long time without either gaining the least advantage.

Lælius and Maffiniffa having pursued the enemy's cavalry as far as possible, determined the fate of this famous day; they charged the Carthaginians briskly in flank and rear while the Romans attacked them in front. Carthage was forced to yield to Rome; the Romans were conquerors, and the victory was complete. Eleven elephants taken from the Carthaginians, 130 standards, 20000 prisoners, 20000 Carthaginians left on the field of battle, form, in a few words, the detail of that celebrated victory which Scipio gained in the plains of Zama, over Hannibal. This great man, although he was defeated, displayed there more knowledge, presence of mind, firmness, and courage, than either at Cannæ or Trebia, from which he returned with conquest; and in Scipio's judgment he acquired more glory than by his greatest successes. The Romans lost only 2000 men. When Hannibal saw he had no longer any hopes, he took advantage of the confusion to save himself, with a small party of those brave Carthaginians who were willing to follow his fortune. He arrived soon after the battle at Carthage, and went straight to the senate, who were then assembled. They asked his opinion how they should act. He answered, they were conquered without resource; that they could no
P 4 longer

longer think of war; and that the only means left of saving the republic, if that was yet in their power, was to make peace with the Romans at any rate.

Scipio, after having given up the enemy's camp to pillage, first of all sent Lælius to Rome with the news of the victory. To improve it, and not give the Carthaginians time to breathe, he presented himself before Carthage with his fleet, while Octavius conducted the army thither by land.

He was not far from the port when he discovered a galley, ornamented with garlands, and covered with olive branches. She carried ten of the chief men of Carthage, sent in consequence of Hannibal's advice, to implore the clemency of the conqueror; they went on board Scipio's ships, their heads covered and their countenances fallen, with every outward appearance of the most humble supplicants. Scipio not choosing to give them audience there, said that he should sail to Tunis to make some stay, and that they might come to him there.

They did not fail to repair thither as Scipio had directed; but instead of the ten deputies, who had been with him when he passed under the walls of Carthage, to complete their terror and dread of the Romans, the senate sent thirty. The deputation consisted of all that were most respectable and distinguished in Carthage, as well for their birth as for the employments they now held, or had formerly filled; they presented themselves before Scipio with every mark of grief and dejection, as the leading men of a ruined people, who had no hope left but in his moderation: they did not forget any thing that could awaken the compassion of the Roman general, as the recol-
lection

lection of their past treachery in the infraction of the truce, had rendered them even less deserving than before.

Previous to granting them an audience,* Scipio held a council on the answer he should give them. Resentment for the injuries they had so recently done the Romans, had exasperated the minds of all against them; every one of the officers was of opinion that Scipio should march and invest Carthage, without giving the inhabitants time to recover from their consternation, and prepare for farther perfidies; but Scipio remonstrating on the length and difficulty of the siege of a town, fortified both by art and nature, defended by a prodigious number of citizens, of whom necessity would make as many soldiers, when they were headed by a great captain, all fell in with his opinion, which was to grant the Carthaginians peace. A stronger reason, and one more personal to Scipio, determined him in this resolution; the jealousy of some of his contemporaries, excited by his successes, had raised him powerful adversaries in the Roman senate; the command of the troops, the choice of generals, depended there; he was apprehensive lest they should appoint him a successor, who would bear off the glory of the war, after he had endured the fatigues and dangers of it.

The deputies of Carthage were then introduced into the council; where Scipio, after having reproached them with violating the former peace, without having received any provocation on the part of the Romans, and with unjustly attacking their allies, laid before them their late perfidies, more black and scandalous than the others in the circumstances

* Polyb.

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circumstances attending them. He added, they must not be surpris'd at the severity of the conditions he annexed to the peace they solicited; but that after having so often broken their faith with the Romans, so unfairly as they had done, being conquered by their arms, they ought rather to wonder if they still found in him that moderation and humanity, which they had no reason to hope or expect to meet with.

These are the principal articles of the treaty he propos'd, as they are preserv'd by Livy and Polybius.

That he would leave the Carthaginians all the towns, territories, and wealth they possess'd in Africa, before the declaration of the late war.

That he would exercise no act of hostility against them or their towns, in which he would place no garrisons; and that they should live according to their own laws and customs, as they had hitherto done.

These, says Polybius, were the only articles favourable to the Carthaginians; the following were more severe.

That the Carthaginians should restore to the Romans all they had unjustly seiz'd by the infraction of the truce; that they should in general give up all slaves and deserters, without considering how long they had been at Carthage.

That they should deliver up all their ships of war, except ten of three ranks of rowers, or *triremes*, and that they should bring to Scipio's camp all their elephants.

That they should enter into no war whatever out of Africa; that even in it, they should not undertake any without the consent of the Roman people.

That

That they should restore to Massinissa all the lands and domains they had usurped from him or his ancestors, according to their ancient boundaries, which should be pointed out to them.

That they should furnish corn for the army, and pay the allies, until they could receive from Rome the answer of the senate to the plan of peace which he offered them.

That moreover they should pay the Romans 10000 talents Euboic currency, at fifty equal annual payments.

That they should give hostages for the observation of the treaty; that Scipio himself should chuse them out of the youth of Carthage; that these hostages should not be under fourteen, nor above thirty years of age.

As soon as the Roman general had delivered these conditions to the deputies, they made haste to return to lay the plan of peace before the senate. Polybius relates that a senator, whom he does not name, objected to receiving the treaty. Livy asserts that it was Gisco; whoever it was, Hannibal, hurried away by a gust of passion which he could not govern, seized the senator, and dragged him from his seat. At that instant he had forgot that he was in the senate house, where he had only one voice, and a right to remonstrate. Every one condemned his violence in a free state, and especially in the senate, the center and asylum of that freedom. Hannibal perceiving it, spoke thus in justification of himself. "If I have been
 " guilty of offending against your forms, it was
 " because they have till now been unknown to
 " me; recollect that I am at present above five
 " and forty, and that I was hardly nine years old
 " when I left Carthage; I have therefore had but
 " a short

“ a short time to inform myself of your laws and
 “ customs; besides, this act of violence, which
 “ has shocked you so much, proceeds from the
 “ warmth of my heart, and zeal for my country.
 “ I cannot conceive, after what each particular
 “ citizen, and Carthage in general, has acted
 “ against the Romans, that there should be a sin-
 “ gle Carthaginian who would not return thanks
 “ to fortune for the mildness of the terms the
 “ conquerors impose on us, when they have it
 “ in their power to treat us with the greatest se-
 “ verity. Trust me, Carthaginians, we are not
 “ now on a subject to be discussed by harangues.
 “ Adore the gods, be thankful to them, and,
 “ without loss of time, unite with one voice, to
 “ accept unanimously the treaty they offer you.”

Hannibal's advice appearing agreeable to their
 present circumstances, all voted for peace on the
 conditions offered by Scipio, and immediately de-
 puties were sent to inform him the senate had ac-
 cepted them.

Scipio insisted, as a preliminary, that all the
 vessels taken during the truce should be restored,
 with their cargoes of provisions and ammunition
 entire. As the people had plundered them, it
 would have taken up much time to find out all
 those who had been partakers of the spoil; the
 senate resolved to return to Scipio all the Roman
 ships that were in the port, and in lieu of their
 cargoes, to pay for them immediately out of the
 public treasury, any sum that Scipio himself should
 value them at.

The deputies therefore went to accept the peace
 in the name of the republic of Carthage; Scipio
 of course granted them a truce for three months,
 about time sufficient for their journey and negoti-
 ation

ation at Rome. He experienced the fickleness of the Carthaginians so often, that he judged it necessary to take such precautions as were requisite with a people in whom he could place no confidence; he therefore sent with them Lucius Scipio his brother, and several other officers of his army, to watch their behaviour on their voyage, and see that they went directly to Rome.

He moreover obliged them to promise not to send ambassadors to any court, or republic, till the return of those who were gone to Rome, to prevent all treachery, of which he knew them so capable. He required also, that if any came to Carthage they should not give them audience without his consent, and until he was informed of their business.

People at Rome were exceedingly uneasy about the state of affairs in Africa; they had heard there of the treachery and hostile behaviour of the Carthaginians, and the Romans were preparing to send over large succours. On the arrival of the Carthaginian ambassadors, their alarms were succeeded by the most lively joy; they were admitted into the senate. The deputation, as has been already observed, was composed of the first men of Carthage; their respectable appearance, the great offices they had filled, their whole deportment, attracted the greatest regard, and convinced people of their sincerity.

Asdrubal, who was surnamed Hædus, a firm and zealous advocate for peace, and who had constantly and steadily opposed the Barcinian faction, which was ever for war, the most distinguished of the Carthaginian deputies, spoke first. He acknowledged many wrongs and injuries on the part of their republic, and ably justified those which would

would admit of any excuse. His age and experience giving him a kind of privilege to speak with more boldness, he represented to the senate, that it was their interest to use their good fortune with mildness and moderation; he said that had he and Hanno been attended to, and their republic known how to profit from events and circumstances, the Carthaginians would have had the pleasure of granting to the Romans that peace they now were come to solicit. "But," added he, "wisdom and prosperity are seldom seen together among men.* If the Roman people are invincible, it is because they know how to set bounds to their schemes of conquest, and to enjoy their good fortune with temper. It would indeed be surprising if they acted otherways. Success is apt to intoxicate those only to whom it comes with the charm of novelty; as to the Romans, a long habit of conquering has rendered their hearts so little sensible to their late victories, that they hardly seem to feel that joy which is common to the occasion; and it may justly be said, that their clemency and generosity have contributed more to extend their conquests, than the superiority or success of their arms."

The rest of the deputies endeavoured to excite the compassion of the senate, by describing the late grandeur of Carthage compared with her present deplorable state, when they were hardly left in possession of the site of their town, after having aspired to the empire of the universe. Their discourses, filled with expressions of the keenest anguish, began to affect the audience, when a senator who could not forgive the Carthaginians their

* T. Liv.

their treacheries, demanded of them what gods should preside over the alliance they wished to enter into with the Roman people, after the contempt they had shewn for those who had been called on to witness their former acts? The very same, replied Asdrubal, we invoked to attest our sincerity, and who have punished us so severely for disregarding the religion of our oaths.

The senate satisfied of the rectitude and sincerity of their present intentions, suffered themselves to be moved by their prayers and intreaties, granted them peace on the conditions proposed by Scipio, and sent him powers to conclude it on the spot, in the name of the republic.

The deputies, encouraged by the clemency of their conquerors, implored permission of the senate to see their countrymen, who were captives at Rome, amongst whom were several of their friends and nearest relations. They prayed leave to repurchase some of them; the senate complied with their request, and bade them make out a list of those they wished to have. They laid it before the republic, after having washed with their tears the chains of their fellow-citizens: it amounted to 200. The senate seizing so fair an occasion of displaying the generosity of the Romans, sent them to Carthage with the ambassadors, and at the same time, an order to Scipio to restore them to the Carthaginians without ransom, as soon as the peace was ratified.

It was at last concluded, and gave satisfaction to the two nations, who were equally desirous of it, and conferred the highest degree of glory upon Rome and her general. All the articles which would admit of it were executed directly. The Carthaginians, amongst other things, delivered up

500 ships of war, which was the surplus above the number the Romans, by the treaty, allowed them to maintain. Scipio had them all burnt in view of the town, in the very port of Carthage; a sight as distressing to this people, bred up with a passion for the marine, as if Carthage itself had been in flames.

When it became necessary to think of preparing for the first payment of the tribute due from Carthage to Rome, for the space of fifty of years, it is said that Hannibal, seeing the whole council alarmed on account of their weakness and the difficulty of raising such a sum, began to smile.* Asdrubal Hædus having reproved him for insulting, by his sneers, the distress and misfortunes of his fellow-citizens, of which he had been the cause: "I am far from smiling at our common misery," says he, "I am myself undone; but I cannot help smiling with astonishment, when I reflect that you, who now deplore our ruin with so much eloquence, are the very persons, who with the same eloquence, constantly prevented our government sending me the necessary succours I demanded, to complete the conquest of the Romans."

The treaty being concluded, peace was restored in Spain, Sicily, and Africa. The Carthaginians, whose situation obliged them to act sincerely, sent fresh deputies to Rome, to have it ratified and confirmed by the people. The sea was no longer covered with their fleets, they had no more an army by land, nor were they in a condition to hope to set one on foot for many years. The wise policy of the Romans had raised them a powerful enemy in the person of Massinissa; under the specious pretence of gratitude and generosity,

* An. R. 551. Ante C. 202.

rosity, they probably enriched this prince, with the spoils of Syphax, with donations and titles the most magnificent, only for the immediate advantage of the Roman republic. The difficulty of maintaining conquests so distant, Massinissa's aversion to the Carthaginians, his attachment to Rome, were perhaps the real motives for enlarging the dominions, and augmenting the power of the Numidian prince. Massinissa, with a powerful army on foot, was superior to the Carthaginians, disarmed, as I may say, both by sea and land, over whom the Romans had assumed a right of controuling all their motions and enterprizes; this prince, so strong, seated on a throne in which Scipio had placed him, was in reality nothing more than a servant and dependent of the Roman republic.

Scipio's presence was no longer necessary in Africa, all there was subdued and quiet; he therefore left it when every thing was settled, sailed for Sicily, and from thence repaired to Rome. It is impossible to express the eager curiosity of every one to see the deliverer of his country, and the conqueror of Carthage. Villages, towns and cities were deserted on his road; they spent whole days and nights in the high ways, to have the satisfaction of seeing him. The soldiers pointed him out to the labourers and manufacturers, mothers to their children, and Romans to strangers. Scipio on his arrival at Rome, did not meet with greater crouds than he had seen on his journey, but the joy was higher there, as being the center of the great advantages or losses of the nation. The republic herself wished to give the most signal testimony of her gratitude in the triumph she decreed him.

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Nothing

Nothing had hitherto been seen equal to it in magnificence. Scipio, in a chariot superbly decorated, was followed by Syphax in chains. All the grandees of this prince's court, together with an immense number of captives taken at the late engagements in Africa, followed in chains also. Terentius Curio, a senator who had been long a prisoner at Carthage, marched after Scipio with his head covered. All the inhabitants of the city, of its environs, and people from places the most distant, came to partake of the general joy. The day the most glorious to Scipio was likewise the happiest to the Romans. There did not appear in his train, precious spoils, curious works of art, pieces inestimable for their antiquity, as were seen in many succeeding triumphs; luxury had not as yet, at Rome, brought into esteem these dangerous superfluities, which were either unknown or despised: but the bare name of Hannibal, driven out of Italy, and vanquished in Africa, the mention of Carthage subdued and tributary, adorned the triumphal pomp more nobly than marbles, bronzes, or metals, which became the more shining ornaments, in proportion as Rome deviated from the simplicity of her ancient manners.—It was in the excessive transports with which this persuasion inspired both the people and army, that all with one voice unanimously conferred on Scipio the surname of Africanus; a most glorious title, which contains in a single word the history of his brightest exploits. Scipio was the first Roman who bore the name of a conquered nation; and no general of the republic ever triumphed over a people more warlike, more bold, or more inimical to Rome, than the Carthaginians. The superior force and abilities of this nation

nation justly intitles him to the first place among the great captains of Rome, who were either before, or after him. His unwearied application to the study of the art military, joined to surprizing talents and a most happy disposition received from nature, were the real means by which he attained to this glorious pre-eminence.

The triumph on the entire subjection of Carthage, put an end to the second Punic war, after seventeen years of continual combats. Never was universal empire contested for with more warmth, more bravery, more obstinacy, than by these two rival states. Carthage had nearly carried it at the famous battles of Trebia and Cannæ; but Rome, more warlike than that republic, was able to extricate herself by the abilities of her generals, the courage of her officers, and the exact discipline of her troops, from the imminent dangers which threatened her, and escaped them only to plunge Carthage into the same gulf of misfortunes, to the brink of which she had driven her. The character of the two nations was perhaps the leading cause of the defeat of the one and the success of the other. A warlike spirit was natural to the Romans; born soldiers, formed early to discipline, and military exercises, the glory of arms was the ruling passion of the nation, ever ready to take the field, ever united when they had a formidable enemy to deal with, but constantly torn by implacable divisions when at peace. The Carthaginians on the contrary, were born and bred with a taste for commerce, and the marine. Their republic required of her citizens only adventurous and laborious merchants, soldiers, as the necessities of their country called them out; but naturally much more given to extend their

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trade,

trade, and enrich themselves by its profits, than to wage war; which nevertheless she maintained with a most extraordinary fund of courage.

Scipio, by continued successes, by several victories gained in pitched battles, as well in Spain as in Africa, at last reduced this people, so long the rival of the Roman greatness, to the low condition of tributaries; and so weakened them that they were never able to break their chain. It was to the grand project of carrying the war over into Africa, which he had so much trouble in prevailing with the senate to agree to, and which he conducted so ably, that Rome owed the superiority she at last gained over Carthage. If the valour of his soldiers contributed, the wisdom of his measures was still more essential to it. As generous a friend as he was a dangerous enemy, he gained the affections of all the people he had hitherto conquered. But Carthage, ever an enemy and always a rival of Rome, constantly disposed to tricks and treachery, could not adhere to her treaties with the Romans any longer than while her weakness kept her from being in a condition to break them.

Scipio on his return* was raised successively, and almost without interruption, to all the great dignities of the republic. The senate and the people appointed him censor on the first election of that magistrate. The censorship conferred so extensive a power on those invested with it, that they could cite to their tribunal the principal members of the republic, to give an account of their conduct, and might strike their names out of the register of their tribe, if they were not satisfied with their justification. The patricians, the con-
fulars

* An. R. 553. Ante C. 199.

fulars, even those who had been dictators, were subject to their citations; those who had been the most distinguished, frequently quitted the first offices only to be condemned by the censors to great fines, and sometimes to perpetual banishment, having first been degraded from the rank of Roman citizens. Scipio acquitted himself so well in the difficult office of censor, that the senate and people, convinced no one could have a greater regard for justice or was better qualified to discern and administer it, when the term of his censorship was over, created him Prince of the senate.

This title was the most illustrious they had at Rome, and was conferred only on such as were become, if I may so say, the first in the republic, from the superiority of their talents, and the services they had performed. To be capable of filling this august station they must have extricated their country out of the most imminent dangers, and preserved it, by their courage and abilities, from the greatest evils. The very retreat of Hannibal, obliged to abandon Italy, had justly entitled Scipio to this glorious pre-eminence; the conquest of Spain, the reduction of Carthage; Rome, in short, delivered and victorious by his exploits, had raised him so high above the rest of the senators, that all were pleased with seeing him distinguished, as much by the first rank in the republic, as he was by his virtues. Thus beloved by his fellow citizens, whose delight he was in peace, as much as he had been their pride in war; Scipio, not only the greatest, the most admired, but also the happiest man in the nation, received on all occasions fresh marks of its esteem and gratitude. Whatever high ideas he had excited of his universal talents, he surpassed them all by the

equity, the nobleness and disinterestedness with which he filled his several employments ; as great in the character of a magistrate at Rome as he had shewn himself in that of a general at the head of her armies abroad.

Soon after he had been created Prince of the senate,* he was elected consul a second time. The republic then enjoyed a profound peace ; but when the Romans had no foreign enemies to engage with, the two principal orders were perpetually making war upon one other. The senate, possessed of the first dignities, aimed at rising above the people ; the people, proud of their first origin, which put them upon a level with these haughty patricians, could not see, without chagrin, the distinctions which set them above them. The ambition of the plebeans was seconded by the vigilance and boldness of their tribunes, who always warmly opposed whatever seemed to attack the equality of the two orders. They were mixed in most of the public ceremonies. In the feasts and games which were celebrated at Rome, the plebeian walked at the side of the senator without any distinction ; and the general, who had quitted the command of armies, had on the same seat with him, in the amphitheatre the common legionary who had fought under his orders.

Scipio, persuaded that this usage was contrary to good order, as the nation was represented with more dignity in the senate, undertook to reform it. He thought it would be decent to appropriate to the senate the first places, and by that means separate them from the mob of the people ; thus the corps of patricians had particular seats allotted them, which the people were forbid to occupy.

* An. R. 557. Ante C. 195.

py. The people could not see this open infringement upon the apparent equality of the two orders without their usual uneasiness and impatience at whatever tended to lessen it; but Scipio was so considerable, and his authority so great, that the decree for this separation passed in spite of the repugnance of the people.

It has been said that he afterwards repented of this innovation, perceiving doubtless that the senate had already but too great an ascendancy in a republic, where equality in the several orders of citizens constitutes the fundamental principle; he was fearful, and not without reason, lest the pride of the patricians should raise them by degrees too much above the commons, and that at last one of their body might arise with ambition, boldness, and credit enough, to attempt a change in the constitution of the state, and destroy it by the usurpation of absolute power. Cæsar, master and sovereign of Rome, in process of time justified his apprehensions.

However that was, we shall soon see, the people resented this affront with their usual sensibility, and that they waited only for a fair opportunity and a specious pretence to be amply revenged.

The engagement the Carthaginians had entered into in the treaty of peace, to restore to Massinissa all that had been taken out of his dominions, as well in the reign of his ancestors as his own, soon raised fresh troubles in Africa; Massinissa, in force to take possession of all that he claimed, had to oppose vain remonstrances, which the republic of Carthage was not permitted to justify with arms, being restrained from having re-

course to them, even in their own defence, without the consent of the Romans.

The lands situated on the coast of Carthage, near the little Syrtes, was the object in dispute. The town of Leptis,* which was not far off, will give an idea of the richness and fertility of the country. It paid the Carthaginians a tribute of a talent a day, which makes near a thousand crowns of our (French) money; Massinissa had long watched for a pretence to invade these lands, which were very commodious to his dominions. He at last found one, which he took care to avail himself of.

It was now two years since Hannibal had left Italy. He found, on his return to Carthage, the departments of justice, and the finances so miserably managed, that he formed a plan to change entirely the administration of affairs. His passion for war and his great reputation, had already created him many enemies; his superior talents for government raised him still more: This, to a character so determined as his, was an additional motive to persevere in his scheme of reformation. The opposition of all parties interested in traversing his design, encouraged him; during the short stay he made at Carthage, he laid a firm foundation for the execution of his project, in spite of the opposition of his antagonists. He flattered himself that the public good and the re-establishment of order would put a stop to the persecution he met with from his fellow citizens; but his new institutions tended to prevent the sale of justice, and plundering the revenue of the state; at this time two ways of making a fortune, which custom had given a sanction to. Those he re-

moved,

* Polyb. Liv.

moved, and those who succeeded them, joined to set the spirit of the nation against him. They attributed all the changes he had effected only to his restlessness and desire to rule.

Peoples minds were thus affected when the Roman republic sent commissioners to Carthage. Hannibal easily guessed the purport of their errand. He concluded they came to demand him, and therefore declared openly that the Romans had made peace with his country, only to wage a perpetual war against him. His successes, his misfortunes, his superior genius, had raised him so many enemies at home, that he had no doubt they would readily consent to give him up.

Rome had in fact ordered her commissioners to demand him; and this business, equally shameful to the two republics, had been managed in concert with the chief senators of Carthage. Scipio opposed, as much as lay in his power, this mean conduct. "Is it then becoming the dignity of the Romans," he constantly repeated in full senate, "to put themselves at the head of the cabals and factions of Carthage, and to support them with the authority of the republic? Is it decent for the commissaries of Rome to appear there in the vile character of the accusers of Hannibal? We have vanquished him, and our victory was fair; every thing beyond it is unjust."

This generous opposition to the disgraceful resolutions was ineffectual. Greece and Asia threatened Rome with a bloody war; Antiochus openly made preparations for it. This prince was in a secret, but intimate league with Hannibal. Rome could not endure the thought of seeing him again, one day or other, at the head of the armies of her enemies;

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enemies; whatever might secure her from this dread appeared lawful:—an evident proof of the decay of that generous spirit of the first ages, and of the corruption of manners.

Hannibal, angry at the Romans, and enraged against his own countrymen, submitted to the necessity of his circumstances. He had no resource left but in flight; and even this was attended with many difficulties: he was, I may say, closely guarded by traitors, and had need of his most wily artifices to get away from Carthage. He made use of them, and after having escaped, by their means, from several dangers, he repaired with speed to Antiochus, who expected him. He insinuated to this Prince, that it was not by any means impossible to vanquish the Romans, who aspired at the conquest of the whole world, and from whom he himself was not safe, unless he was before hand with them, by making a descent upon Italy. He at last persuaded him to declare war against them; and so soon as he had engaged him in his views, he thought it necessary to give notice of it to the party he still preserved at Carthage.

Letters were unsafe, they might be intercepted. Hannibal, who sought only for an opportunity to deliver his country from that humiliating degree of slavery to which it was reduced, sent therefore an express to Carthage, to inform his faction of the designs of Antiochus, and to exhort his partisans to raise a revolt there at the time the king should make a powerful diversion by the war, which he shewed them that prince was ready to declare against the Romans. He had met at Ephesus with a Tyrian named Aristo, an artful intriguing fellow, fit to manage the most hazardous enterprises;

enterprises; he had proved him on many occasions, and had been well satisfied. Upon him he cast his thoughts, as a proper person to inform the Carthaginians of the happy change, which he flattered himself he should soon effect in the state of their affairs.

Hannibal's agent acquitted himself at Carthage of his negotiation with all the success his employer could wish; he privately met the chiefs of the Barcinian faction, communicated Hannibal's views, and brought them into them; but his plots were soon discovered. Carthage, in no condition to go to war, thought of nothing but recovering herself, by strictly adhering to all the articles of the peace. The Suffeti, having intelligence of the meetings held by Hannibal's friends, had Aristo seized, and demanded of him an account of his conduct. He was one of those men who are never disconcerted, because their eloquence ever supplies them with specious reasons, which give them every appearance of innocence, even when they are most guilty. Having heard him, they determined that they had no grounds for detaining him: the wily Tyrian in the midst of the Carthaginians, so noted for finesse, was yet a greater master of it than they. The subject of his journey having taken wind, he no longer thought himself safe at Carthage, however able he was to justify his conduct; he therefore determined to depart immediately, lest on examining more narrowly they should find him out. He secured a vessel to carry him away, he caused papers to be fixed all over the town, publishing Hannibal's intentions; he had even the address to introduce them into the council, and even over the

the seats where the Suffeti administered justice, and then embarked for Ephesus.

The senate of Carthage, justly alarmed at the spirit of sedition he attempted to excite in the capital of the republic, resolved in suppressing it, to inform the Romans of Hannibal's design, and by that means remove any suspicions they might otherwise entertain of their fidelity. But Aristo not having been stopped, Massinissa sure of making the Carthaginians appear culpable at Rome, seized upon this pretence to enter sword in hand upon the lands of the lower Syrtes, to which the title of the republic had never yet been disputed. The senate who had purposed sending ambassadors to Rome, to discover the seditious proceedings of Hannibal, charged them at the same time to implore justice of the Romans for the violences and arbitrary usurpations of Massinissa. This prince sent some also on his part; he instructed them to insist principally on the cabals of Aristo. Both were received at Rome in full senate. Notwithstanding the innocence of the Carthaginians, their conduct did not accord with their professions; they said their intention was to have sent Aristo to Rome, but their imprudence in not securing him and his vessel when they had it in their power, gave just grounds of jealousy to the senate of Rome.

On the subject of the lands which the Carthaginians complained were usurped from them by Massinissa, the ambassadors of that prince, taking things up from the beginning, demanded of them in railiery, by what right they extended their claim so far, since they had originally granted them, and that too as a favour, in Africa, only as much land as they could encompass with an ox's hide.

hide.* The ambassadors of Carthage pleaded their cause with an eloquence equal to the justice of it. But Carthage, says Polybius, was ever in the wrong in the Roman senate; not, he adds, that the intelligent senators were ignorant of the partiality of their decrees, but because they were persuaded it was their interest, that all the disputes should be determined to the disadvantage of the Carthaginians. They therefore gave no direct sentence, and only promised to send commissioners, who should, upon the spot, inform themselves of the truth, and decide accordingly. Scipio was appointed chief of this commission, and repaired to Africa, apparently to put an end to these differences; but, in fact, to observe the present state of Carthage. He heard the pleadings of each party, he examined the limits which he himself had prescribed, and gave no judgment. Certain it is, no one was better qualified than he, to pass a decisive sentence in this affair, which caused a suspicion that the Roman republic had restrained him from determining it, in case he found Massinissa was the strongest. Rome, tho' victorious over Carthage, still dreaded her, after her defeat. She was rejoiced at finding herself freed from the trouble of combating with her; and depended on a prince, whose power she had so greatly enlarged, only to enable him to make head against her old enemy.

The preparations for war, which Antiochus made, the fleets he equipped, the armies he assembled, and above all Hannibal, who enjoyed the favour of that prince, and was to have the command of his troops, awakened at Rome the uneasinesses which that implacable enemy of the republic

* An. R. 559. Ante C. 193.

republic had so often occasioned. The Romans therefore sent an embassy to Antiochus, to dissuade him from the projected war, to lessen the confidence he placed in Hannibal, and excite in his discontented and wavering mind, such suspicion as would naturally arise from the high reputation of that celebrated general, and the influence he had already acquired over the troops and the principal officers. Hannibal was of a nation notorious for inconstancy and perfidiousness, his own character was not quite clear, and it might not be impossible to render his probity suspected. Publius Vilius and Publius Sulpitius were accordingly sent to Antiochus with this design. They first visited most of the princes of Asia Minor, to raise in them doubts and fears of this dreaded enemy of the Romans. The ambassadors every where asserted that the interests of these princes was not so much his motive, as his hatred to Rome and regard for Carthage, in whose favour he endeavoured to excite them to take up arms, under false suggestions, the real object of which was known only to himself.

Livy assures us from several authors, that Scipio was in this embassy, and that he met Hannibal at Ephesus; he also relates a conversation these great men had together. Scipio asking Hannibal whom he esteemed the greatest captain of all that had hitherto appeared, it is said he answered, doubtless Alexander, because he had defeated, with what we may call an handful of men, immense armies, and had subdued by his arms so many and such distant countries, as it hardly seems possible for one man in his whole life to travel through. Scipio asking who was the second, he answered that he knew no greater than Pyrrhus; that

that it was he who first invented the method of encamping; that no one knew better how to avail himself of the advantages of posts, of circumstances, and situations; that this prince excelled as much in managing tempers as in the art of war; so much indeed that the people of Italy preferred the government of this foreign prince to that of the Romans, who had been so long their natural masters. They add, that Scipio again demanding who was the third, Hannibal did not hesitate to name Scipio himself. "Ah!" says Scipio, smiling at this rodomontade, "but what rank would you have placed yourself in, had you vanquished me?" "I should have put myself," replied Hannibal, "before Pyrrhus, before Alexander, and before all the greatest captains that ever existed."*

Scipio felt all the delicacy of Hannibal's flattering judgment, who by avoiding to draw a parallel between him and the most celebrated commanders, insinuated that he knew none worthy to be compared with him.

However this was, Vilius had several conferences with Hannibal, as well with intent to discover his designs, as to remove his fear of the Romans, who seemed unwilling to leave him an asylum on earth. Their frequent interviews gave Antiochus suspicions of so famous a guest, whose company the Romans were so very fond of, and to whom they shewed so much attention, and treated with such respect even in his presence. Hannibal, for all the sincerity of his hatred to Rome, was suspected of holding intelligence with his mortal enemies; and in a short time lost, by his intimacy with their ambassadors, that confidence which

* An. R. 559. Ante C. 193.

which, by a cautious conduct for many years, he had gained in the mind of Antiochus; and this perhaps was the chief end aimed at by the attention and affected caresses, the policy of the Romans bestowed on the Carthaginian.

As the war which broke out between the Roman republic and Antiochus, is in itself foreign to my purpose, I shall not stop to examine the causes and give the detail of it, confining myself solely to relate what regards Scipio Africanus, who had the honour of putting an end to it under the command of his brother.

Lucius Scipio and Lælius had been declared consuls;* each was connected with Africanus by the strongest ties, those of blood and friendship. Lucius Scipio had distinguished himself on several occasions, and supported the dignity of his name by his courage and conduct; Lælius had likewise acquired a high reputation: and the two consuls, ambitious of signalising themselves still more by fresh exploits, cast their eyes upon Asia, where the weight of the war was likely to fall. The republic would gladly have put Scipio Africanus at the head of the legions, but to effect it he must have been created dictator; and as they did not as yet apprehend much danger from Antiochus, it would have been offering the greatest indignity to the consuls to raise him to that office, which would have given him all the honour of the command, and its subsequent successes. Every one looked upon him as the general the best able to support the glory and the interest of his country, and yet there appeared no probability of his being sent into Asia.

The

* An. R. 561. Ante C. 191.

The two consuls therefore canvassed for the province with great warmth, and with the influence of all their friends. Lælius, who had more interest in the senate than his colleague, proposed to leave the appointment to the senators, without drawing lots, as was the usual custom. Lucius Scipio consulting his brother on the answer he should give, Africanus told him he might venture to assent. The senate was divided into two parties, of which the most considerable was in favour of Lælius. His reputation, his address in gaining the affections, the gracefulness and eloquence of his discourse, were ready to turn the balance in his favour.* Scipio Africanus, touched with the disgrace and mortification his brother would feel if he was worsted, put an end to the contest by these few words: "Conscript fathers," says he, "if you will grant my brother the department of Asia, I offer myself to serve under him as his lieutenant in this war." Hardly had he finished, when all the suffrages were united in favour of Lucius Scipio. Italy was decreed to Lælius, and Asia to his colleague.

Besides the consideration of the public good, which could not be trusted in better hands than those of Africanus, the curiosity of again seeing Scipio and Hannibal opposed to each other, operated on the minds of all; they were delighted to think that arms should yet once more decide between these two great men; and they were impatient to see which would prevail, Antiochus assisted by Hannibal, or the consul seconded by the conqueror of this famous Carthaginian captain. It seemed, from the opinion all people had conceived

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* An. R. 562. Ante C. 190.

of these two illustrious commanders, as if they were alone worthy to engage against each other.

The lustre of Scipio's military abilities should not entirely take off our attention from his domestic virtues. After having commanded, for almost his whole life, the armies of the republic, he descends without difficulty to the rank of lieutenant; better satisfied perhaps from the warmth of his affection in procuring the command for his brother, than if he had obtained it for himself.

His noble sentiments and lively tenderness received the rewards they were entitled to. The consul's lieutenant, in spite of all he could do, was more regarded than the consul himself; the princes, the ambassadors, often addressed themselves to Africanus before they waited on his brother. His great reputation, and the universal confidence it procured him, drew on him almost the whole weight of this war. He gave up to Lucius all the credit, he took to himself only the fatigue of it.

The consul and his brother lost no more time in getting to Asia than was absolutely necessary for conducting the troops. Before they came to the territories of Antiochus they passed through those of several princes, who might have interrupted them in their march. Scipio Africanus persuaded it was their business to get at Antiochus as soon as they could, advised his brother to make alliances and truces with them, that he might not weaken his army, nor give Antiochus time to augment his. Lucius followed his advice, and by that means secured all the country behind him, whose inhabitants not only granted him a free passage, but would moreover cheerfully have supplied him with succours, fearing lest Antiochus, who was continually

continually extending his conquests, should at last get possession of all Asia.

The Roman army being arrived at the Cherfonesus, met with the most friendly reception from the princes who reigned there; it was fatigued with the length of the march, and many sick were left behind. The consul, as well to collect his troops as to give them rest, halted in the country of Eumenes, one of the most powerful kings of Asia Minor, whom he had secured in the Roman interest. They had no expectation of penetrating into the territories of Antiochus but with the point of the sword; they were encouraged by the ease with which they effected it; they entered without being obliged once to give battle; the conduct of their generals opened the passage without shedding blood.

The consul and his brother were intent only upon raising the spirits of the soldiers while they refreshed themselves, when Heraclides, Antiochus's ambassador, came to the Roman camp to offer terms of peace. The council of this monarch made no doubt but that as soon as they set foot in his country, they would move towards his army to attack it. It was in fact only to be able to do this with more advantage, that Scipio thus spared his men; but this delay induced Antiochus to imagine that the terror of his arms was the sole reason of the Roman general's conduct, he therefore flattered himself, in consequence of these conjectures, that he might make peace on any conditions he chose to prescribe.

Before we enter upon this negociation, it is proper the reader should be made acquainted with a very important circumstance: Young Scipio, son of Africanus, was in Antiochus's power; some

say he was taken by one of the king's ships of war in going to Asia by sea;* others, that he was made a prisoner in Asia, in a skirmish at the commencement of this war. It is however certain, that Antiochus had been careful to give him as good an education as if he had been his own son; that he had always treated him with kindness, and every mark of distinction; and that even if the Roman people, or Scipio's family, had been his allies and friends, he could not have shewn greater attention to his prisoner. Antiochus hoped much from it; Scipio's affection for his child promised him great advantages in the treaty he meant to propose.

Whilst Lucius Scipio advanced with the army, Publius his brother had remained behind. He was detained by the Feast of Bucklers, which happened during the march; he was a member of the college of the priests of Mars, known by the name of Salians. The prodigies which had been reported about his birth, the opinion the nation entertained of his peculiar commerce with the gods, the political necessity of keeping up these superstitions, all seemed to lay him under an obligation to respect the forms of the religion in which he was bred. The antiquity of this feast of bucklers, instituted by Numa, made it very famous: It was said, that under the reign of this prince, Rome being desolated by a cruel pestilence, a buckler fell from heaven and put a stop to it. The nymph Ægina assured them that this buckler was to the town which should preserve it, a sure sign and pledge of universal empire. The people easily believe what flatters their vanity, and Numa, not to lose the effects of this credulity,

* Livy.

dulity, had twelve bucklers made of the same metal and the same form. Whenever the feast founded on this occasion returned, the patricians made interest for the honour of carrying these bucklers; and Numa on that account erected a college of priests of Mars. In their ceremonies they were cloathed with an open robe, a tunic of purple laced with gold, and girt about with a baldrick at which a sword hung; in the right hand they carried a pike, and in the left these bucklers; thus equipped they formed mysterious dances, and sang hymns in honour of the god Mars. These hymns were in the language of the age of Numa, which was become so obsolete that the people listened to them with the greater awe and admiration. Scipio celebrated the feast with the more pomp, as it was a spectacle or shew for a foreign people. It is certain nothing could be more proper to inspire the troops with the courage necessary on the beginning of a campaign, than an assurance of the protection of the god of battles.

At this time it was that Antiochus sent Heraclides on an embassy to Scipio. Though by this preference he failed in his respect to the consul his brother, he concluded the young Scipio, whom Heraclides was ordered to offer him, would be a sufficient excuse. The ambassador communicated his master's intentions to Africanus, with the terms he proposed; he loaded him with all the compliments he was entitled to; he promised that if he would engage the senate to agree to his plan of peace, the king should restore him his son without ransom. On his own part he tendered him vast presents in gold and silver; and concluded with telling him, that should the negotiation succeed to his wishes, the king even intreated him

to share with him his power, his wealth, and the government of his kingdom; that he would reserve to himself only the royal title, that every thing else should be in common between them.

Scipio answered Heraclides, that he plainly perceived his master had no idea of the manners of the Romans in general, nor of his particular character. "I pardon him," added he, "and you too, for not knowing me; nor am I surprised at it, since I find from your discourse you are equally ignorant of the real situation and true interest of your master." He explained to him in the sequel, that Antiochus in the present state of things, the Romans having found the means of gaining his frontiers, should not think of prescribing the terms of peace, but be content to accept of any the republic might impose on him.

The ambassador was astonished when he saw Scipio made so light of the offers Antiochus had instructed him to make to the Romans in general, and himself personally. He rejected them without entering into any explanation. "As for my son," says he, in concluding, "if the king your master will restore him to me, I will do all that lies in my power to find an opportunity of shewing my gratitude for the favour he confers on me. Go, carry my answer to Antiochus, and give him this advice from me: He is undone if he persists in the war; his true interest is to make peace at whatever price the Romans will grant it him."

Scipio's zeal for the good of his country, and above all the haughtiness with which he had rejected the offer that had been personally made him, excited in Antiochus the most violent rage and resentment. Exasperated at seeing himself
treated

treated by the Romans as if he were already vanquished, he resolved to risk all rather than accept of the conditions on which, his ambassador informed him, Scipio, in the name of the republic, offered him peace.

He therefore prepared for carrying on the war with all his powers, and boldly to dispute the victory. The consul did the same on his part; he quitted his camp, and came under the walls of Ilium, the capital of the ancient kingdom of Troy; a town glorious in its ruins as having produced the first Romans, to whom the fates had promised the empire of the world.

Lucius Scipio, perceiving the joy of his army at the sight of those places which had given birth to the first founders of their nation, entered the town, sacrificed to Minerva the protectress of the citadel, loaded the inhabitants with presents and marks of friendship, and on the morrow departed to meet the enemy, whom he wished to bring to an engagement before the winter, which was approaching, should set in and prevent him.

The effort which Africanus had made to sacrifice the interest of parental affection to that of the public, cost him what such violent exertions ever cost a generous soul. Able to recover and again see his son, he chose to leave him in the hands of a prince, who, on account of his firmness, might become his own personal enemy, rather than betray the interests of the republic. Agitated as well by an eager desire of seeing him, and by the regret of having been forced to make so tender a sacrifice to his country, as by the fear lest Antiochus should avenge himself on a son he so dearly loved, for the father's constancy in rejecting the offered peace; these anxieties and constant fret-

ings were at last too much for him, and he fell sick at Elis, a town belonging to Eumenes, while his brother hastened to face Antiochus, who on his part advanced towards the Romans.

This prince hearing of Scipio's illness behaved on the occasion like a truly great man, who knew how to distinguish the tender father from the public man of a whole nation; he sent deputies to Scipio with a present, which he foresaw would be received with as much joy as he shewed greatness of soul in making it: it was young Scipio, who he judged would be the most agreeable and efficacious remedy for his father's disorder. Hardly were the first transports of paternal tenderness satisfied with the delightful embraces of a son so beloved, and so long lost, when Scipio began to recover his health, and was soon restored to his former strength. In the excess of joy which the return and sight of his son excited, he would have been happy to express his gratitude to Antiochus by the most transcendent testimonies; but the interests of Rome did not depend upon him: notwithstanding his transports, he was fully convinced that a personal service, however great, ought not to make him forget *them*. "How unable am I," said he to the deputies, "to acquit myself of the obligations I owe to the generosity of your master; return him my best thanks for the present he has sent me; I really have it not in my power to do him any other service than to counsel him not to give battle before my return to the army; prevail with him to defer it till that time; above all, let him be assured that gratitude alone leads me to give him this advice."

The deputies informed Antiochus of the caution Scipio gave him. This prince had so much confidence

confidence in the sincerity of that great man, that he avoided an engagement to the very last extremity, although he had an army of 60,000 foot and 12,000 horse.

The consul, ignorant of the counsel his brother had given Antiochus, finding that the king shunned a general engagement with as much industry as he used to bring one on, saw with uneasiness the time fit for action wasted in skirmishes and rencounters, which decided nothing. At last the ardour of his troops being encreased to such a degree by Antiochus's conduct, that it would have been dangerous attempting to restrain them, he resolved to attack the enemy in their intrenchments, and endeavour to force their camp. The legions, impatient to come to blows with soldiers they despised, advanced boldly under the king's lines. He thought now he could not decline an engagement, and ordered out his army which he hastily formed. The Romans, though inferior in numbers above one half, totally routed it, and made a most frightful slaughter. There remained on the field of battle more than 54000 men on the side of Antiochus, and the historians make the loss of the Romans to amount to so small a number as is hardly credible. A victory so complete was followed by every advantage the conquerors could expect. The enemy's camp was given up to the soldiers; they employed the rest of the day in conveying the plunder into their own, and the morrow scarcely sufficed to strip the dead, and bring into the camp the wounded and fugitives who were made slaves. All the neighbouring towns opened their gates to the Romans; one single battle brought the greatest part of Asia under the dominion of the republic, and snatched from

from Antiochus the fruits of many years conquests.

After his defeat he retired hastily with his queen and the royal family to Apamea, to secure himself from the pursuit of the Romans. The consul following him, repaired to Sardis, where his brother was arrived from Elis, which he left as soon as he was able to support the fatigue of the journey. Scipio undoubtedly hurried in this manner, in hopes of engaging Antiochus to make peace without exposing himself to the fate of a battle; but this battle had been fought and lost, by the time he reached Sardis; he had but just got there when Zeuzis and Antipater came in search of him, on the part of Antiochus, to terminate, if it was yet possible, in a friendly manner, the differences between their master and the Romans.

The consul, full of gratitude for the service his brother had done him, in procuring him the department of Asia, was delighted in finding an opportunity of resigning to him the honour of the command. As Africanus was better qualified than he to conclude a treaty, as well from those he had made with the Spaniards, as that of the peace of Africa, the consul desired he would receive the ambassadors and treat with them. The answer Scipio Africanus was to return them had been prepared, even before their arrival. They intreated him to pardon the king the mistake he had fallen into, in fancying he was able to beat the Romans; they assured him, they came to acknowledge sincerely their superiority over other nations, and to avow, that, after the fatal experiment they had made, the clemency of the victors was their only hope. They added, that
nevertheless

nevertheless it was the glory and duty of the Romans, after the example of the gods, to provide for the happiness of the whole world, of which the late battle that had subdued Asia, made them entire masters.

Scipio answered, that his countrymen had received from heaven a constant temper, independent of events; that adversity was not able to depress the Romans, nor prosperity to exalt them; that Hannibal might serve as an example of what he advanced, and that hereafter they might themselves afford one to the universe. He granted them peace on the conditions proposed before the victory, viz. That Antiochus should never carry his arms into Europe; that he should content himself with what he possessed in Asia, on this side mount Taurus; that he should pay 15000 talents towards the expences of the war; and lastly, that he should send hostages to Rome for his fidelity in observing the treaty. "But," added he, "as it is impossible for the Romans to have a
 "lasting peace with any people that grant an
 "asylum to Hannibal, who will never cease to
 "stir up against them all the credulous and ambitious, whom his resentment, his eloquence,
 "or his antipathy to us, can induce to take up
 "arms, Rome requires as a preliminary that you
 "deliver up to her this dangerous disturber of
 "the repose of the universe. It is on this condition that we grant you peace; you are the
 "subject of it, Hannibal alone can be the seal
 "of it." The treaty consisted of several other articles, which were all complied with, excepting that by which Antiochus engaged to deliver up Hannibal to the Romans.

Hannibal

Hannibal had been vanquished some time before in a naval engagement, and this ill success having utterly ruined him in the good graces of Antiochus, he expected to be given up to the demands of the Romans, against all the laws of hospitality; he had therefore taken care to provide himself an asylum, and moved off before they could secure him, and withdrew to the court of Prusias. This illustrious unfortunate, banished from his own country for having wished to restore its glory, persecuted by the Romans, who would hardly suffer him to find a place of refuge, dreaded by Rome, esteemed every where, and betrayed continually by those who pretended to be his most faithful friends, wandered long in the world without any fixed abode, until at last he had recourse to poison to free himself from the persecution of the Romans, to whom Prusias, while he was loading him with marks of favour, and receiving the most important services from him, was ready to betray him by a sacrifice invaluable in the eyes of that haughty and jealous people.

The troubles of Asia being thus settled by the defeat of Antiochus,* and by the treaty concluded with him, the two brothers returned to Rome, where Africanus had the pleasure of hearing Lucius, in the midst of the pomp of triumph, saluted with the surname of Asiaticus: the honour of being denominated from the two quarters of the world they had subjected to the republic, being, if I may use the expression, reserved for the family of the Scipio's. This triumphal entry was set off with all the spoils of Asia, and
cost

* Anno R. 563. Ante C. 189.

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cost the state only a single victory, for which solemn thanksgivings to the gods were ordained.

Scipio had great satisfaction in beholding his brother's glory, and did not fail to attribute to him the whole success of the war. More worthy of admiration for his modesty, than of applause for the vast advantages he had gained for his country, Rome to recompense him for the sacrifice he had made his brother, by serving under him as the consul's lieutenant, conferred on him again the highest dignity of the republic; by the unanimous voice of all orders of nobility and commons he was declared Prince of the senate a second time.

The honours the Romans were so eager to heap on him, revived in peace the jealousy of those who envied him, whom the fame of his victories kept silent while he was at the head of the army. This implacable vice, which takes fire and is provoked at the most perfect assemblage of virtues, disturbed with her envenomed darts the joys which Scipio tasted in the bosom of his country and family, equally carested by most part both of the plebeians and senators.

Marcus Portius Cato who had ever been a zealous partizan of Fabius Maximus, and an admirer of the simple austere manners of that famous dictator, inherited his prepossessions and animosity against Scipio, who attracted the attention of almost all the people and senate; jealousy insensibly betrayed him into injustice in his harangues, injustice gave birth to reprisals, and reprisals to a desire of revenge; and this desire was soon followed by hatred, which other envious enemies of inferior rank took care to excite. Scipio's new
dignity

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dignity united them in a determination of leaving nothing unattempted to ruin him.

Cato had been long ago incensed against Scipio. He commanded in Spain when Scipio, by the favour of the people, was placed at the head of the affairs of that province;* he could never forgive his having robbed him of so fair an occasion to distinguish himself; he esteemed all his future victories over the Carthaginians in Spain, as so many laurels snatched out of his hands.

Some time after, being questor in the army which Scipio led into Sicily, instigated by his own narrowness of soul, we have seen how loudly he condemned the young general's liberality; he did not consider that the conduct he blamed might at times be very usefully pursued to the advantage of the republic. He resigned the questorship to return to Rome, and join Fabius Maximus in soliciting the recall of Scipio, whom he accused of being a dissipater of the public money. The happy conclusion of the war in Africa, instead of reconciling him to the conqueror of Carthage, only exasperated him the more; the glory of *his* expedition into Asia completed his aversion; for all the great advantages these two victories procured to Rome, Cato, more a slave to his passions than zealous for the public good, was a constant declared enemy to the greatest benefactor of his country.

His jealousy of his rival, who had always got the better of him, made him hold all the honours Rome conferred upon Scipio as so many affronts to himself; he never ceased declaiming against the extravagance of this hero. In the army he endeavoured on all occasions to take from his fame
by

* An. R. 564. Ante C. 188.

by every possible means, and employed himself constantly in raising him enemies, who were so considerable as to enable him to attack him with success; he was, above all, careful to represent Scipio to the plebeans as a proud patrician, whose insatiable ambition, supported by the power of the senate, and the valour of the troops, might perhaps tempt him to think of raising himself by degrees to the sovereign authority.

He prevailed with the two Petilii, who were at this time tribunes of the people, to enter into his views; he made them apprehensive of danger to the republic by servilely paying court to them; and by constantly exciting suspicions of Scipio's power, he made them the instruments of his hatred and resentment. He did not take so much pains to gain Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, who was also tribune that same year; Sempronius had an old quarrel with Scipio, and Cato made no doubt but that would be sufficient to induce him to support the Petilii in their endeavours to humble so glorious an enemy. The Petilii however were enough for his purpose; he made such good use of his practices, his eloquence, and the jealousy he raised in them, that they no longer thought it necessary to keep any terms with Scipio.

These daring magistrates, naturally inimical to the senate, and above all to the most distinguished patricians, inflamed by Cato's continual solicitations, had the folly and audacity to cite the famous conqueror of Africa, and summon him to appear at their tribunal, to render an account of his conduct in the presence of the people, and chiefly to purge himself from a charge of having embezzled large sums, they alledged he had received

ceived from Antiochus, and not returned into the public treasury.

The senate beheld with indignation this attack of the tribunes; they reproached Rome with the same ingratitude to Scipio as Carthage had shewn to Hannibal; much less excusable on the part of the Romans, as Scipio had gained that glorious victory which loaded his country with wealth and honour; Hannibal on the contrary having with his defeat brought on the ruin of Carthage. All intelligent persons who knew how to value true merit, saw with horror the greatest man in the republic about to be sacrificed, by the influence of the tribunes, to the unjust animosity of a few whom envy at his successes had made his enemies.

The tribunes, on the other hand, asserted that no citizen in a republic ought to think himself above the laws; that the most distinguished by his exploits was bound to shew the greatest submission to them; that appearing before them could not make him guilty. If Scipio's pride led him to disobedience, they should set an example in his person by obliging him to submit to the citation.

The town was thus divided into two factions; that of the senators, who were shocked at the disgrace that threatened a consular, who had been twice Prince of the senate; and that of the people, who were always delighted with having it in their power to humble the patricians, in whatever was the most respectable and admired amongst them. The whole united senate, after the strongest remonstrances, were not able to bring the multitude, prepossessed by the violent harangues of the tribunes, and seduced by the artful intrigues of Cato, who had engaged the most considerable and powerful in his interest, to a just moderation.

moderation. Scipio, with almost as many friends as there were senators in Rome, could not obtain from the commons a dispensation for appearing before the tribunes.

The senate alarmed, and fearing lest some neglect on Scipio's part might give colour for the accusations of the tribunes, chose themselves to examine the accounts of the war in Asia, and the application of the sums paid by Antiochus.

Lucius Scipio had hastily prepared a most minute and exact state of the receipts and disbursements of that war, from whence might be seen at one glance the injustice of the charge brought against his brother; but Africanus, enraged that he should be miserably reduced to the meanness of an explanation, snatched the state of the account out of his brother's hands as he presented it to the senate, and not without some warmth tore it in pieces; preferring, if it must be so, rather to appear culpable in the eyes of some, than descend so low as to prove his innocence.*

If it seems extraordinary that Scipio Africanus was attacked in this business and not the consul his brother, who had the chief command, and to whom he only acted as lieutenant, it was because the opinion all the princes of Asia, and Antiochus in particular, had of him, induced them to apply to him in preference to his brother; his great reputation gaining him an authority superior even to that of the consul.

All possible delays of the summons being expired, the important day in which those arrogant magistrates of the commons were to sit in judgment on the conqueror of Spain and Africa, the

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vanquisher

* An. R. 565. Ante C. 187.

vanquisher of Hannibal, and the deliverer of Rome, at last arrived.

Never was Scipio, censor, consul, or prince of the senate, so well attended as Scipio accused. He appeared in the Forum, and the people keeping a profound silence as soon as they perceived him, he made an oration, in which he related the services he had been so happy as to do the republic in the several posts he had filled. The consul his father rescued by him, while but a boy, out of the hands of the enemy; the principal men of the republic, about to abandon Italy on the loss of the battle of Cannæ, encouraged by his discourse and example, and collected together by his care; the Carthaginians driven out of Spain, which he had recovered; Hannibal forced to quit Italy by his advice being followed, and soon after conquered in Africa; Carthage from a rival now made a tributary to Rome, by the success of his arms; in a word, every thing he had done for this ungrateful people was recounted to them. With respect to the account demanded of him, persuaded that for one of his character to undertake to justify himself from so mean a crime, was in a manner to acknowledge it, he said not a word about it. The esteem they had for him, the truth of what he advanced, the disagreeable situation he was in, induced them to attend with pleasure to the eulogium he was forced to pronounce on his own actions and continual labours. They were acquainted with his modesty, and convinced that he was not moved by vanity, but a desire of avoiding with credit a most ignominious affront they saw him threatened with.

The tribunes alone, ever steady in their persecution, were not touched with these affecting discourses.

courses. They, in their turn, related the revolt of the troops at Sucrona, occasioned by Scipio's too great indulgence; the licentiousness of those at Syracuse, which was carried so far as to despise the orders of the senate; the violences and cruelties of Pleminius, whom Scipio not only made governor of Locri, but restored malgré the sufferings and complaints of the Locrians, who could find no relief but in the authority of the senate. They added, that Antiochus would hardly have restored his son without ransom, had he not had particular reasons for so doing; that this prince addressed himself to him only during his negotiation, looking upon him as the arbiter of the interests of the republic. They lastly asserted, that Scipio had not made the campaign of Asia as his brother's lieutenant, but rather as if he had been invested with the sovereign dictatorship; that he arrogated to himself alone the authority both of senate and people; that his bare wishes were decrees; that doubtless he esteemed his country too happy in reposing under the shade of his laurels; and that by the management of his ambition, Rome herself triumphant, and mistress of the world, was less known than the name of her general.

It was by means of these artful harangues the tribunes laboured to gain the assembly to their party. How eager soever their desire to ruin Scipio was, they durst not attack his reputation, and applied themselves wholly to raising that jealousy, the high consideration he was held in would naturally excite. Concerning the sums they charged him with embezzling, they produced only vague and uncertain conjectures, without one positive proof to support them. The day was thus worn out in violent speeches from the tribunes, without

being able to provoke Scipio to plead to the accusation; and the assembly of the people being adjourned and convoked for the next day, the meeting was prorogued without giving judgment.

Scipio indifferent about his own conduct, was not so with regard to the severity and ingratitude of the Roman people; he was an example to posterity of the excess to which it might be carried, and it would perhaps otherwise never have been believed that the firmest pillar of the republic might fall a sacrifice, though ever so innocent, to the seditious jealousies with which the demagogues of Rome were able to inspire the people, and draw them into their measures. The whole city was in the greatest agitation; Scipio's relations and friends went through the streets and houses, to demonstrate to the least violent the dishonour Scipio's condemnation would bring upon their country; that *his* name would suffer much less by this abominable plebiscite than the name of Rome, which would be for ever reproached with having so ungratefully treated her deliverer; that among Scipio's virtues his disinterestedness had shone on all occasions above the rest. From remonstrances they proceeded to intreaties; the whole senate, who esteemed Scipio's cause as their own, implored it as a favour of the people not to cast so foul a stain on one of the most illustrious patrician families, which had at all times deserved so well of the republic. They gave the most solemn assurances that the senators would never forget this complaisance in the people, and that they would on all occasions shew their gratitude. They added, that the ambitious views with which Scipio's adversaries charged him, were incompatible with that

love

love of justice and his country which they could not deny him.

The plot was well laid and deep; Cato and the Petilii had prepossest the minds and hardened the hearts of all. The day being come, the Forum was crouded at the first dawn with an infinite conflux of people; the tribunes renewed their harangues and cabals, and the patricians continued to solicit for Scipio. He arrived in the height of this tumultuous debate, that divided the whole assembly, and was attended by his friends and clients, who would never leave him lest the tribunes should attempt to seize his person. Every one was interested in the event, either from the part they espoused or mere curiosity. The tribunes had prepared refutations of the answers of this illustrious object of their accusations, firmly determined to treat him with the last severity, and to exhibit in his case a notable precedent of the power their office gave them over the first men of the republic.

Scipio without the least emotion mounted the rostrum, and from thence, with that air of dignity and confidence which innocence and superior virtue alone are able to inspire, and which he preserved in the midst of the greatest dangers, beheld his associates with that mild and majestic countenance which was natural to him. "Romans," says he, "and ye tribunes, I recollect that on such a day as this I had the happiness to gain, by the defeat of Hannibal, the celebrated victory of Zama, which subjected the Carthaginians to the Roman republic. The gratitude due from us to the gods for so signal a blessing, ought to take place of all private quarrels and dissensions; I therefore think we should first go to the capitol to return solemn thanksgivings to

“ Jupiter, to Juno, to Minerva, and all the gods;
 “ I shall in particular be thankful that they have
 “ supplied me with courage and opportunities to
 “ be serviceable to my country on several occasions;
 “ sions; I beseech the whole assembly to follow
 “ me in so devout an act, and to come and pray
 “ with me to heaven, to give you ever such generals
 “ as myself: if from my twenty-seventh
 “ year to this day, when I begin to border upon
 “ old age, you have without ceasing distinguished
 “ me by the highest honours; recollect, Romans,
 “ that my actions have always distinguished me
 “ first, and that your honours only followed as
 “ rewards.”

At these words he descended from the rostrum and repaired to the capitol. The people and the senate, equally struck with the novelty and grandeur of this answer, the only one he deigned to give his accusers, followed him in crowds to the capitol, and afterwards through all the temples in the city. The tribunes were deserted by every body, and remained alone with their lictors, and a crier continuing to cite to their tribunal Scipio, who was no longer within hearing.

If we reflect on this event, we shall find it decisive of the constitution of the republic. The instant for a revolution being come, it only depended on Scipio's taking advantage of it. All the orders of the state sacrificed to him their magistrates and their liberty, and put themselves entirely in his power. Fabius's party, that is, the advocates for the manners of ancient Rome, constantly kept up and encouraged by Cato and his followers, must have thought themselves undone. Happy under the command of Scipio in war, under his administration in peace, and at all times

in the effects of his prudence and conquests, the Romans consented to be slaves to their good fortune, and seemed eager to surrender their empire to him to whom they owed it. But Scipio never aspired higher than to polish, to soften, and enlighten his country by introducing a taste for pleasures the most civilised, and noble in the eyes of heathens, those of public shews and literature, whose rise and origin may be referred to his age. He never lost sight of the love of liberty, although he changed the spirit of the government; and he might perhaps have found means to make the change consistent with republican freedom, had he not given up the management of affairs. He pointed out to Sylla, to Marius, to Cataline, and to Cæsar, the art of usurping absolute power over a people who seemed born to submit to no master but the laws; as for himself he would never have usurped it, as we have seen he would not even accept of it. But such and so great was his love and zeal for the republic, that he remained true to it in opposition to those who abandoned it in his favour.

This victory which he so gloriously gained over his enemies, perhaps gave him a more sensible pleasure than he derived from the fame of all his triumphs and conquests, he owed it solely to the love and esteem of good men.

This day, says Livy, was the last of Scipio's bright ones. The success of his proceeding had so irritated the tribunes against him, that for all the purity of his heart he had nothing to expect but a most rigid condemnation. Besides, in the two assemblies held for his justification, he would not condescend to enter into the detail of this matter; a noble pride made him esteem this con-

descension beneath him. He was undoubtedly persuaded, that virtue, which he possessed in an eminent degree, was insulted by an attempt to justify, and that his silence would plead more powerfully in his behalf than the most forceable and brilliant eloquence. Perhaps too, he was fearful of entering the lists, lest the people, who were weak enough to harbour a suspicion of him, might be so desperate as to reject the arguments and proofs he might bring in his justification.

The day therefore drawing to an end, when he had gone through all the temples of Rome, he determined to leave the city and go into voluntary exile. His friends in vain endeavoured to restrain him, by representing the conclusions the Tribunes would draw from his withdrawing. He was acquainted with the temper of the Roman people, susceptible of the most opposite impressions; he knew that the very persons who had marched that day after him through the whole town, were unsteady enough to condemn him on the morrow. He therefore tore himself from the hands of his relations and friends, assuring them of his most affectionate remembrance; and mingling his sighs with their lamentations, he quitted the base, the ungrateful city of Rome, which he had saved, had enriched, had avenged, and covered with glory, and which, in return, was about to refuse him an asylum in her bosom! On leaving the town, he took the road to Linternum, a small village on the sea-shore near Gaeta, about thirty leagues East of Rome, where he had a country house; his family, his clients, every honest citizen of Rome, the senate in a body, followed him a long time, watering his steps with their tears. The loss the republic was going to
suffer

suffer in the retreat of her most glorious citizen, merited the tears that were shed; nor was it but with the regret of the most affectionate child that Scipio departed from those beloved walls, for whose safety and honour he had passed his whole life in wars and combats; and which contained all that was most dear to him, his wife and family. But the assurance and animosity of the tribunes, the credit of the envious faction, the easy belief the Roman people had given, without any examination, to the suspicions insinuated against his probity, reduced him to the unhappy necessity of abandoning the city, the most fertile in the world in great men, the most susceptible of alarms at the greatness they rose to, and the most ungrateful for the services done her. The Coriolani, the Camilli, all in Rome who had ever been most illustrious before him, had paved the mournful path into which he was entered; he surpassed them in the glory of his life only to be on a level with them in the disgrace of a banishment, into which they had been driven with equal injustice.

The second day of the citation having passed without Scipio appearing, his brother Lucius attributed his absence to a fever which had seized him. The tribunes, far from admitting this excuse, charged Scipio afresh with insupportable haughtiness: "This it was," said they, "which induced him to quit our tribunal and draw away the people with him; this led him to presume that he was not made to justify himself. In thus forcing you to follow him, in thus tearing you, as we may say, from your tribunes, his intention was not so much to withdraw himself from our authority, as to triumph completely over all Rome, even in the capitol. You de-
 " fected

“ ferted your tribunes, he in his turn abandons
 “ you; you have but too well deserved it of him.
 “ What, pray, is the weakness of government at
 “ present? You had the courage a few years
 “ since, to send the pretor of the province with
 “ commissioners instructed to arrest, at the head
 “ of his army, this same Scipio, if he was found
 “ culpable; dare ye not then send to seize him at
 “ his country seat, where he is alone, and with-
 “ out defence, and force him to give you an ac-
 “ count of his conduct?”

The result of these bitter harangues was, that
 if Scipio was really ill, they should wait and put
 off his trial till his health was restored, and that
 the assembly should be prorogued till then. All
 the tribunes signed this decree except Tiberius
 Sempronius Gracchus, who openly refused to set
 his name to it. As his particular enmity to Scipio
 was well known, it was supposed he meant to add
 still to the rigour of his colleagues; but the ge-
 nerosous tribune, laying aside the private quarrel
 he had with Scipio, and sacrificing his hatred to
 the virtue of that great man, said, to the amaze-
 ment of all, “ That since Lucius Scipio gave his
 “ word that his brother was sick, the tribunes
 “ ought not to push the affair any farther; that
 “ they had already carried it too far against so re-
 “ spectable a citizen. I *forbid* (veto)”* added
 he, elevating his voice (a word of most sacred
 and inviolable authority in the mouth of a tri-
 bune) “ I *forbid* (veto) any farther process a-
 “ gainst Scipio until his return to Rome; and if
 “ he chuses to have recourse to the power I am
 “ by my office invested with, to obtain a dispen-
 “ sation from pleading his cause before the peo-
 “ ple,

* Livy.

“ ple, I now inform you I am ready to grant it,
 “ and shall ever esteem it an honour to undertake
 “ his defence.”

He then added to the opposition he had made to the decree of the tribunes, such reproaches as their injustice and violence merited. “ Ye design for Publius Scipio,” says he to them, “ a recompence well worthy of the fatigues he has undergone, and the services he has done his country ! It was, doubtless, that he might become the fable and laughing stock of senseless youth; it was to appear before you as the vilest criminal; it was to furnish you with matter for a glorious triumph over the senate, that he took Syphax prisoner, that he vanquished Hannibal, that he forced Carthage to pay tribute to the republic; it was to sink at last under the prosecution of the Petilii, that he afterwards carried his conquests into Asia, and subjected Antiochus and his dominions to the Roman people in the space of one short campaign. And is it possible, citizens, that such vast exploits of immortal glory, such high honours as your well-judged gratitude has conferred on this great man, should not be a sufficient defence against the attacks of his envious enemies? Respect at last the remains of the life of a citizen, so highly deserving, or at least forbear to attack his age with such sensible strokes, by no means so dishonourable to him, as they are shameful to the whole nation.”

Sempronius's discourse produced the desired effect; the tribunes reflected, and began to see the horror of the conduct into which a blind compliance with Cato's schemes had hurried them; they answered Sempronius that they would
 examine

examine, without loss of time, what was proper to be done in the present state of things, and instantly broke up the assembly of the people, which they dissolved.

The senate gave Sempronius the most flattering testimonies of gratitude for the signal service he had done in interposing his authority in favour of Scipio. This action did the tribune the more honour, as being a declared enemy to Scipio it was the less expected of him. The senators loaded him with praises, and thanked him in the highest terms, for having had a soul capable of rising above personal quarrels, and having so nobly taken up the interests, and preserved the honour of the republic.

Scipio on his part, who could not bear to be outdone in generosity, returned the obligations he owed Sempronius in the most striking manner. He gave his daughter in marriage to the generous tribune, who, though a plebeian, entered by this alliance into one of the most distinguished houses of the senate. On the one part, it was a recompence worthy of such heroic impartiality; and on the other, Scipio pretended to do honour to his daughter in giving her in marriage to so virtuous a citizen,* of so much consideration in the republic for his probity, and who had acquired so much glory.

Scipio did not return to Rome after he had once taken leave of it; the republic not having any dangerous enemy on her hands, he was not willing to give occasion to those who had accused him of an immoderate ambition. He passed the remainder of his life at Linternum, absolutely sequestered from all public business, occupied
either

* Plut. in Vit. Emilie.

either in the study of morality, or in the practice of domestic virtues among his family and friends; amused by literary researches, and by the various pleasures of a country life; sometimes in the ease of solitude, and sometimes in the conversation of a few select friends, consisted from henceforth all his happiness. He never grew tired of his retreat at Linternum; Livy says more, he assures us that he did not even regret leaving Rome. The delights of a leisure so full of dignity, as that in which he passed his latter years, was sufficient to enable him to forget all the past.

The perusal of the works of Xenophon always afforded him new pleasure;* he had them ever in his hands. The fatigues he had borne with such constancy, and concealed under an air of tranquillity, nay even of gaiety, came often to his recollection: It seems as if reflecting upon them, he had sought to discover the motive which had been strong enough to determine him to face them. He found it out in the Greek historian, and observed how well he knew the human heart by the explanation he had given. "Fatigue and labour, says he, "are not the same to the general and the soldier; the honour of the command takes off the whole weight of the burthen."

A man puffed up with glory and prosperity, appeared to this philosophic warrior, to resemble those hot fiery steeds which shew a kind of fierce liveliness when you are about to mount them.— "They must be tamed," he would say, "before they can be used. Thus it is," added he, "that experience brings these vain and haughty men to reason, teaches them to know the world, " and

“ and to perceive the emptiness of greatness, and
 “ the fickleness of fortune.”

Plutarch in commending Cato for his unwearyed application to the affairs of government, seems to blame Scipio for having abandoned them in his exile; but Cato, by nature active, restless, and firm, obstinately persevered in all his purposes. Scipio naturally gentle, and fond of tranquillity, ceased to be anxious about fame as soon as he had discovered how little it was worth: he had done all to secure it that could be expected from the greatest steadiness: he judged it more prudent to give way to the people than to force the people to submit to him: he would have divided the two orders of the republic by residing at Rome: This division might perhaps appear to him to be the seed of perpetual seditions. The people could never forgive him the disgrace he had brought upon the plebeian order, by appropriating particular seats to the senators and patrician families at the public shews. The senate and nobility held this distinction to be so wise, that nothing could prevail with them to give it up; and they maintained it at all times most rigidly. From this principle proceeded the rage of the tribunes to judge Scipio. The art of flatter-
 ing, of supporting, and justifying the most absurd caprices of the people, was the usual means by which they obtained their credit and consequence. We have seen how difficult it was to prevail with them to drop their prosecutions. The senate had combated their animosity with so much courage and intrepidity, when Scipio was cited to appear before the people, that this great man had reason to be apprehensive of dividing the nation if he returned to Rome, where his residence would cer-
 tainly

tainly have produced dangerous effects. Such extremes were less consistent with the rules of prudence than with the character of Scipio. Plutarch therefore might have praised Cato without casting reflections upon Scipio; to whom his own taste, the necessity of the times, the temper of his countrymen, at the bottom still the same tho' much softened and corrected, left no choice but retreat.

Scipio had three children by Emilia, the daughter of the famous Paulus Emilius; one son, of whose life we are totally ignorant; and as to the cause of this obscurity, the disgrace of his father might have damped in him all desire of aspiring at honours and dignities, favours more dangerous in Rome in proportion as a man was more deserving of them; or perhaps living with his father at Linternum, he might acquire a habit and taste for a private retired life, and keep ever at a distance from business: however it was, he is known in history only by its silence with regard to him, and by the adoption of Scipio Emilius.

The elder of Scipio's daughters was married to Publius Scipio, surnamed Nasica, son to Cneus Scipio, killed in Spain; and the younger, named Cornelia, espoused, as I have already said, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, tribune of the people. Among the historians some say that it was in the life-time of her father, and others that it was not till after his death. Livy does not determine this point; some of those who assert that it was while her father was living, give the following account of the marriage.

The malice of Scipio's enemies pursuing after his exile his brother Lucius, had nearly ruined him. Publius informed of it, returned to Rome

to succour and defend him; on his arrival in town he met him in the hands of the lictors, who were conducting him to prison on a charge of peculation. Scipio, full of indignation, stopped them, and protested he would die rather than suffer so cruel and unjust an affront to be offered to his family. The lictor persisted in obeying the plebiscite of the tribunes, when Sempronius interposed and delivered Scipio. Publius supped that night in the capitol with the senate, which was assembled to receive him: some senators demanding of him his daughter for Sempronius, he consented to it. On his return to his wife he informed her that he had promised his daughter in marriage. Too sensible of the little confidence her husband seemed to have in her, Emilia answered hastily, that she would never give her assent to a match upon which she had not been consulted; "even" "though Tiberius Gracchus were the person intended for my daughter," added she, "it would" "be impossible for me to agree to it." He is the very man said Scipio to her, delighted she should think as well as himself, that in their present circumstances, he was the Roman the most deserving of their daughter. Certain it is however, that this daughter, the famous Cornelia, espoused Tiberius Gracchus, and that she brought him two sons, as noted for their courage and misfortunes as their mother was for her greatness of soul.

An occasion as pressing as the disgrace of Lucius Scipio, was necessary to draw his brother from his retreat; the short stay he made at Rome confirmed him in the preference he had given to Linternum. Cato constantly defended with obstinacy the ancient spirit of the Romans; he fancied the
virtue

virtue of Rome, poor and weak, might still subsist in Rome opulent, and mistress of so many nations; not considering that the changes, which had happened in the state of the republic, must necessarily bring with them a change of manners. Cato, in short, knew not how to yield to the necessity of the times; Scipio, on the contrary, naturally accommodated himself to circumstances. The calm he enjoyed at Linternum, without giving up his manner of thinking, appeared to him preferable to the storm of troubles he must have raised, had he attempted to establish his system at Rome. Cato gained nothing by constraining and forcing the spirit of the nation. Scipio prevailed by suffering this spirit to follow the inclination it would naturally take in the present condition of the republic. What is clear from history, is, that Cato's austerity made no progress; and that under Scipio Emilius, who was adopted by the son of Scipio the Great, arts, learning, and the sciences, appeared at Rome with a brilliancy which foretold the perfection they arrived at under Augustus. This was the fruit of the spirit of Africanus, which had descended through his son to his adopted grandson: This was the proper spirit of Rome civilized and enriched. Peace and plenty always promote the progress of arts, letters and science; and their cultivation necessarily produces their perfection. Thus it is that the most powerful and enlightened nations of Europe think at present; and thus it was that Scipio thought, when his country had acquired a degree of power much superior to what any of these nations enjoy; whence we may draw this conclusion, that the government which will take pains to excel its neighbours as much in purity of manners as

in arts and sciences, will be able to attain to the highest pitch of power. If these objects, distinct in their natures, are confounded together, or if attention is given to one, at the expence of the other, the fault will not be in them but in the government only.

Scipio consoled himself in his disgrace with the comforts of a retired life; but he did not lose the remembrance of it. The resentment he felt for the outrages his services had been repaid with, lasted even to his death, which happened about twelve years after his leaving Rome. His last wishes were a proof of it; he ordered a tomb to be erected for him at Linternum, "That thou, ungrateful country," as Livy makes him say, when he was dying, "mayest be deprived of the honour of my obsequies.*"

This resentment roused afresh the inveteracy and rage of envy against him, and his whole house. The people, ever violent in their affections, would have created him consul and perpetual dictator; Scipio remonstrated so strongly against it, that the proposers of the scheme were punished. They would have raised statues to him in the forum and the temples close to those of Jupiter, but he constantly opposed it. They moved that his portrait, painted with all the ornaments of a triumpher, and placed in the temple of Jupiter, should be solemnly carried through the whole city. His moderation alone prevented his receiving these honours; thus, as has been since observed by Mr. St. Evremont, did the corrupter of the manners of his country continue always free from corruption. But to change the manners when such a change is become necessary, is that

* Anno. R. 570. Ante C. 182.

to corrupt them? And who can say what use Scipio might have made of these changes, had the republic permitted him to carry them to the end he proposed?

The zeal and respect of the people, so often merited, and expressed, was at his death converted into indignation and rage. It was customary at Rome to deliver in public the eulogium of great men after their death. This wise practice, multiplied, if I may be allowed the expression, the effect of their virtues, by giving a fresh view of them in a circumstance the most likely to render the impression more lively and affecting. The blind rage of envy ranked amongst citizens, who had forfeited their privileges, the vanquisher of Hannibal, the preserver of Rome, and the conqueror of Carthage! The meanest patrician was honoured at his death with a funeral oration.—Scipio the Great was refused this compliment by an order of government, which reflected disgrace only on its authors. All who had a just esteem for talents and virtue, indemnified Scipio, by their open expressions of concern for this outrage of his country. The day in which the account of his death reached Rome, was a day of general mourning; it was so justly due to a citizen, who had raised the glory and power of Rome to a height it had never before attained, that the very persons who forbid rendering his name due honour, could not help mingling their tears with those of the public.

Pliny relates that he saw at Linternum the tomb of this great man, and that it passed for a truth, that a dragon constantly guarded it. Thus does ancient history disfigure the plain fact by the false marvelous, invented only to amuse the vulgar.

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The same author adds, that they still shewed, in his time, olives planted by Scipio's hand, and a myrtle of extraordinary beauty, which he had set; circumstances which prove how much the idea of greatness which great men communicate to every thing, interests the curiosity or rather the vanity of mankind.

There was another tomb for Scipio at Rome, raised undoubtedly to him by his family, in happier times. It is well known that great men have experienced more persecution in republics than in other governments; but sooner or later the time of doing justice to their characters arrives. If no people was more capable of feeling this virtuous recompence than the Romans, the memory also of no one was more likely to inspire it than the memory of Scipio.

REFLECTIONS

R E F L E C T I O N S

*On the different Characters and Success of
Scipio and Hannibal.*

ALTHOUGH the leading circumstances in the life of Scipio give it a great resemblance to that of Hannibal, there was nevertheless a great difference between them in the means they employed to attain the end they proposed; and to this we must attribute the various successes which made the good or ill fortune both of the one and the other.

Each formed by nature with dispositions the most favourable to the talents which form illustrious men, was signalized from his youth by actions the most brilliant. Hannibal in swearing from his infancy, on the altars, an implacable hatred to the Romans; Scipio in swearing at Canusium, sword in hand, not only that he would for ever defend the republic, but moreover that he would not suffer a single citizen to desert her.

Both formed the most vast and difficult projects, and met, in their several states, with the same obstacles to surmount in the execution of them. Hanno, the senator of the greatest weight in the council of Carthage, never ceased to cross Hannibal, and at the head of a powerful faction to reject all his demands. Scipio met with an adversary equally powerful in the person of Fabius Maximus, who absolutely condemned as rash and hazardous the passage of the Romans into Africa; and he had occasion for all his good sense, eloquence, and firmness, to bring the senate to consent to his scheme.

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They

They both joined to the valour and intrepidity of the soldier, the ability, the depth, the extent of genius which form the accomplished general. Both the one and the other possessed the military science in the highest degree; each excelled in the art of making brave soldiers and able officers, and of inspiring them with the love of discipline, a passion for glory, a great confidence, a firm and constant courage, and a strong emulation, which raised them above the fear of danger.

Hannibal in this important point seems to excel the Roman general. Scipio was never in want of troops, and the most part consisted of Roman legions, warriors by choice and habit. Hannibal, on the contrary, able to draw but small supplies from Carthage, would soon have found himself without an army, had he not had the address to renew his own in the countries he conquered. Men the most clownish, the dullest, and most incapable of instruction, collected from various nations, who agreed neither in manners, discipline, nor even in language, became under him invincible soldiers; and with such it was that he obtained the victories of Trebia and Cannæ, over the most warlike people in the universe. Possibly he might have beat Scipio, had he been assisted by as good troops as the Romans.

Both were from their youth placed at the head of the armies of their country; but their conduct in that station was in every respect totally different.

The bright talents for war, which each possessed in the highest degree, were eclipsed in Hannibal by several vices; in Scipio, on the contrary, all the virtues of a good citizen rendered him superior, and seem more than sufficient to counterbalance the advantage Hannibal had over him

in some few particulars of the military art, in which he excelled Scipio.

Hannibal by not pursuing the advantages he might have reaped from the defeat of the Romans at Cannæ, shewed that he only knew how to conquer. Scipio, after having vanquished Syphax and taken him prisoner, after having gained the celebrated battle of Zama, proved, in forcing Carthage to receive the law from the Roman republic, that he knew equally how to conquer, and to make the most of his victory.

Hannibal owed part of his success to stratagem, to artifice, to deceit, and treachery. Scipio acquired his only by open force, aided by his good sense and religious exactness in adhering to his treaties.

Hannibal often procured creatures and friends, by promising more than he was able to perform. Scipio in his returns to his allies always exceeded his engagements.

Hannibal, a dangerous enemy, was also as dangerous a friend; as he shewed when he forced those brave Italians, who had so long and so courageously served him, to perish in the flames, because they refused to attend him into Africa. Scipio after a victory became as sincere and firm a friend as he had been a formidable enemy before.

Scipio, born in a nation rigidly attached to a superstitious worship of its imaginary deities, never failed to pay apparent respect to the forms of the religion of his country and his ancestors, though perhaps he knew how weak and ridiculous they were. Hannibal, in his passion, regarded neither religion nor the gods, whose temples he more than once profaned.

Hannibal, fierce, haughty, severe even to cruelty, aimed not at the esteem of his soldiers, satisfied if he inspired them with sentiments of fear. Scipio, mild, indulgent, liberal, and popular, spared nothing to win the hearts of his men, and eagerly seized on all occasions of making them love him.

Scipio, as appeared after his death, was unjustly suspected of having given way to a passion for money. Hannibal, on the other hand, had amassed vast riches, as is evident by the stratagem he employed to save them from the rapacity of the inhabitants of the isle of Candia, by concealing them in the bodies of the statues of the gods with which he landed on that island.

Both had the mortification to die out of the capital of their republic; one in a voluntary banishment, the other in a rigorous exile. But envy alone obliged Scipio to leave Rome without being on that account the less beloved or esteemed by all worthy men; though absent from Rome he was universally honoured there, and ended his days by a natural death in the midst of his family and friends, who mingled with his last groans the most unfeigned grief and sincere tears. On the contrary, in the latter years of Hannibal, his great miseries exceeded all the former favours of fortune; he could not find a place of safety on the whole earth. Dreaded and hated by his fellow citizens, and ever suspected by the princes who afforded him shelter in their dominions, he was at last constrained to deliver himself from the plague of preserving a life, become almost as irksome to himself as to his enemies, and to be his own executioner by poison! ---a deplorable end, from which

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one would think his great name would have been sufficient to preserve him.

Historians in agreeing that Hannibal never shewed more judgment before an action than at the battle of Zama, more attention whilst in it, or more eloquence in encouraging his troops, pay the highest compliment possible to his conqueror; since, as he gained the victory, they allowed him to have been yet a greater and more able commander. But they did not attend to the superior valour of the Roman officers and soldiers, a superiority which must insensibly procure the success which is too often attributed solely and unjustly to the conduct of the general.

The quality in which Scipio particularly excelled Hannibal, was the art of gaining the love and esteem of his officers and soldiers, which Hannibal knew nothing of; but this was not so much the effect of address in Scipio as of a mild and placable temper, and an innate disposition to justice and benevolence; a natural character which Hannibal was not blessed with: for it is inconceivable how much, on certain decisive occasions, the love and admiration of mankind for great and eminent virtues will effect.

It may perhaps be asked, how, with so many fine qualities, Scipio had such violent and illustrious adversaries to persecute him at home? how he could be publicly reproached with haughtiness and a contempt of others? There is room to presume that he was not sufficiently attentive in praising Fabius Maximus and Cato for the services they had done the republic; and that their several enemies exaggerated these inattentions of Scipio, and the revilings of Fabius, Cato, the Petilii, and the rest of the tribunes. This might be a fault in Scipio,

pio, but Hannibal's failings were much more considerable; there was no depending on his promises, he was covetous of riches, violent and unjust in his anger: it is not then to be wondered at, that the greatest faults and vices should draw upon him the heaviest disgraces, the most grievous miseries.

THE END OF THE THIRD BOOK.



NOTES.

N O T E S.

NOTE I. (a)

WHAT was the object of this conduct? To make superstition, the only religion of the ancients, contribute to the public good. But can this, in a political view, be looked upon as low trick and little design? Is it not rather an useful mean, and a necessary spring in the management of the vulgar? If Scipio had no greater faith in his religion than other intelligent men of his time, and to all appearance that was the case; if moreover he practised all its duties with a scrupulous exactness he ought not to be accused of impiety. Nevertheless M. Rollin, in the Roman history which he published about four years after the first edition of this work, condemns Scipio rather too hastily for not undeceiving the people, with respect to his marvellous birth, and the opinion prevalent at Rome, of his commerce with the gods. Thus M. Rollin brings in religion where Scipio meant only policy. Whatever high character his works may have obtained, I thought myself bound to follow Polybius, who commends this conduct, in preference to M. Rollin, who censures it.

NOTE

N O T E II. (b)

The Chevalier De Folard, so noted for his knowledge in the art military, thinks that the movement Scipio ordered his army to make in this battle, was totally different from what is related, owing either to some faults in the Greek impression, which the translators have followed, or perhaps to the technical terms of war in that language not being well understood at this distance of time. M. De Folard is positive they have not been able to make out the true sense of Polybius, who was too expert in war to give us a plan of battle so defective.

Take, in a few words, the critical remarks of this skilful officer, upon Scipio's movement in this battle, and the manner in which he explains it.

The Greek, Latin, and French texts say, that Scipio being at a very small distance from the enemy, caused his right wing to wheel briskly to the right, and the left to the left, in such a manner, that, as they say, the right by this means became the left, and the left marched to the right.

Two unanswerable reasons, says M. De Folard, make this movement absolutely incredible in the circumstances in which so great a general as Scipio then found himself.

The first is, the time which must necessarily have been too short to execute it in; Scipio could not suppose the enemy would allow it him. It would have been for Scipio in the face of the adverse army, to make his two wings cross the whole length of his line, which extended perhaps more than half a league.

The second reason is, that even allowing he had time sufficient to make this change in his order of battle, he

was

was not so ignorant as to expose his wings to be charged in flank, while they were marching from right to left, and from left to right, which could not but happen. The disorder this movement must necessarily occasion in the Roman army, would have given the Carthaginians too manifest an advantage for them to neglect availing themselves of it. These are the two inconveniencies which induce M. De Folard to suspect some mistakes in the description given of this battle in the Greek of Polybius, followed by Dom Thuillier in his translation.

M. De Folard explains the matter thus. Scipio had determined to engage in this battle with his wings only. His army was much inferior to the Carthaginian; but for all that he wished to get upon their flank, though their front was much more extensive than his. For this purpose he moved the left of the right and not the whole, to the right, and on the left wing he did the same. By this means the left of the right wing, which filed off in the rear, became the right, and the right of the left wing became the left, by going and taking post above those who were before at the extremities of the two wings. The void occasioned by this manœuvre, was immediately filled with some horse and light infantry; and thus, without being imprudently exposed, Scipio effected his purpose, in getting round the enemy, and charging them at once in flank and front. It is for men of the profession to judge of this explanation. In following it the Roman general's order of battle appears much more clear and probable; neither of the inconveniencies attending the other account occurs, he preserves both the character of the general, and of the historian, who were each of them too well versed in the art of war, the one
to

to make out his order of battle so injudiciously, and the other to describe it so imperfectly.

We may possibly one day or other see a much fuller explication of this affair, in the works with which the learned author of these remarks may hereafter favour the public. If I have thought it my duty to consult him in a matter which experience alone can enable us to comprehend, he has chearfully assisted me with the knowledge acquired by above forty years practice and study in the art of war.



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END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

E R R A T A.

Page 51, bottom, *for 517 read 537.*

Page 103, bottom, *for 435 read 543.*

Page 128, bottom, *for 456 read 546.*

